Strengthening Women’s Civic and Political Participation: A Synthesis of the Scholarly Literature

Research and Innovation Grants Working Papers Series

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In 2016, USAID’s Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance launched its Learning Agenda—a set of research questions designed to address the issues that confront staff in USAID field offices working on the intersection of development and democracy, human rights, and governance. This literature review, commissioned by USAID and the Institute for International Education, addresses two of those questions:

What are the most effective ways to encourage women’s civic (e.g., volunteer, advocacy, etc.) and political (e.g., voting, running for office) participation? What are the risks to women of these strategies in contexts where resistance to changing gender norms is strong?

The resulting literature review, conducted by graduate students and faculty at Wayne State University, will help to inform USAID’s strategic planning, project design, and in-service training efforts in the democracy, human rights, and governance sector. For more information about USAID’s work in this sector and the role of academic research within it, please see https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/organization/bureaus/bureau-democracy-conflict-and-humanitarian-assistance/center.
# Acronym List

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCT</td>
<td>Conditional Cash Transfer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIAO</td>
<td>Columbia International Affairs Online</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMLN</td>
<td>Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (El Salvador)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GABRIELA</td>
<td>General Assembly Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership, and Action (Philippines)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technologies</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGBTQIA</td>
<td>Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, Intersex, Asexual</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>PAIS</td>
<td>Public Affairs Information Services</td>
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<td>RAWA</td>
<td>Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan</td>
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<td>SES</td>
<td>Socio-Economic Status</td>
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<td>SGBV</td>
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<td>V-Dem</td>
<td>Varieties of Democracy</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report provides a multidisciplinary overview, assessment, and synthesis of current scholarship related to the question of what are the effective strategies for increasing women’s civic and political participation. The report is organized into three main sections:

1. What the scholarly literature says about how to understand the gender gap in women’s civic and political participation.
2. What the literature reveals about the effects—and possible risks—of various policies or strategies designed to increase women’s civic and political participation.
3. What we know about how these strategies work in contexts of strong resistance to changing gender norms.

A. Effects and Potential Risks of Strategies to Increase Women’s Participation

Policies or strategies to increase women’s civic and political participation that emerge in the literature include:

1. Using quotas to enhance women’s representation.
2. Using social media platforms to mobilize women and amplify their voices.
3. Targeting women as participants or beneficiaries of social programs.
4. Mobilizing women through their intersecting identities.

There is consensus in the literature that gender quotas improve descriptive and symbolic representation—in other words, increase the number of women in elected office and their visibility in those positions. Adoption of gender quotas and their effects in government branches other than the legislature are understudied and should be further examined. However, the literature shows that mandatory quotas are more effective than voluntary party quotas, and quotas for local-level office appear to have great potential to enhance women’s participation. Studies also indicate that when women participate in politics via quotas, they risk discrimination, friction with men in their surroundings, and higher workloads. In some cases, they also face threats to their physical security. These risks, combined with an uncertain likelihood that their participation will have positive policy outcomes that benefit women as a group, discourage women’s political participation.

The use of social media by women and feminists has emerged as a promising, strategic way to enhance women’s civic and political participation. This relatively new tool allows female candidates and politicians to bypass mainstream media and appeal directly to voters. However, as with conventional information and communication technologies (ICTs), using social media also can increase the risk of online abuse of women, which can result in gender-specific electoral and political violence. In addition, because of the digital divide in developing countries, future studies should empirically examine the benefits and dangers of using social media to empower and mobilize women, especially in these regions.

There is consensus in the literature that social programs that target women can increase their participation. By social programs, we mean programs run or mandated by the state or NGOs that are designed to involve citizens in aspects of governance or to improve the welfare of particular populations, sometimes on the condition that recipients participate in civic or health education programs or other community activities. However, the literature also highlights multiple limitations of social programs as a strategy for mobilizing women’s civic or political participation—specifically, the risk...
that women will opt out because of the “triple load” such programs can create, adding responsibilities to the program to women’s standing family duties and work duties, or because of social backlash that can become violent. To overcome the backlash to women who participate in social programs, implementers should analyze the risks and incorporate strategies to mitigate negative outcomes for women. Ideally, steps to mitigate backlash or the problem of the “triple load” should be developed before the program is implemented.

Finally, the literature reveals different ways in which women can be mobilized to participate through appeals to their intersecting identities. Specifically, there is evidence in the literature that “motherhood” frames are used to mobilize women in civil society while mitigating risk. In addition, studies also suggest that utilizing women’s identity as “workers” may be effective in helping women to mobilize to alleviate adverse working conditions.

B. Effects and Potential Risks in Contexts of Strong Resistance

Two streams of literature emerged that dealt with contexts of strong resistance to changing gender norms. The first refers to women’s participation in conflict and transitional situations, and the second to women in the Islamic world. Evidence in both streams indicates that there are opportunities to foster women’s agency even in high-resistance settings.

The literature shows that women play diverse roles in conflict. Conflict presents risks, but also can present multiple opportunities to strengthen women’s participation. Also, violence during periods of conflict is likely to carry over to post-conflict, transitional society. As such, we should recognize that gender-based violence after conflict may be ongoing and just as detrimental to women’s civic and political participation as violence during conflict periods.

The literature does confirm a gender gap in political and civic participation in the Muslim world. However, cross-national studies generate significant debate as to whether Islam (widely assumed to generate a cultural context of strong resistance to changing gender norms) accounts for low levels of women’s empowerment and participation. This doubt is compounded when we look for intra-regional differences between Muslim countries. In addition, the case study-based literature provides further evidence that Islam has heterogeneous effects on women’s political participation and empowerment.
INTRODUCTION

Women’s civic and political empowerment matters for democracy and development. While women with different backgrounds—race, ethnicity, sexuality, nationality, geography, (dis)ability, age, marital status, parental status, etc.—may have different experiences in being able and empowered to participate in civic and political activities, women can be viewed as a “social collective” as they share similar situations (Young 1997). Hence, gender, and here specifically the collective of women, remain an important category for analyzing socio-political structures (Allmendinger 2011).

This report provides a multidisciplinary overview, assessment, and synthesis of current scholarship on effective strategies to increase women’s civic and political participation. The report is organized into four main sections: 1) a presentation of methods used in surveying the literature; 2) a summary from the literature of how the gender gap in women’s civic and political participation is understood; 3) a summary from the literature on the effects—and possible risks—of various policies or strategies designed to increase women’s civic and political participation; and 4) a summary of what we know about how these strategies work in contexts of strong resistance to changing gender norms.

METHODS

This report’s findings come from a meta-analysis of relevant, interdisciplinary, social science literature on women’s civic and political participation in the developing world, conducted by a team of seven interdisciplinary scholars and PhD students at Wayne State University. The analysis used elements of the rigorous, multi-step Cochrane method for systematic review and evidence synthesis (Cochrane Handbook for Systematic Review of Interventions 2011) and was completed in response to two questions from the 2016 Learning Agenda developed by USAID’s DRG Center:

1. What are the most effective ways to encourage women’s civic (e.g., volunteer, advocacy, etc.) and political (e.g., voting, running for office) participation?
2. What are the risks to women of these strategies in contexts where resistance to changing gender norms is strong?

A main benefit of the meta-analysis method is that it frees the researcher from making a priori assumptions about the subject matter. We do not start from an assumption that we know the causes of the gender gap or the strategies that should be used to address it. Rather, we scrutinize a large body of scholarly work to see what scholars from around the world representing diverse academic disciplines have identified as important.

A. Definitions

i. Resistance and Strong Resistance

We understand resistance to mean long-term obstacles, often embedded within society or family life, to women’s participation in political and civic activity. Resistance could originate in various arenas—religious beliefs and practice, cultural and traditional practices, patriarchal norms, government, and/or civil society—and resistance may be heightened during periods of conflict or political transitions.
We conceptualize resistance broadly, and analyze how violence in areas considered the “private sphere,” such as the home and family, can influence women’s likelihood of participating in the “public sphere,” including politics and government. While rejecting the false binary of private and public spheres and the accompanying gendered dichotomy, we argue that resistance in multiple sites—including overlooked spaces such as the home—may either promote or restrict women’s participation. While reading the articles and other works, we searched for descriptions of resistance to changing gender norms, noting whether the work discussed resistance and, if so, the type: patriarchy, limited access to education, caste system, feudal system, traditional values, socio-cultural discrimination, machismo, or lack of family support.

To identify strong or high resistance countries for closer study, we created a list according to two existing, external schema: those offered by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Women’s Political Empowerment Index (Coppedge 2016) and the WomanStats Physical Security of Women Scale (WomanStats 2015). The V-Dem Women’s Political Empowerment Index conceptualizes empowerment based on three factors: choice, agency, and participation. The index is formed by taking the average of three indicators: women’s civil liberties index, women’s civil society participation index, and women’s political participation index. The WomanStats Physical Security of Women scale reflects the degree to which women face threats to their physical security. The indicator attempts to capture the extent of laws, practices, and data related to domestic violence; rape and sexual assault; marital rape; and the murder of women, including honor killings and femicides.

We first looked at the V-Dem indicators for three years of concern that spanned the time period of our study: 1990, 2000, and 2010. We generated a list of the countries that were consistently rated as worst in terms of gender equality (those that scored less than 0.5 out of 1, where 1 indicates highest empowerment). We then cross-referenced this list with a list of countries that had the lowest rating (“4”) on the WomanStats Physical Security of Women scale for 2007. A “4” rating indicates that there are no or weak laws against domestic violence, rape, and marital rape, and these laws are not generally enforced. Honor killings and/or femicides may occur with impunity. Among the countries identified as high resistance through these means were Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. We added North Korea, although there are no data reported for North Korea in WomanStats.

ii. Strategies and Risks to Strategies
We identified as strategies the different interventions, programs (including social programs), and any other efforts and intentions that scholarly research discussed as attempts to increase the number of women participating in civil (e.g., volunteer, advocacy, etc.) and/or political (e.g., voting, running for office) life. We did not identify strategies a priori but were guided by the variety of strategies that scholarship identified.

We interpreted risk as discrete actions that followed, or were caused by, strategies to increase participation and coded for six risk types: psychological, physical violence, sexual and gendered harassment, economic violence, legal and political discrimination, and other (coders described). This framework was developed after consulting scholarly works such as Krook (2016) and grey literature on violence against women in politics such as the National Democratic Institute’s “Not the Cost” Action Plan 2016, and the International Foundation for Electoral System’s “Breaking the Mold: Understanding Gender and Electoral Violence” report (Bardall 2011).
Most works did not intentionally study risks associated with strategies to increase women’s participation: of the 417 works studied, only 187 discussed any type of risk. The works that did study risk often discussed multiple types of risk associated with the implementation of strategies to increase participation. For example, gender quotas may result in psychological risk, sexual harassment, and political discrimination against female candidates and officeholders.

**B. Search Strategies**

We adopted a two-step strategy for the literature search: we first conducted a general search with an intentionally broad scope and then focused more narrowly on the objectives of the questions posed by USAID. Following guidance from USAID, the second step also included a stronger focus on literature from the fields of sociology and anthropology.

For the general search, we developed a comprehensive list of terms for keyword searches relating to women’s civic and political participation, as well as risks and resistances. With the aid of three university reference librarians—specializing in political science; communication studies; history; and gender, sexuality, and women’s studies—we conducted systematic searches of multiple databases and indices to identify works with combinations of the selected keywords in the title or abstract, limited to regions of interest and a publication date from 1990 to 2016. Databases searched included AnthroSource, Anthropological Literature, Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO), Communication and Mass Media Complete, Ethnic Newswatch, Google Scholar, JSTOR, Public Affairs Information Service (PAIS), Political Abstracts, ProQuest Research Library, ProQuest Dissertations, Science Direct, Scopus, Sociological Abstracts, Sociology Connect, Summons, Web of Science, and Worldwide Political Science Abstracts (WPSA).

**C. Corpus and Coding**

This search produced a pool of 492 works. We eliminated 75 works that did not focus on regions where USAID works, were off-topic, not evidence based, or written in languages outside team capacity. This left 417 works of peer-reviewed journal articles (82% of the sample); grey literature reports (13%); and dissertations, books, book chapters, and media reports (5%). The 417 works were from multiple academic disciplines, but predominantly political science. Qualitative methods predominate, and many works are case studies. Regional distribution of research is surprisingly even, although relatively few works covered Eurasia. More of the literature concerns political, rather than civic, participation. The Cochrane method allows us to assert that these characteristics reflect trends in the overall literature, though we acknowledge the influence of our selection of search terms, characteristics of the search engines of each database or index, and the search strategies. As one research librarian involved in the project noted, “searching is an art, not a science.”

For disciplinary areas and strategies not found in large quantity during the original search, we searched in appropriate databases again with terms tailored to enlarge the number of studies. Additionally, we used our members’ expertise to include studies we were familiar with for strategies that did not come up during the formalized database searches, such as women’s empowerment through Islam/Islamic feminist movements, through social programs, and through media/social media.
After conducting several exercises and discussions to ensure inter-coder reliability, the team coded the 417 studies for relevance—that is, whether they partially or fully speak to one, several, or all aspects of our overarching questions of strategies to increase political and civil participation as well as risk and resistance to these strategies. We also coded for disciplinary area of study, language of article, study addressing civic/political participation (or both), risk to strategy addressed in scholarship, strong resistance in country studied, method, kind of quantitative/qualitative method, case study, program evaluation, sample size and unit of analysis, methodological rigor, region, country, if USAID operates in country of study, topic of study, population of women studied, research question, theory/framework, findings on strategies, findings on risk to strategies, and practical implications.

D. Analysis

We first established inter-coder reliability through practice coding exercises during several team meetings. Then, each study was coded by one team member so that we could code all 417 studies within the timeframe. Coders focused on the individual findings of each study regarding strategies and risks to strategies.

We selected out literature of high quality and relevance, defined as works meeting the following criteria: studies coded as high rigor, studies including countries where USAID works, studies with direct relevance to the two questions posed by USAID, and all studies related to the identified high-resistance countries. During several weekly sessions with all team members, this literature was discussed and grouped into streams of strategies to increase women’s civic and political participation, after which one or two team members analyzed studies within each strategy stream to identify points of consensus and discussion. This fine-grained analysis within each stream also allowed for a thematic analysis to uncover nuances and contextual information on the country/countries, region, and/or system at the center of the study. This process also revealed gaps in the literature and contradictory findings for the application of the same strategy.

The synthesized findings within each strategy stream were discussed with all team members in weekly meetings and then modified based on the discussion and critique to allocate them to the proper strategy stream and subcategory. A similar process was conducted for determining risks to the identified strategies, although we found that relatively few studies directly addressed risks.

Understanding the Gender Gap

The existence of a gender gap in both civic and political participation has been well documented by studies in industrialized countries (Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010) and more recently in the developing world (Desposato and Norrander 2009, Coffé and Dilli 2015). Espinal and Zhao (2015) find significant gender gaps in both civic and political participation in 18 Latin American countries. They find more countries with significant gender gaps in civic participation than political participation. The countries with high gaps in civic participation tended to have low levels of human development (see Lewis 2004).

There are real variations across regions in resistance to gender equality norms and in public opinion about women’s political participation. For instance, the regional barometer surveys from Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) include questions asking whether men are better
political leaders than women ("Global Barometer Surveys: Questionnaires" 2016). A majority of Latin American and African respondents (69% and 59%, respectively) reject this idea; however, only 35% of Arab Barometer respondents disagree with the statement that “men are better at political leadership than women.” The women’s political empowerment index developed by the V-Dem Project reveals a similar pattern: between 1900 and 2015, women’s political empowerment has risen in all regions, but countries in the MENA region lag behind European and Latin American countries (Sundstrom et al. 2015, Coppedge 2016). As Benstead et al. (2015) note, “[t]he Middle East ranks at the bottom of regional comparisons with regard to female labor participation rates, financial independence, and civil rights and political participation” (p74). A common assumption is that MENA women’s participation is culturally constrained by Islamic religious norms (Inglehart and Norris 2003). If that is the case, the prescription for increasing women’s participation would be the promotion of cultural, rather than institutional, change. However, research in this area is divided, as is discussed later in this report.

To understand the most effective ways to encourage women’s civic and political participation, it is necessary to start first with an understanding of the nature and theorized drivers of the gender gap in civic and political participation. As Figure 1 presents, scholars identify two categories of determinants of the gender gap: individual and contextual. Methodologically, a majority of studies on the gender gap rely on secondary data sources such as the regional barometer surveys or the World Values Survey, and use multi-level analysis to identify the individual and contextual factors.

Figure 1. The Gender Gap: A Conceptual Framework

i. Individual Determinants of the Gender Gap
A large body of research examines individual attitudes that contribute to the gender gap in participation. Tong (2003), for example, finds that, as a result of socialization, female Chinese respondents are more passive than men toward achievement, more accommodating in conflict situations, and have a higher preference for conflict mediation by traditional authority. Other studies suggest how such socialization
might be overcome. Using the Latinobarómetro public opinion survey data from 19 countries, Morgan et al. (2013) investigate factors that facilitate or undermine support for women in politics in Latin America. Their study finds that elite cues shape men’s attitudes toward women in politics and that citizens who distrust government tend to express higher support for female candidates; they conclude that when citizens trust government, elite cues matter.

Another important individual determinant of the gender gap is socio-economic status (SES) and education. The relationship between SES and political participation is well-established in advanced industrialized democracies, not just in relation to women (Verba et al. 1995). Studies in our sample, too, find that the gender gap is worse for women with lower education or for those who are unemployed (Isaksson et al. 2014, Htun 2014). For example in China, Tong (2003) finds that higher SES women are more politically engaged than both lower SES women and men. Studying multiple countries in Latin America to determine what factors may explain which countries succeed in electing more women to their national legislatures, Htun (2014) notes that greater income and skills enable more women to run in and win national elections. However, other studies contradict this finding: for example, Desposato and Narrander (2009) find that, in Latin America, education and SES have “non-gendered impacts with equal effects for men and women” (p156), and Gleason (2001) finds that, in India, richer women are not more likely to run for office.

There is mixed evidence in support of the modernization theory that economic development and labor market participation will lead to democratic growth, including broader participation. According to Arana (2005), Pachon (2012), and Htun (2014), women in the workforce are more likely to participate in politics. Additionally, Cherif (2010) finds that, as educational levels improve and labor force participation increases, women can have active civic and political engagement. Lack of labor market participation also has been associated with limited political and civic participation. Ross (2008) argues in oil-rich MENA countries, women are left out of the labor force and therefore have fewer avenues through which to extend beyond the domestic sphere and are less empowered economically. Consequently, they are less likely to be empowered politically.

However, other scholars find that labor force involvement may be negatively related to political participation (see Melkonian-Hoover’s 2008 quantitative analysis of interview data from factory employees in Mexico). Gleason (2001), studying India, finds that where women have a higher labor force participation rate, there is a larger gender gap in voting and in running for office. Worthen (2015), studying Mexico, also finds that the demands of labor force participation reduced the political participation of women in indigenous communities: indigenous women rejected local town council posts because they argued that it would increase their labor exploitation within the communal systems in which they live. Thus, employment and labor can have mixed effects on participation, particularly when participation would create the “triple load.”

### Contextual Determinants of the Gender Gap

The examination of the presence of female politicians in political office is based on a “critical mass” hypothesis that, once women occupy a sizable proportion of the legislature (commonly posited as 30%), women’s presence will start to have a broader impact on the political process. Using Afrobarometer data from 20 African countries across four waves of surveys from 1999 to 2008, Barnes and Burchard (2012) test whether increases in women’s descriptive representation at the elite level decreases the
gender gap between men and women’s political engagement as individual citizens. They find that, as the percentage of women in the national legislature increases, women are more likely to engage in politics. Similarly, Desposato and Norrander (2009) investigate a statistically significant gender gap in conventional and unconventional political participation in all Latin American countries except Costa Rica. They suggest that the presence of female office holders along with protection of civil liberties (both characteristics of the Costa Rican political context) can do more to mitigate the gender gap in participation than other hypothesized forces such as economic development and modernization.

Many studies also investigate patriarchal culture as a source of resistance to changing gender norms, and, correspondingly, of the gender gap in participation (Jennings 1998). For instance, Guo, Zheng, and Yang (2009) examine participation in Chinese village elections and find that women have lower levels of participation even though there are no significant differences in political attitudes between men and women. They contend, “China’s patriarchal system, embedded in various forms of mindset and political practice, continues to constrain rural women’s political involvement in a substantial way” (p145). Studies from Africa also show that societal gender norms, rather than individual characteristics, explain the majority of the gender gap in political participation (Isaksson et al. 2014). Gottlieb (2016), studying Mali, attributes the lack of women’s participation in civic information programs to “a deeply held asymmetric gender norm” associated with women’s public sphere participation (p102).

A third contextual factor is related to the global spread of norms and ideas. Coffé and Bolzendahl (2011) point to a process of cultural isomorphism that can trigger changes in the gender gap in participation. Cultural isomorphism suggests that global ideas about women’s political equality and participation can influence women’s political participation worldwide. Mechanisms include norm diffusion, priorities of international donors, regional pressure from groups such as the African Union, and pressure from advocates in the global women’s rights movement. Coffé and Bolzendahl (2011) study the factors that explain gender gap in 18 Sub-Saharan African countries, conducting quantitative analysis of 2005 Afrobarometer survey data. They find evidence that both modernization and cultural isomorphism processes are at play. On the other hand, Hughes et al. find, in the context of adoption of gender quotas across a global sample of countries, that “when international and domestic activists push highly controversial scripts simultaneously, governments may be more resistant to change, provoking recoiling effects instead of a seamless alignment with international standards” (2015, p370).

Finally, changes in the political opportunity structure—including political transitions, periods of armed conflict and struggle, political reforms (such as constitution reforms or changes to election law), or the creation of new political institutions or social programs—alter opportunities and incentives for women’s political and civic participation. This literature provides diverse findings, which are discussed in more detail later in the report.

**Strategies for Reducing the Gender Gap**

In this report, we understand strategies to be interventions, programs, and any other efforts to increase the number of women participating in civil and/or political life. Our analysis revealed four predominant streams of strategies in the literature: 1) using quotas to enhance women’s representation, 2) using social media platforms to mobilize women and amplify their voices, 3) targeting women as participants
or recipients of benefits from social programs, and 4) mobilizing women through their intersecting identities.

A. Gender Quotas

Among the four strategy streams, the scholarship on gender quotas is the most developed: of the 417 works reviewed, at least 91 focused on quotas. This emphasis is partly due to the global diffusion of quotas, which has facilitated their popularity as a research subject: more than 100 countries have now adopted varying forms of quota policy for women’s representation in political processes (Krook 2006). The emphasis exists also because quotas can be studied fairly easily by comparative quantitative and qualitative methods.

Gender quotas are expected to increase women’s political engagement, and therefore decrease the gender gap in political and civic participation (Barnes and Córdova 2016). Quotas are implemented in a variety of ways, at the national or local level. They most frequently are used for legislative office, but can be implemented to improve gender balance for cabinet or civil service positions. Common quota systems include constitutionally mandated quotas imposed on all political parties that specify a minimum percentage of female candidates that must appear on the ballot, quotas voluntarily adopted by individual political parties, and reserved seats for women in political office.

The main policy objectives of gender quotas are to increase the number of women in political office and to improve policy outcomes on women’s issues (Barnes and Burchard 2012). Expressed in Pitkin’s terminologies (1972), the goal is to improve and enhance descriptive, symbolic, and substantive representation of women in decision-making processes. Descriptive representation refers to demographic and identity similarities between representatives and constituents—in this case, based on gender. Symbolic representation refers to constituents’ sense that representatives “stand for” them. Substantive representation refers to the congruence of issues or policies pursued by representatives and their constituents—in this case, whether female representatives can better adopt and implement policies that support women.

We find consensus in the literature that gender quotas improve descriptive and symbolic representation. Quotas can increase the number of women in politics, especially in the legislature (Patnaik 2014);¹ enhance the visibility of women in politics (i.e., symbolic representation); and demonstrate that women can serve as effective political leaders (Franceschet et al. 2012, Lombardo and Meier 2016). However, there are remaining debates. First, the assumption that gender quota systems will lead to a greater level of substantive representation of women in the developing world has not been fully investigated. Second, few works have intentionally studied specific risks that are associated with quota implementation, although there is mention of various types of resistance to quotas as a means of changing gender norms.

i. Quota Adoption at the National Level

A great number of studies focus on analyzing the number of women in legislatures, often contrasting before and after political caesuras such as the end of civil conflict, a political transition toward democracy, or incisive political events such as election reforms. Scholars highlight both success stories of quota systems that bring more women into politics and dynamics that undercut establishment or implementation of quotas and their supposed beneficial impact for women in the population at large.

Mandatory quotas matter. Among several countries in Latin America that were early adopters of mandatory gender quotas, well-designed quota legislation increased the number of female representatives regardless of open or closed party lists; closed lists worked only slightly better (Jones 2009). In post-apartheid South Africa, Britton (2002) also finds that quotas matter, but notes that it was important that gender quotas were secured prior to the implementation of the new constitution to prevent a situation in which only men could entrench themselves in new positions of power.

Second, strategies within civil society (women’s movements) and the political sphere (gender quotas and laws) can work in tandem to support women’s political and civic empowerment, overcoming other constraints. Bauer (2004) shows that Namibia achieved a high percentage of women in the National Assembly through a combination of an electoral quota and extensive work by women’s organizations during the struggle for independence to promote women’s political representation.

The effects of quotas adopted voluntarily by political parties are more variable, and also subject to more variation in implementation. Muriaas and Kayuni (2013) find, in their study of local government in South Africa, that voluntary gender quotas may not consistently and permanently ensure the representation of women. Voluntary quotas can be shed when deemed politically inconvenient for keeping the party (and its male leaders) in power—for instance, a dominant party with voluntary gender quotas might imitate the practices of a rising party without gender quotas, if its hold on power is threatened. Other party practices can also contradict quota initiatives. In Mexico, Baldez (2007) notes that a relatively new practice of parties holding primary elections has limited the effectiveness of national gender quotas.

In the Asian context, Basu (2005) contends that the biggest obstacle to gender equality in the party systems in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and India has been that parties draw on women’s participation as individuals but not as members of a group that has suffered discrimination. Yet, even as parties neglect women’s interests, they have profited from employing gendered imagery, drawing on women’s votes, and using women in electioneering. She, and other authors such as Htun (2014), find that left-of-center parties are more likely to address questions of gender inequality, at least rhetorically, but even leftist parties do not necessarily have better representation of women in leadership positions.

Improving gender equity within political parties could have broad-ranging impacts on women’s political prospects, but the literature on voluntary party quotas suggests that even if gender quotas are adopted, political parties remain largely inhospitable spaces for women politicians. To improve the effectiveness of the party quota as a strategy of increasing women’s representation, it will be important to change the way decisions are made within political parties. Bruhn’s (2003) study of party quotas in Mexico suggests that transparent and democratic decision-making processes within political parties are crucial to ensure that, once adopted, quotas are successful.
ii. Quota Adoption at the Local Level
Implementing quotas at the local level may be an effective way to support women’s entry into politics, because gender quotas at the village or municipal level may facilitate the development of a cadre of experienced women leaders. Some argue that gender quotas appear to be most successful at the local level (Costa 2010). Patnaik (2014) finds that local female representatives in India benefitted from learning skills to further engage in the public sphere. In Jordan, Nanes (2015) reports that gender quota policy allowed women to gain political knowledge and enhance representation at the local level, even in the context of a clientelistic political system. In Lesotho, Clayton (2014) reports that having a quota-mandated female leader reduced the perceived influence of traditional leaders, “suggesting that quotas have allowed women not only de jure but de facto leadership roles in these communities” (p1008).

Studies report that quotas in local elections have a positive impact on women’s participation in village councils in India (Bryld 2001, Patnaik 2014); Jordan (Nanes 2015); and Afghanistan (Beath 2013). In sum, some argue that gender quotas appear to be most successful at the local level (Costa, 2010).

However, the disjuncture between descriptive and substantive representation also occurs at the local level. In rural India, Vissandjee (2005) concludes that quota saturation does not guarantee that women will have substantive input into policy discussion because cultural perceptions, lack of education, and household workloads may significantly limit women’s ability to participate fully as leaders (p132). Similar negative or null effects are documented in Bangladesh (Zaman 2012). Randall (2006) finds that flawed propositions, caste conflicts over reservation policies, and insufficient support among women limit the effects of quotas in India.

Other studies report structural constraints of local quota systems (Wang 2013, Chin 2004, Cummins 2011). For example, Cummins (2011), studying why women in Timor-Leste who occupy reserved seats on village councils have been unable to establish themselves within local politics, finds that women’s representation is limited due to structural issues—i.e., lack of governmental support for village councils.

iii. Risks to Quota Strategies
As noted above, few studies explicitly examine risks of using gender quotas to increase women’s political participation (i.e., risks to women who participate in the strategy). Those that do agree that women who come to office through quotas face paradoxical, counterintuitive, or negative outcomes following the adoption of gender quota policies or efforts to adopt gender quotas (Bawa and Sanyare 2013, Basu 2005, Burnet 2011, Clayton 2015).

In Ghana, Bawa and Sanyare (2013) describe a host of factors that cause barriers to women’s political empowerment. Socio-cultural obstacles to public service include beliefs that women are less capable in the public sphere than their male colleagues; a colonial legacy that disempowered women; and a lack of political will to include women. These general, long-term factors manifest in specific risks for women in politics and public service, such as psychological intimidation, sexual harassment, and social-cultural discrimination. Similarly, Bawa (2012) finds female leaders elected through quotas experienced high resistance from men who did not accept political change. Rural women experienced increased workloads, friction with male relatives, and troubles in marriage. Men reported a sense of loss of access to informal ways of addressing problems. Burnet (2011) also observed that women in politics in Rwanda experienced various types of risk due to their involvement in public service, including friction with their
male relatives and troubles in marriage, an increased workload for rural women, cooptation of rural women by the ruling party, and a reinforcement of the status quo including the use of bribes.

Similarly, Zetterberg (2008), studying Mexico, suggests that women elected via quotas face more institutional obstacles (from male colleagues in male-dominated institutions) than women elected by other means, and asks whether this, in turn, hampers the policy output of women elected via quota in their attempts to carry out reforms that can benefit women as a group. In Argentina, results from interviews with 65 male and female legislators suggest that female leaders who gain office under quotas are labeled as “quota women,” and seen as less qualified than their male counterparts (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008).

In Afghanistan, Cameron (2014) concludes that, even with quotas, the Afghan government and international community need to take further steps to advance Afghan women’s rights and participation. Through field research conducted in five cities in Afghanistan, the International Crisis Group (2013) found that the national gender quota law had increased women’s formal representation, but women elected to office face threats, attacks, and insults from male legislators, and there is widespread impunity for violence against women. Hence, studies indicate that, when participating via quota, women risk discrimination, friction with men in their surroundings, higher workloads, sometimes security threats, and an uncertain likelihood that their participation will have positive policy outcomes that benefit women as a group.

iv. Resistance to Gender Quotas

In many places, efforts to implement gender quotas have been met with tough resistance from male party elites and from both male and female voters, who object to the use of quotas in candidate selection. In some cases, the resistance to gender quotas is rooted in ideas about women’s roles in society. For example, Clayton (2015) found that when gender quotas were implemented in randomly assigned electoral divisions around Lesotho, all citizens expressed less interest in politics. Some of the resistance to gender quotas came from women, who tended to support traditional women’s gender roles. The counterintuitive finding of Clayton’s study is that quotas may reduce women’s engagement with their women representatives, but this is possibly a case-specific finding due to negative reactions to the quota’s design. In a study in India, Randall (2006) found that gender quotas have not received widespread support among women, limiting their effectiveness in increasing women’s political voice and empowerment.

In Ghana and Rwanda, female leaders elected by quota experienced high resistance from men who did not accept political change (Burnet 2011, Bawa and Sanyare 2013, Bawa 2012). Mediating factors such as lack of education, cultural perceptions, and household workloads can serve as barriers to the successful implementation of quotas, according to Vissandjee (2005), who, in studying rural India, concluded that quota saturation in isolation does not guarantee that women will have substantive input into policy discussion.

A lack of resources to fully implement quotas—due to lack of political will or constraints on government programs in general—is yet another form of resistance. In South Korea, Chin (2004) found that despite a quota policy in political parties, women rarely get elected to local political positions due to resource problems. Cummins (2011) learned that in Timor-Leste, which has quota policies at the village level,
women's representation was limited due to structural issues such as lack of resources, capacity, and support from the government to the village councils.

v. Conclusion

Based on this comprehensive review of the gender quota literature, we note several issues that should be further explored and empirically examined. Successful implementation of gender quotas is not guaranteed by the adoption of the policy (Costa 2010), and more evaluations on the implementation of quota systems should be conducted. Some studies report curtailing of quota policy after initial adoption and implementation by reducing the required percentages of female candidates or seats (Calfas 2015, Cameron 2014). Other studies focus on the diffusion of gender quota adoption and not on implementation and its effects (Tajali 2013).

Gender quota policy is perhaps best viewed as a first step toward reducing the gender gap. Piscopo (2015) argues that after quota laws are passed, state institutionalization of gender rights often extends beyond the first quota law. That is, after the quota law is passed and implemented, the state may be more likely to strengthen, expand, and diffuse quotas beyond the legislative branch to other branches, and in different levels of government. This is an interesting and potentially important finding, and there should be continued research on whether and under what conditions descriptive representation translates to substantive representation. Although there is a small body of interesting work in this area (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008, Htun 2013, Josefsson 2014, Piscopo 2015, Benstead 2015b), the assumption that gender quota systems will lead to a greater level of substantive representation of women in the developing world has not been fully investigated.

Second, there is a need for empirical study of gender representation among non-elected officials in branches of government other than the legislature, such as the executive or judiciary. According to the Diamond Leadership Model by Hughes et al. (2014), women’s political leadership should be strengthened through three levels of leadership (high, mid, and low) and four government sectors (legislative, executive, judicial, and security). In the gender quota literature, the research focus is primarily on political representation of women in the legislative branch at different levels of leadership. A series of case studies detailing women’s rise to the presidency in different countries around the world largely consider the personal qualities and professional career path of women as determinants of achieving this high office (Van Doorn-Harder 2002, Morales Quiroga 2008, Bauer 2009, Florez-Estrada 2010), but the judiciary, cabinet-level positions, and civil service are left out. One exception is Coffé and Bolzendahl (2011), who report that the presence of women in ministerial positions is positively linked to gender equality in participation. However, even in this study, participation was operationalized in only a very minimal way, as voter registration.

Finally, while some studies pay attention to socio-economic factors—such as education, prior political experience, and elite status (Josefsson 2014); labor force participation and education (Yoon 2004); or caste, in India (Patnaik 2014, Randall 2006)—of the women elected with or without quotas, little attention is paid to other important aspects of identity such as sexuality, parenthood, marital status, disability, age, and/or tribal/ethnic affiliation to analyze in depth which kinds of women are elected and benefit (or not) from quota systems. Too often, scholars see women as a monolithic, essentialist category rather than heeding insights from feminist epistemology (Harding 1991, Hartsock 2004, Steiner 2012) and feminist studies (Collins 1986, Crenshaw 1989). These authors argue that the way in which
gender intersects with other dimensions of identity is crucial to how women experience their environment and how they understand which civic and political opportunities may, or may not, be available to them.

**B. Social Media**

The rise of new ICTs has greatly promoted women’s civic and political participation. With a plethora of digital platforms, women can weigh in on any political issue they are concerned about but also push new issues into the public sphere, hence altering the online political environment.

For instance, Karan et al. (2009) shows how the largest women’s organization in the Philippines—the General Assembly Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership, and Action (GABRIELA)—used social media to help win two legislative seats through its political branch, the GABRIELA Women’s Party. The party used YouTube and Friendster as low-cost campaign tools to establish a presence among young and female voters. Odine (2013) examines the role of social media in transmitting messages to empower women during the Arab Spring, finding that the number of Arab women using social media rose sharply in 2011 and that social media played a significant role in mobilizing women’s participation in the movement (see also Sreberny 2015).

Even when used outside the political sphere, access to social media and online spaces can empower women and strengthen their participation in civic and political life. For instance, Elsadda’s (2010) study of literary blogs of three women in Egypt demonstrates that these blogs opened up political discussions of the role of women in Egyptian society. Similarly, El Nawawy and Khamis (2011) reiterate that Egyptian blogs and Muslim discussion forums have become sites of self-expression especially for women, who had been more restricted in speaking out in public prior to the advent of the Internet. Khamis (2010) also points to examples of successful blogs by women in Gaza and in Iraq, which “offered unique opportunities for these newly emerging alternative female voices to make themselves heard within contemporary cyberspace discourses—as representatives of a new Islamic feminist agenda that manifests social and political resistances in different forms and on many levels” (p251).

Women and feminists have used hashtags strategically for civic and political participation. Indian feminists have campaigned for mobility in public spaces and safety during public transport with hashtags such as #BoardTheBus and #IndiaNeedsFeminism (Eagle 2015). Other campaigns such as #JusticeForLiz about a kidnapping of a woman in Kenya and #BringBackourGirls about the kidnapping of girls by Boko Haram in Nigeria can draw attention to violence against and suffering of girls and women. However, although hashtags can travel globally to spread word about important issues, some scholars worry that international publics who participate in these context-specific hashtags may oversimplify and decontextualize complex local issues (Eckert and Steiner 2016).

Although social media improve women’s chances to participate in civic and political processes, a digital gap regarding access, literacy, and resources to utilize social media and online spaces persists. Schuster (2013) argues that while social media provide many opportunities for feminist participation, they exclude some people, such as older or differently abled women.

In sum, social media emerge as useful tools to encourage more women to enter the public sphere for civic and political participation, and to allow female candidates or politicians to bypass mainstream news
media. Women can appeal directly and proactively to voters, especially female voters who have the potential to become more visible, and therefore powerful, via social media use. This may empower young women and girls by creating opportunities to exercise their abilities to argue and persuade publicly and to bring their concerns into debates. Additionally, one of the greatest advantages to date has been the use of social media to collect and document incidents of violence against women, thereby recognizing the existence of the problem and establishing baselines for progress.

i. **Risks to Social Media**
Social media as a mobilizing tool has definite risks. Bardall (2013) contends that ICTs are frequently employed as tools of gender-specific electoral and political violence. For instance, ICTs may be used as a tool for intimidating, threatening, or inciting physical violence against female candidates and female voters. Studies in Western contexts have documented that victims of online abuse suffer emotionally, professionally, and commercially (Citron 2014, Duggan 2014). Online abuse comes in many forms and may involve electronic sabotage in the form of extensive spam and damaging viruses; sending abusive email; impersonating the victim online and sending email, spam, blog posts, tweets, and other fraudulent online communications in the victim’s name; or subscribing victims to email lists without consent, resulting in hundreds of unwanted messages daily (Ellison and Akdeniz 1998).

Thus, social media remain a double-edged sword. On one hand, they are used to spread misogyny and to harass women around the globe; on the other, they provide outlets to address and fight violence against women (UN Broadband Commission 2015) and for women to raise their voices on existing and new issues of their concern.

ii. **Gaps in the Literature**
Research on social media use is an emerging field of study. Given different levels of internet access and literacy in developing countries, there have been few studies on social media use and fewer still on women’s social media use or on gender-based differences in social media use. Although we found studies on women’s uses of social media and ICTs for civic and political participation, our initial literature search did not include key terms on digital media, social media, hashtags, and specific social media sites. We supplemented this section based on our team members’ expertise on social media use and gender, but still found relatively little academic research on women’s access to ICT globally or on the use of social media strategies to strengthen women’s participation. This is an area that is ripe for further study.

C. **Social Programs**
We understand social programs here as those run or mandated by the state or by NGOs that are designed to involve citizens in aspects of governance or to improve the welfare of particular segments of the population, sometimes on the condition that recipients participate in civic or health education programs or other community activities. Social programs can be used strategically to mobilize women’s civic and political participation, and many lead to positive results. For instance, Pant and Standing (2011) find that in Nepal, which experienced a Communist insurgency for years, a women’s forum program helped to raise the status of women in the community. Similarly, a non-formal education program in South Africa with “mentor mothers” has helped local women gain greater independence (Kenny 2007).
i. Risks of Targeted Social Programs

Yet, the literature agrees that almost all social programs also have negative unintentional consequences for women. Some state social programs reproduce or fail to surmount patriarchal norms. Chuku (2009) shows that, in Nigeria, state-sponsored women’s programs undermine women’s interests by upholding patriarchal practices that emphasize wifehood and motherhood as women’s foremost responsibilities. Other social programs, by prioritizing women as participants, unintentionally compromise them by reinforcing gender divisions of labor. Corboz (2013) investigates the gendered effects of a Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program in Uruguay that provides benefits to disempowered, poor, female heads of household in a squatter town where crime, a lack of kinship networks, and men’s unemployment mean that mothers receiving CCTs are put in an impossible situation. To receive the needed support, they must fulfill CCT program obligations that burden them with unachievable expectations, and thus decrease participation (see also Gil-Garcia 2016, Worthen 2015). In addition, because they are known to receive the support, the women are vulnerable to theft and violence in the public sphere.

Social programs with direct benefits for women can also provoke social backlash. Gottlieb (2016), using an experimental research design, finds that after men and women in Mali participated together in a civic education treatment, both men and women increased their political knowledge. But despite this increase in knowledge, men’s participation increased and women’s participation declined. In follow-up interviews, women reported that their participation was either limited by men (e.g., a husband) or that they self-limited to compensate for perceived social infractions. Gottlieb suggests that “future attempts should be more attuned to the social constraints faced by women and other marginalized groups,” perhaps offering programs to women only, or men and women separately (p105). However, Gottlieb admits that such a solution would not directly address the problem of repressive gender norms.

ii. Mitigating Risks

Nevertheless, some evidence shows that the backlash or risks to women who participate in social programs can be surmounted through program design that takes cultural barriers into account and engages the local community. Patterson (2006) reports the results of a “mainstreaming gender and development” program implemented in six districts of Balochistan, Pakistan—a large, poor, and sparsely populated province where women’s activities and mobility are severely restricted due to cultural norms. Yet, 20 women were recruited, with family permission and involvement, for a program that promoted self-empowerment, learning to communicate, and a focus on individual rather than collective action but with an emphasis on including family and community. The small but positive impact on participants, achieved without serious backlash, shows that women’s empowerment is possible in highly patriarchal environments. Programs should be attentive to women’s workload and family obligations and their social support networks. Alami et al. (2013), in Iran, finds that women who were free from time-consuming responsibilities at home and embedded in diverse, intimate, and supportive social networks, were more willing to participate in a government-based Women’s Health Volunteer (WHV) program. That program, though organized by the state for other purposes, enhanced women’s agency and sense of autonomy as public actors.

The general lesson seems to be that prescribing women’s participation in social programs is not enough. Peru, by law, requires civil society participation in allocation of capital investment at the district, city, and regional levels. But McNulty (2015) finds that, despite an institutional commitment to equity, women have been underrepresented in these participatory budgeting processes because, especially in
rural areas, poverty, domestic duties, and patriarchal norms make it hard for them to attend meetings. The weakness of the women’s movement also means that there is a lack of formally registered women's organizations that could participate. McNulty finds that concrete interventions at the local level to address gender disparities—such as cities dedicating funds for gender equality projects or creating an office to oversee gender inclusiveness, or local NGOs assisting women’s organizations in forming, registering, and training members to participate—have significantly enhanced women's participation in participatory budgeting (p1439).

In sum, social programs that target women can increase women’s participation. However, the literature highlights multiple limitations of social programs as a strategy for mobilizing women’s civic or political participation. Specifically, women may opt out because of the “triple load” such programs can create, or because of social backlash that can become violent. To overcome such limitations, social programs should integrate design elements to mitigate these negative outcomes—ideally in the adoption phase of the program, before it is implemented.

**D. Intersecting Identities**

Women’s various identities—as members of economic classes, ethnicities, religious groups, professional classes, sexualities, and marital status—also affect women’s mobilization and activism. Framing issues around intersecting identities, in general, can foster participation.

First, one framing strategy used by women to help overcome closed spaces is to invoke “motherhood” and “maternal” frames. Pieper Mooney (2007) argues that women in Argentina and Chile successfully mobilized against authoritarian regimes in the 1970s and 1980s by invoking and redefining maternal obligation. In Colombia, Lemaitre and Sandvik (2015) note two strategies used by female activists internally displaced by that country’s long-standing civil conflict. Colombian women used two self-protection methods to surmount risks of participation: 1) they limited their public visibility, keeping a low profile to minimize risk, and 2) they invoked their status as mothers as a form of self-protection, while also pursuing community action (pp13-14). This finding links to other literature on the symbolic “uses” of motherhood (e.g., Franceschet et al. 2016). In a sociological study of women’s movements in Mexico, Huiskamp (2000) gives an excellent example of how a women’s movement can mobilize women as mothers. Motherhood and family continue to serve as vital points of reference in their struggle, but, in the dynamic evolution of their group, the meaning of “woman” and of “acting politically” have changed considerably. These refractions of gender identity have not only engendered a new self-confidence and organizational ability; they have also allowed the women to alter concrete instances of gender oppression in their communities, and to provide a more autonomous voice for communicating community interests within the Mexican political system.

Second, utilizing women’s intersecting identity as “workers” can help women alleviate adverse working conditions. Mills (2008) provides a case study of how Thai labor activists refigured an exclusionary urban and national landscape into one in which workers (both as migrants and as women) can assert themselves as legitimate, visible actors in arenas of public power, privilege, and modern citizenship. Labor activism is shown to be an empowering strategy for women, a space in which women can articulate explicit demands for tangible, material remedies to exploitative workplace conditions. Nevertheless, labor activism does entail a great deal of risk, including sexual harassment and risks to physical security.
Finally, to create successful inclusive participation, the intersection of ethnicity and gender must be also taken into account, as noted in Pape (2008) and Zanotti (2013). Zanotti (2013) studies Kayapo women who were generally excluded from community meetings in keeping with indigenous tradition in Brazil. Nevertheless, they exercised civic and political influence through acts of everyday resistance and used peripheral spaces in which they had more freedom to exert civic and political influence. Pape (2008), studying the empowerment of women in rural areas of the Bolivian Andes, finds that policies created to lift indigenous rights failed to consider the intersectional identities of women and the ways that traditional customs may suppress women’s voices while giving voice to indigenous communities (p58).

STRATEGIES AND RISK IN HIGH-RESISTANCE ENVIRONMENTS

Even in high-resistance settings, there are opportunities for women’s agency. Two streams of literature emerged that dealt with contexts of strong resistance to changing gender norms: 1) women's participation in conflict and transitional situations, and 2) women's participation in the Islamic world.

A. Participation During Conflict or Transition

Conflict (civil and international war) and political transitions (including transitional elections and other periods of regime change) can be considered high-resistance environments. The literature agreed that women face serious risks when they participate during armed conflict, democratization, and regime change. Yet, the literature also indicates that periods of instability may offer new opportunities for women's political and civic engagement: gender roles can become more flexible, or women may have political opportunities to challenge historic gender roles. The most effective strategies, discussed below in relation to the risks they entail, include taking advantage of divisions among the elite, leveraging political standing within armed or civil society groups to influence post-conflict/transition governments, and either countering or conforming to gender norms.

Women’s participation during conflict is complex and reflects the varied political, economic, and social situations of women in conflict zones. Existing accounts have tended to emphasize women’s status as victims of war. Karam (2000) argues that patriarchal structures explain the tendency within the literature to emphasize women as innocent civilians or victims, as opposed to agents with political will and political identities (see also Alison 2009, who writes on female combatants in Sri Lanka). There is consensus in the literature that, to understand women’s participation in conflict contexts, we move away from gendered tropes—particularly those reifying women as innocents, mothers, or victims. In fact, the literature illustrates that women engage in diverse roles in conflict zones. Women may participate in national liberation movements as rebels, as soldiers with state armies, or as aides and supporters of armed groups and violent extremist movements.

i. Risks During Conflict

Conflict situations may make it especially dangerous for women to assert their political rights. Abdallah's (2010) research illustrates that female dissidents who engage in protest or violence during periods of conflict—such as the ongoing occupation struggle in the West Bank and Gaza—may face retaliatory punishments and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) when imprisoned or detained by police. Abdallah’s interviews with ex-prisoners include the revelation that, during interrogations, many female...
prisoners were threatened with sexual violence and other forms of sexual harassment as well as torture. Yet, despite the climate of risk, female prisoners engaged in collective mobilization even while in prison, forming women’s groups that continued after the prisoners completed their sentences.

Women may also encounter serious risks when organizing around feminist principles during a conflict, particularly in a regime that is highly resistant to women’s empowerment. These obstacles are discussed at length in Fluri’s (2008) study of the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA). RAWA strategically navigates and conforms to existing gender norms. For instance, members rely on men to accompany them in public, viewing this as a necessary “evil” due to social norms constraining women’s activity and autonomy in public. The organization thus supports and conforms to gender norms, divisions of labor, and normative family forms “when it is strategically pertinent” (p50). As a result, RAWA is able to promote a feminist nationalism—but one of limited impact at the national level. Empowerment occurs “mainly... in the private spaces of RAWA-run programmes [schools, orphanages, youth hotels, and health clinics], which are clandestine and exclusionary [e.g., to men]” (p45).

Eras of political transition provide opportunities for women to participate, but also provide risks similar to those during conflict. Examples from Arab Spring countries such as Libya suggest that there are considerable risks for women who engage in activism in authoritarian or closed political systems. Media reports show that Libyan women have faced major setbacks following the 2011 revolution, including an increase in polygamy and limited access to work and education. For example, after voting in Libya’s parliamentary elections on June 25, 2014, lawyer and human rights activist Salwa Bugaighis, who had been active in Libya’s 2011 revolution that overthrew Muammar Gaddafi, was killed in her home. She had encouraged others to overcome their fear of voting, posting a photo of herself at a polling station on her Facebook page. Hours after voting, Bugaighis was shot and killed, along with her gardener, and her husband was abducted. In early 2015, another high-profile women’s rights activist, Intissar al-Hasaari, and her aunt were killed in Tripoli. These examples suggest that although women’s movements can be integral to democratic transition and consolidation, the women who engage in them must be aware of the risks to physical security and to legal and political standing that such activism may entail.

ii. Risks in Post-Conflict Periods

Violence during periods of conflict may also carry over into transitional and post-conflict society, and have a disproportionate effect on women. As a result of war, violence becomes a normalized response to conflict—including interpersonal and familial conflict—rather than peaceful means of dispute resolution, as found in Carey’s (2010) study of violence against women (including femicide) in post-civil war Guatemala (1962 to 1996). Carey finds that the collective experience of civil war contributed to the normalization of violence, including violence against women (pp150-151).

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4 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/libya-women-murder-situation-gaddafi-regime-militias.html#ixzz4K4jxy0ZI
5 In the Guatemalan Civil war, more than 200,000 people, many of them Mayan, were killed, and the war was marked by forced disappearances, arbitrary execution, and other major human rights abuses (Commission for Historical Clarification 2016).

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Similarly, in Liberia, violence against women continues to be a major public health and security concern more than 10 years after the conclusion of its Second Civil War (Anyeko 2016), marked by pervasive use of SGBV by combatants against civilians. Carvalho (2011) finds that in post-war Liberia, at least 50 rapes per month are reported, yet few cases are sent to court due to a lack of resources of the police and judicial system. Carvalho argues that international efforts to support effective justice and recovery for SGBV victims have failed because donors have focused on the immediate problem, not the importance of rebuilding the justice system as a whole (pp136-138).

There is consensus in the literature that, in certain contexts, violence during peacetime can operate in similar ways as it does during war, posing major risks to women’s physical security and wellbeing. Even when a country is not engaged in formal war—either civil or international—it may face circumstances similar to these types of conflict due to gang warfare, drugs, or other organized crime (see Gianatti et al., forthcoming, on women in Rio de Janeiro affected by crime and sexual violence). Bonnin’s (2014) research on violence resulting from the politicization of space in South Africa and Anastario’s (2014) work on election-related sexual violence in Kenya suggest that political violence outside of formal conflict periods can severely discourage women from freely pursuing political and civic activities. Anastario’s research on post-election violence in Kenya (2007-2008) demonstrates that, during periods of political violence, so-called “peacetime” environments can resemble conflict zones and that the characteristics of SGBV in Kenya during the post-election period—multiple perpetrator rape, additional bodily injury, rape by a stranger, and waiting to access health care facilities—closely resembled the characteristics of conflict-related SGBV.

iii. Strategies during Conflict and Transition

Women have developed strategies to overcome the challenges of participation during conflict and after major periods of political transition. Periods of transition from conflict to peacetime may represent periods of fluctuating gender roles, which open political opportunities for women. Female combatants in some contexts have leveraged their increased political standing (achieved during the conflict) to gain rights in the post-conflict era. For example, women in El Salvador who reported having empowering experiences as guerilla fighters were more likely to participate actively in political life after the war ended (Viterna 2003). Luciak (1998) also finds that female combatants lobbied male combatants for inclusion in post-conflict politics in El Salvador and Nicaragua, including by advocating for quotas. In El Salvador, 30% of FMLN combatants were female, and they secured 35% quotas in the party (p43, p50). In Rwanda, Powley (2003) notes that conflict had a major influence on women’s political power. After the 1994 genocide, innovative mechanisms were created that enabled women’s participation in leadership structures at all levels.

Fallon (2002) finds that the transition to democracy in Ghana strengthened women’s movements. These movements, in turn, supported democratic consolidation by encouraging women to vote and engage in politics. Tripp (2016) also observes that women’s movements played a key role in influencing the content of constitutions in Kenya and Somalia during political transitions. In both countries, women’s rights activists took advantage of disarray and divisions among the elite to increase women’s representation in politics by supporting gender quotas (p80, p88). Even in a context of patriarchal norms, women’s movements can help women achieve increased rights and combat discrimination, especially where guarantees of civil and political liberties allow them to organize and mobilize members for collective action (Van Allen 2001). However, in both Kenya and Somalia, Tripp reveals that women
face risks in trying to promote gender equality in politics, including the risk of legal and political discrimination (p94).

In protracted conflicts such as Colombia’s decades-long civil war, women who are displaced due to conflict seek various strategies to enhance their political and civic rights. Lemaitre (2015) found that women’s internally displaced persons (IDP) organizations were most effective when they adopted three broad strategies: adapt to unstable frames, follow vanishing resources, and brave dangerous political opportunities. After the passage of a Victims Law in 2011, organizations changed their names to include the term victim rather than IDP, and new victims’ organizations were created to give the women access to compensation, land restitution, and donor-funded projects. Women’s organizations learned to adapt quickly to the changing priorities or international donors to remain competitive for outside funds. Finally, they braved danger by estimating the risk of collective action and taking steps to counter the risk, specifically limiting their public visibility and presenting themselves as mothers and grandmothers engaged in an extension of “apolitical” domestic work in the public sphere (p13).

In summary, women participate in myriad ways in time of conflict, despite the particular and often gendered risks that participation entails. Some successful strategies for strengthening women’s participation in times of conflict and political transition include leveraging women’s standing as active participants in the conflict (as fighters, leaders); taking advantage of elite divisions to form alliances and advance women’s causes; and mobilizing around intersecting identities.

iv. Participation in Peace Processes
Peace movements and processes also create opportunities for women’s participation that should be further studied. In a quantitative working paper, Stone (2014) finds that peace processes that include women as witnesses, signatories, mediators, and/or negotiators were 20% more likely to last at least two years than agreements that did not include women in the process. A qualitative study of 40 peace negotiations between 1999 and 2013 by Paffenholz et al. (2016) finds that processes in which women’s groups had strong influence on negotiations were more likely to reach agreement than those in which women’s groups had little influence. A study commissioned by UN Women (2015) to evaluate the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)—which requires that women participate at all levels of decision-making in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peacemaking—found that decisions are often made by a small group of male leaders, even if women are included in various stages of the peace process. The authors recommend that international partners and national governments support women’s inclusion in peace building at all levels (p394).

Osman (2014) presents a study of an NGO-led effort to promote grassroots peace building in Afghanistan. The Oxfam program supported primarily female-led civil society organizations that focus on women’s rights to increase these organizations’ contact with, and influence of, elected leaders at the community, provincial, and national levels, with careful attention to participant security. Oxfam finds some evidence that this strategy has been successful, as in the case of the governor of Parwan who publicly changed his position on violence against women and started to meet regularly with women’s civil society groups. But, challenges remain. Osman concludes that “women are peacemakers who facilitate the resolution of local conflict but they are also the victims of conflicts that oppress women and reinforce the cycle of domestic violence, as well as “pawns” given away in Ba’ad as the price of
settling conflicts” (p11). We note that in framing women’s roles as either peacemaker or victim, he reinforces the exclusionary binary in the scholarship on women and war that scholars such as Alison (2009) seek to reform.

In summary, violence and the ensuing social disorder it causes—including trauma, injury and death, displacement, family breakdown, infrastructure collapse, and economic fallout—can have profound impacts on the ways that women and men relate to each other, and on women’s willingness and capacity to participate in politics and civil society. Yet, women’s participation in conflict and during transitions has been little addressed in the literature (Karam 2000). There is growing consensus that it is useful to think about the continuum of violence in different contexts, recognizing that stark demarcations of peace versus conflict can obscure our understanding of how violent norms diffuse both spatially and temporally (Cockburn 2004, Davies and True 2015, Meger 2016). Taking a broad and inclusive definition of what constitutes political violence—not only between warring factions or countries but also between individuals with social and political power and those who are repressed—opens up opportunities for a comprehensive analysis of the ways that violence and conflict can affect, and pose risks to, women’s political and civic participation.

B. Islam, Risk, and Resistance

Broadly speaking, Islam has been singled out as potentially deleterious to women’s empowerment, rights, and political/civic participation. Taken together, cross-national findings lend support to the hypothesis that the Muslim world (in general) and the MENA region (in particular) are exceptional in both dearth of democracy and lower levels of women’s empowerment (Fish 2002, cf. Donno and Russett 2004). However, there is a significant debate on whether Islam itself accounts for low levels of women’s empowerment and participation, a debate that is compounded by intra-regional differences between Muslim countries. The case study literature provides further evidence that there are heterogeneous effects of Islam on women’s political participation and empowerment.

i. Cross-National Findings

In his cross-national study, Fish (2002) finds that Islam constrains democratization indirectly through limiting women’s empowerment. After controlling for a variety of socio-economic variables, Fish finds that countries with a Muslim majority are significantly associated with lower levels of women’s empowerment—measured in differences between men and women’s literacy rates, presence in public office, and the UNDP Gender Empowerment Measure (see also Inglehart and Norris 2003).

However, although Islam has often been cited as the main culprit behind the slow or even incremental development of women’s empowerment in the Middle East, scholars contend that Islam has not deterred women in non-Arab Muslim countries such as Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Pakistan from reaching top-elected positions (Sabbagh 2004). Resistance to changing gender norms in the Muslim world appears to differ between the Arab and non-Arab Muslim world. Donno and Russett (2004) retested Fish’s (2002) findings—adjusting and expanding his measures of women’s empowerment and participation and adding an additional control variable for Arab majority countries—to show that Islam’s

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6 Ba’ad is an ancient Pashtun custom in which families give away young girls to settle conflicts resulting from the commission of misdemeanors and serious crimes. The girls may be forcibly married or treated as slaves (Osman 2014, p14).
predictive power, vis-à-vis a bevy of variables related to the status of women, considerably diminishes or becomes statistically insignificant when controlling for membership in the subset of Arab League states. Thus, it is not Islam in general, but the Arab world in particular, that accounts for the gender gap and authoritarian character of the MENA region.

Furthermore, Rizzo et al. (2007) show that gender equality is negatively associated with support for democracy in the Arab Muslim world but not in the non-Arab Muslim world. Specifically, in the Arab Muslim world “the majority supported democracy as a system of governance, but did not extend the idea of democracy to including women’s rights. In the non-Arab world... support for gender equality was strongly linked to support for democracy” (p.1164). A precise mechanism underlying these findings has yet to be specified. However, as Karam notes, “it has been rightly pointed out that what is at issue is not so much the religion per se, but a broader aspect of neopatriarchy... it is not culture alone that impacts women’s political participation, but a whole host of other factors combine to render the situation as it is” (A. Karam 1999 ctd. Sabbagh 2004, p.55).

Labor market participation also appears to matter. Michael Ross in his article “Oil, Islam, and Women” (2008) argues that the “resource curse” leads to authoritarianism—disempowering women, principally by leaving them out of the labor market. Haghighat (2012) concurs, noting that in countries like Tunisia (no oil, majority Muslim) where the economy was developed through labor-intensive industrial production, there are higher rates of women’s participation in the labor force and politics and an increased status of women.

If labor market participation matters, then a possible state-led strategy for strengthening women’s participation could be economic diversification. Yet, it is unclear from Ross’ findings whether oil is in fact the culprit for the exclusion of women from the workforce or if other cultural factors (e.g., Islam, tribalism, “Arab culture”) remain at play (see Charrad 2009, Spierings et al. 2009). Ross’ (2008) contention of “oil, not Islam” is also incomplete, given that other mineral resource-dependent states do not evince such sector-wide exclusions. Furthermore, Kang (2009), examining 161 countries, reports that the negative effects of oil rents on women’s political representation in parliaments can be offset by the adoption of gender quotas.

Our third observation is that the gender gap in Muslim majority countries extends from formal to informal modes of political participation. Coffé and Dilli (2015) investigate determinants of “less institutional” forms of political participation in Muslim-majority countries. They find that “women are, on average, less likely to actively participate in less institutional forms of politics than men in Muslim-majority nations” (p.539). However, instead of discovering culturally “exceptional” reasons for this gender gap, the authors show that “factors that differentiate Muslim-majority countries from other regions may be of limited importance regarding the influence of individual-level explanations for the gender gap in political participation” (p.539).

ii. Case Study Research
The case study and comparative literature offer an excellent frame for understanding the complex ways in which Islam and women’s empowerment and participation intersect, or not. Women’s agency can take myriad forms within Islamic discourse; it is important to understand Islam as diverse, evolving, and approaching women’s issues gradually and as an integrated part of other long-term goals. In this sense,
collaboration on issues of common interest and benefit is possible including with “bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, women’s organizations, etc.” (Pruzan-Jørgensen 2015, p5). Mahmood (2001) as well as Marsden (2008) alert us to the myriad forms that women’s agency can take within Islamic discourse. These works admonish scholars to be aware of their a priori assumptions regarding how emancipation, agency, or empowerment should, and do, look.

Scholars on Arab women’s political participation have suggested many strategies to promote women’s participation, such as increasing women’s labor force participation and education. Afary (1997) argues that if women are to become less reliant upon their husbands—and therefore free of the need to exude piety to keep and attract a husband—better working conditions, shorter work weeks for mothers, child care centers to support working women, and other measures are needed to reduce the burden of the gendered division of labor. Otherwise, women cannot fully participate in the labor market, civic organizations, social movements, or electoral politics. Cherif (2010) also examines the relationship between Islam and women’s rights movements and notes that promoting women’s core rights in education and labor force participation can moderate the effects of religious culture. As educational levels improve and labor force participation increases, women are better positioned for civic and political engagement.

Some women’s participation in the Muslim world is radicalized or fundamentalist. The literature shows that women’s motivations for joining Islamic movements are complex and multifaceted. Afary (1997) offers that Islamist groups provide shelter from the negative effects of neoliberal late capitalism and the (resultant) fracture of the “traditional family,” as well as representing a moral rebuke of state corruption and indebtedness to foreign powers (p109; see also Wedeen 2003 and Mahmood 2001, p209). Pruzan-Jørgensen (2012) examines how women can assert gender rights within an Islamic framework by looking at the diversity of contentious expressions and challenges associated with mobilization in Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco. The author finds that Islamic women’s activism is an important complement to liberal/secular women’s activism. In many cases, women’s activism within a religious framework enjoys wider local legitimacy—overcoming post-colonial wariness and the idea that women’s empowerment is a Western idea.

In Palestine, where women used their role in the nationalist movement to press political leaders for broader political inclusion, they have met with backlash from Islamic parties and within the Palestinian Authority (Jamal 2001), leading them to seek support outside of the state and in the opposition movements (Jamal 2001, p276). In Kuwait, Rizzo and Youssef (2002) found that people who were highly educated and older tended to oppose women’s rights. On the other hand, Sunni members of volunteer organizations were found to be more supportive of women’s rights than the general Sunni population. For Shias, the opposite was true. Thus, using religious conservatism as a proxy for resistance for women’s rights belies intersectionality and complexity on the ground.

Thus the literature establishes that it is simply not possible to cast Islam, Islamic fundamentalism, or political Islam, in any one light. The roots of resistance to women’s participation in Muslim societies are multifaceted and complex—encompassing political, cultural, and economic factors. Thus, we must look closer and rely on “thick description” and contextual methods of inquiry to parse the multiple points of contact and feedback between these broader phenomena.
iii. Participation in Islamist Parties and Movements

Islamist parties can be an important arena for women’s participation. Marks (2013) shows that—despite post-revolution discourse in Tunisia that has revolved around “the threat of Islamism” to women’s rights—the main Islamist party, Ennahda, was responsible for “42 out the 49 women elected to the 217-member Constituent Assembly.” Marks explains that this is “in part because it was the only major party to fully respect the gender parity rules for electoral lists, and because it mobilized many female activists to win over undecided voters and get people to the polls” (p225). Mona Tajali’s (2015) qualitative, ethnographic field work in Turkey and Iran shows how women gained a foothold in Islamist parties due to the opportunistic desire of such organizations to politicize gender and appear inclusive. Clark and Schwedler (2003) arrive at similar findings on women’s activism in Islamist parties in Jordan and Yemen. Yadav (2010) investigates women’s activism within Islamic organizations through a case study of Yemen and the Islah (the Yemeni Congregation for Reform) party. Yadav portrays Islamist women in Yemen as dynamic actors who respond to changing discursive and institutional circumstances, just as they help to shape them. Their activism is conducted in ways that are spatially private but substantively public in intent and effect. They participate as a segmented public.

Women’s participation in Islamist political parties has increased as women have seized opportunities created by internal party tensions. Women have found greater opportunities not only when party leaders promote women for strategic reasons, but also when they locate spaces that do not exacerbate existing intraparty fissures. A risk is that once inside Islamic parties, women will be relegated to tokens—yet “in recent years it has been conservative and pro-religious parties in Iran and Turkey that have been at the forefront of nominating and recruiting women to higher-level decision-making positions than their secular and liberal counterparts” (Tajali 2015, p581).

Socioeconomic differences affect the nature of women’s participation in Muslim societies. Blaydes and Tarouty (2009) find that wealthier women can join ideological groups—typically Islamic—and act and vote their conscience. Conversely, poorer women have incentives to participate in patronage politics—selling their vote to non-programmatic, regime-supporting parties. The key takeaway is that (ideological) Islamist parties, relative to clientelist parties, offer important if limited avenues for political empowerment for women. In a related study, Blaydes and Linzer (2008), through quantitative cross-national survey research, show that poorer countries and those with the highest male-female wage gaps exhibit higher “levels of fundamentalism among Muslim women.”

iv. Discursive Debates and Islamic Feminism

Discursive debates have proliferated regarding the ostensible tension between “traditional” Islamic values/dogma and feminist concerns—in many cases changing how religious texts and other dictates are interpreted in practice, and thus creating room for feminism within Islam and not in opposition to it. By challenging authority structures, promoting alternative discourses, and gaining access to positions of decision-making in Islamist and other organizations, women can shift hegemonic discourses put in place by authoritarian regimes, patriarchal religious authorities, and the media.

Accordingly, through a combination of historical and discourse analyses, Tajali (2011) traces the trajectory of feminist activism to increase women’s political participation in Iran. This activism has resulted in a transformation of religious norms of authority (political/religious) over time: Tajali argues that “the recent rise in reformist Shi’i ideology regarding female authority is in large part due to...
women’s activism and pressuring of Iranian religious and political elites” (p464). Over time, there has been a marked shift in clerical discourse, from banning women’s access to decision-making positions, to significant, though still circumscribed, moves toward political inclusion. These shifts open further discursive avenues for gender reform in the religious, political, and legal arenas.

Marsden (2008) conducts an ethnographic study (participant observation) of the ways “New Muslim” women in the Chitral region of northern Pakistan have publically criticized and challenged dominant forms of political Islam. Marsden focuses on “the life of one Chitrali woman who in recent years has actively sought to play a vocal and public part in Chitrali debates about what it means to be Muslim, most notably by challenging the pronouncements of Chitral’s Islamizing dashmanan ['hardened' men of learning and piety]” (p414). Marsden suggests that this woman (Amina) represents a trend of women publicly challenging the dominant discourses of political Islam, even in a context of high resistance.

CONCLUSIONS

This report has summarized the findings of a meta-analysis of 417 relevant studies of women’s civic and political participation in the developing world in response to two questions:

1. What are the most effective ways to encourage women’s civic (e.g., volunteer, advocacy, etc.) and political (e.g., voting, running for office) participation?
2. What are the risks to women of these strategies in contexts where resistance to changing gender norms is strong?

Here, we recap our main findings and highlight areas with the greatest need for future research. Although the literature on women’s civic and political participation is generally well developed, the number of rigorous empirical studies that test programmatic strategies for encouraging women’s participation or that systematically consider resistance to changing gender norms is small. Moreover, we found that very few studies specifically examine the risks to women of strategies to increase women’s civic and political participation. Instead, we find general statements that acknowledge resistance and risk, even as the majority of studies do not incorporate these explicitly into the research model.

Nevertheless, we could derive four categories that can be broadly interpreted as strategies for encouraging women’s civic and political participation: gender quotas, social media, social programs, and mobilizing women through their intersecting identities. We also derived two streams of relevant literature that discuss women’s participation and its risks in contexts widely considered to embody strong resistance to changing gender norms.

A. Strategies to Strengthen Participation

The adoption of gender quotas definitely increases the number of women in elected offices at the national and local levels, and can perhaps encourage women to participate more broadly. But, quotas alone do not guarantee improvements in women’s participation. Studies neglect to measure the quality of implementation after quota adoption. Once women are in elected office via quotas, it remains unclear what substantive changes they can bring. Voluntary quotas, and the intervening effects of political parties, also remain understudied. Further, quotas for gender equity in branches of the
government other than the legislature are less common, and their implementation and effects are not well understood. Overall, though, there is suggestive evidence of a diffusion effect in which gender quotas are spreading both globally and within national and local institutions. Once gender quotas are implemented in the legislature, gender equity reforms become more likely in other institutional settings.

Social media can provide a relatively inexpensive, accessible tool for women to participate in civic and political life. Women use social media to highlight issues that disproportionately affect women such as gendered violence and to gain visibility outside traditional mainstream media. Yet, social media also have become a space in which women are contested, harassed, and silenced. Gender and social media, particularly as it pertains to the developing world, is an emerging area of research. There is a need for further study of the specific benefits from and challenges to social media for women users. More research on the way in which online participation translates into civic and political participation would also be welcome.

Social programs that target women appear to be a promising strategy for empowering and mobilizing them. However, these programs almost always impose unanticipated costs, burdens, or risks on the women who participate, thereby creating a depressive effect on women’s participation. The research in this area suggests that there are predictable patterns of adverse impact on women, which should be considered in the planning process of any social program that targets women as beneficiaries.

Finally, we find that women can be encouraged to participate if they are mobilized through intersecting identities—for example, as mothers, workers, or members of a religious group. The literature on intersecting identities is not sufficiently well-developed to point to consistently successful strategies of identity mobilization. The most frequently mentioned frame is that of mobilizing motherhood, but the outcome of this strategy is decidedly ambivalent. Mobilizing women around their identity as mothers may help to mitigate risk or surmount resistance to their participation, but at the cost of reinforcing traditional norms regarding gender roles. Other types of intersecting identities—such as LGBTQIA, disability, age, ethnicity, or race—are not well explored in the literature that we located.

B. Resistance, Risk, and Opportunity

Although conflict and transitional environments, and Islamic culture, often are associated with great risks for women and high resistance to changing gender norms, each of these contexts also offers opportunity for enhancing women's participation. Major changes to social and political life during disruptive periods can facilitate novel modes of participation. Some of the most effective strategies for women during conflict and transition include taking advantage of divisions among the elite, leveraging political standing within armed or civil society groups to influence post-conflict/transition governments, and either countering or conforming to gender norms in response to the risks that activists encounter. In the aftermath of conflict, during quickly shifting political landscapes, women have formed women’s movements, run for office, established legislative gender quotas, and lobbied for government reforms. During conflict, women adopt many roles and express their political agency in a variety of ways; recent literature challenges the historic binary of women as victim/peacemaker and suggests a continued need to question gender stereotypes.

There are several questions that need future research if we are to better understand how to strengthen women’s participation in times of conflict. One is how external agencies can support the domestic
capacity of women’s organizations and movements without undermining their independence and creativity (cf. Direnberger (2011), on women’s rights movements in post-civil war Tajikistan).

Additionally, few studies ask about the relationship between physical violence (one form of resistance to changing gender norms) and women’s activism. We need to know more about when violence against women prompts women to mobilize, and when it discourages activism and participation.

Although there are promising findings from the grey literature on women’s inclusion in peace processes, more systematic research is needed to understand the relationship between women’s descriptive representation in peace processes and substantive results (including outcomes such as duration of settlement and the content of peace agreements). There is little or no mention of the risks—including retaliation or targeting—that women may face when participating in peace processes. This is an urgent question given the extent of state and international agency support for initiatives related to UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which strives to include women in all aspects of conflict prevention, conflict reduction, and peacemaking.

Finally, our review provides evidence to encourage engagement in measured, locally informed efforts to enhance women’s participation in the Muslim world. Our review reveals that when scholars control for economic variables, oil-dependence, and the subset of Arab countries, Islam’s presumed negative effect on women’s empowerment and participation is significantly reduced or disappears altogether. Studies from diverse disciplinary traditions show the effects of Islam on women’s participation to be multifaceted and complex—rendering *a priori* predictions difficult. We find numerous examples where women have been empowered to participate by working within and through Islamic movements, organizations, and discourses. Finally, many of the problems constraining women’s participation in the Muslim world (politically, civically, economically) are shared with countries throughout the global South and North. We conclude that the exceptionalism of the Muslim world generally, and the MENA region in particular, is perhaps overstated.
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APPENDIX A: RAPID KNOWLEDGE MAP SUMMARY

1. Scope of materials reviewed

Sources included:
- 417 coded articles
- Located = 492 sources
- Excluded = 75 sources, for being off-topic, not evidence-based, in the wrong region, and/or in a language in which the team was not sufficiently fluent

Type of materials reviewed:
- 81% journal articles (peer reviewed)
- 13% grey literature
- 6% book chapters, media reports, dissertations, other

Disciplinary area coverage of materials\(^7\)
- 37% political science/international relations
- 27% sociology
- 17% area studies
- 14% gender studies
- 14% interdisciplinary
- 9% development studies
- 9% development studies
- 8% anthropology
- 3% public administration/policy
- 2% history
- 2% communication studies
- 2% other - economics, education, health, law, psychology, religious studies

2. General content of materials reviewed

Regional coverage\(^8\)
- 25% Asia
- 24% Latin America and Caribbean
- 23% Africa
- 15% Middle East
- 7% Afghanistan and Pakistan
- 3% Europe/Eurasia
- 10% Global/multiple regions

Most frequently studied country cases:
- 9% India
- 5% Afghanistan

\(^7\) Does not sum to 100% as some cases are classified in multiple categories.

\(^8\) Does not sum to 100% as some cases are classified in multiple categories.
- 5% Mexico
- 5% South Africa
- 4% China
- 4% Brazil
- 2% Chile
- 2% Argentina
- 2% Iran
- 1% El Salvador
- 1% Bolivia
- 1% Malaysia
- 16% Multiple countries

87% of articles reviewed included at least one USAID country in the sample.

**Type of participation considered:**
- 54% political
- 19% civic
- 25% both political AND civic
- 2% did not consider political or civic participation

**Topical Focus:** Of those articles that studied a particular population of women:
- 36% studied women (or compared women to men) as part of the general population
- 37% studied women as elected leaders (national or local) versus other subgroups
- 37% focused on women in the national political sphere
- 4% focused on women as minorities, by class, as civil society leaders or participants
- Only 1 article focused primarily on LGBTQIA women

**Risk:** Less than 50% (45%) of articles reviewed discussed risks; of these:
- 21% discussed risks to women’s participation
- 8% discussed risks to strategies that strengthen women’s participation
- 19% discussed both risks to participation and risks to strategies

**Resistance:** 69% of articles explicitly discussed resistance to changing gender norms.

**3. Methodological aspects and findings:**
- 67% of articles reviewed were coded as methodologically rigorous (those having a clearly defined, theoretically informed method, using reliable/appropriate data sources, sensible operationalization of concepts, case selection justified)
- 24% were quantitative, the majority based on survey data or aggregate data, but some experimental
- 53% were qualitative, the majority based on either interview or historical/aggregate data, but some participant observation and ethnography
- 8% use mixed methods

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9 Does not sum to 100% as some cases are classified in multiple categories.
- 8% fall in an “other” category (e.g., analytical literature review)
- 55% were case studies
- 4% were program evaluations

**Findings:**
- For 79% of articles, coders reported one or more findings relative to strategies to increase women's participation; however, for just 35% did coders report findings on risks to those strategies.
- For 87% of articles, coders derived some practical implications for strengthening women's civic and/or political participation.

**Annotation selection:**
- 241 (around 58%) of articles met all three initial inclusion criteria for annotation (topic, rigor, USAID country).
- 198 (around 48%) of articles reviewed were recommend by coders for inclusion in the annotated bibliography.