NEPAL Inclusive Governance Survey:

Elaborations and Extensions on the NORC IGP Topline Report

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Introduction

This report elaborates and extends the IGP Topline Report of the Nepal Inclusive Governance Survey. It focuses on citizens’ trust in government institutions, their approval of institutional performance and their satisfaction with the services that public institutions provide. The report also examines citizen perceptions of government corruption and reports of bribery. It briefly examines public knowledge and experience of human trafficking. It also attends briefly to political participation and citizen engagement with government.

The several foci of analysis are disaggregated along several dimensions:

- Geographically, the report compares the results for Nepal as a whole against eleven USAID ZO1 districts where USAID Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DRG) activities are concentrated\(^1\) and seven districts among the hardest hit by the 2015 earthquake.\(^2\) Urban and rural areas are compared as are the five administrative regions (Eastern, Central, Western, Mid-Western and Far-Western) and the three geo-climatic regions (Terai, Hills and Mountains).
- Demographically, the report distinguishes men and women, compares three age groups (under thirty years, 31-50 years and over 50 years) and distinguishes seven education levels.
- Socially, major caste and religious groups are compared.
- Economically the data are disaggregated by several indicators of income, wealth, and poverty.

Descriptions of the sampling frame and field work for the survey are provided in the topline report. To facilitate analyses, the national probability sample (n=780) and oversamples of USAID-targeted and quake-affected districts (n=1200) were merged and post-weighted by district population, creating a nation-wide sample of 1979 cases.

1. Satisfaction with National Government Services

Citizens were asked to assess the quality of seventeen different services provided by the national government. Services were assessed on a four-point scale ranging from 1=Very Bad to 4=Very Good. Figure 1.1 shows that satisfaction varies dramatically across different services. Only small numbers of citizens are very satisfied with any of the services, but large majorities are at least somewhat satisfied with the job the government does protecting rights and liberties, providing health, education, and social security, promoting peace and reconciliation, and protecting against crime. Conversely, large majorities of citizens are somewhat or very dissatisfied with the job the government is doing with regard to the economy such as holding down prices, providing jobs, promoting living standards and providing reliable electricity. Opinions are more evenly divided about the effectiveness with which the government handles migration, human trafficking and giving people a voice. The evidence (not shown) that more than 40 percent of respondents had no opinion on migration and almost 10 percent had no opinion on government’s handling of human trafficking suggests that these are areas where public opinion is not well formed either because the issue is not very salient to the public and/or the public is not very aware of or informed about then issue area.

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\(^1\) These include Kanchapur, Dadeldhura, Doti, Lailali, Bardiya, Banke, Dang, Kapibastu, Surket, Dailekh, and Rukum.

\(^2\) There are Rasuwa, Kathmandu, Makwanpur, Lalipur, Kavrepalanchok, Sindhuli, and Ramechhap.
Assessments of government performance across the seventeen issue areas are remarkably similar across geographic regions, demographic, social and economic groups. Figure 1.2 compares overall satisfaction with all seventeen services, satisfaction with social services (protection of rights, education,
health and social security) and satisfaction with economic services (jobs, prices, living standards and the rich-poor gap). Overall the average level of satisfaction for all seventeen services is 2.33 for Nepal as a whole just below the neutral 2.5 midpoint on the 4-point scale. This compares to an average level of satisfaction of 2.34 in the USAID zone and 2.32 in the quake zone, differences that are trivial. Differences between urban and rural residents also are small. Satisfaction with services are slightly lower in the Far-Western and Terai Regions, but none of the differences is statistically significant.

There are slightly larger differences geographically in public approval of protection and prosperity services. Residents of the quake Zone and especially those in urban areas and the Hill region are the most satisfied with protection services. Approval of protection services is lowest in the Terai. Conversely, approval of economic services is lowest in the quake Zone, in urban areas and the Far-Western region, although none of the differences is large or statistically significant. Citizens in all parts of the country agree that the government does a much better job providing social services than economic services and they give the government a middling grade on its service record overall.

Figure 1.3 compares assessments of government services across various demographic groups. Again the differences are small. Men are slightly more approving of the government’s services than women. Approval of social services generally rises with level of formal education but declines with age. The elderly who depend most on health and social services are least satisfied with them. Interestingly, approval of economic services is highest among those with less than a secondary education and lowest among those with at least a university degree.

Table 1-4 reports only modest differences in public satisfaction with government services by caste or religion. The Newari and Christians are least satisfied with government services overall and also are the least satisfied both with social and economic services. Hindus are slightly more satisfied with the
government’s economic performance as are the Terai/Madhesi. Again, however, caste and religious differences are small.

Figure 1-5 examines economic differences in satisfaction with government services. Because of the size of the informal economy, income is not always the best measure of wealth in the developing world. Wealth and poverty, therefore, are measured in three complementary ways: first using family income, second, by considering the number of consumer goods a household possesses (including radio, television, bicycle, car, motorbike, generator, refrigerator, computer and mobile phone) and third by considering the frequency with which individuals have to do without basic necessities such as food, clean water and needed medical care.

Wealthier individuals express lower satisfaction overall with government services. The pattern is evident only for the highest income levels, but is more apparent when wealth is measured in terms of household possessions and the extent of deprivation. The differences are largest with respect to satisfaction with economic services on which the wealthy feel especially aggrieved.

Despite these small differences, what is most remarkable about the data is the similarity in attitudes about government services across almost all geographic, demographic, social and economic groups. Attitudes toward different services vary considerably, but the public is widely albeit moderately satisfied with the health, education and social security services delivered by government and widely but more strongly dissatisfied with the government’s economic performance.
2. Satisfaction with Local Government Services

Citizens express greater satisfaction overall with the services provided by local government, although assessments of different services vary (See Figure 2-1). For example, fully half of all citizens say that government performs very well in registering citizens and another 43 percent say that government performs this function fairly well. More than 80 percent of citizens also think their local government performs fairly or very well in promoting harmony, and more than 70 percent think the government does a fair to very good job providing health care and education. In all three of the later areas, however, public approval, though widespread is tepid. Many more citizens say that government is performing fairly well than very well. Still the level of approval is impressive. Interestingly, approvals of health and education services are very similar to those registered when citizens were asked about their satisfaction with national government services in these areas. This may suggest that citizens do not clearly distinguish the independent contributions of different levels of government when assessing health and education but credit both levels of government for the services received.

Local governments are given lower marks for maintaining roads and markets. Small majorities say that local governments perform fairly or very badly in both areas. Except for registering citizens, where public approval of government performance is intensely positive, assessments of government performance in
other areas are more moderate. There are no areas where majorities of citizens rate government performance as very bad, unlike assessments of the national government’s handling of jobs and prices (See Figure 1-1).

As shown in Figure 2-2, the average assessment of all local services is 2.81 for the country as a whole. This is well about the neutral 2.5 mid-point on the four point scale and nearly half a point higher than the 2.33 average assessment of national government services reported in Figure 1-2. Citizen assessments of local government services vary somewhat more across different parts of the country, however. For example, local service assessments are slightly lower in USAID-targeted districts and, especially, in earthquake-affected areas. It is not clear from the data whether the latter is a function of dissatisfaction with local responses to the earthquake, but in any case, the differences are small especially given the magnitude of the earth-quake damage.

Urban residents express modestly higher satisfaction with local services than those in rural areas. Local service satisfaction is lowest in the Far-Western and Hill regions. Despite these geographic differences, satisfaction with local services is consistently higher than satisfaction with national services in all areas and regions.

This does not necessarily mean, however, that local governments perform better, although this is certainly one possibility. Another possibility is simply that the national government is responsible for more intractable issues such as jobs and prices. A third is that local communities tend to be more homogenous and more harmonious and are looked upon somewhat more positively that the larger, more distant national government regardless of their actual performance. Further analysis is needed to test the different possibilities.
Socially, there are few differences in local service assessments. Men and women are equally positive about local government services, and there are no consistent differences by level of education. Younger
citizens generally rate local services slightly lower than their elders, and citizens over fifty years evaluate local services highest on average. There is no way to tell in a single survey if these differences are generational and will persist over time or if they are age-related such that younger citizens will become more like their elders over time. The differences, however, are small, and all age groups are positive on balance about local services.

Caste and religious differences in assessments of local service delivery are modest as well. Assessments are most positive for the Terai/Madhesi Brahmin/Rajput and lowest for the Hill/Mountain Janajati and Terai/Madhesi other castes. Among religious groups, Hindus assess local services most positively. Muslim and Christians are less enthusiastic but still positive; Buddhist assessments fall in between.

Figure 2-4 reports the relationship between income/wealth and satisfaction with local government services. Differences related to reported income are generally small although higher income respondents tend to be slightly more satisfied. The relationship appears even stronger when satisfaction is disaggregated by household possessions. Those reporting more household goods are more satisfied with local government services and the relationship holds across virtually all levels of wealth. Conversely, those respondents who report having more often to do without life’s necessities are less satisfied with local services. Interestingly the pattern is stronger and in the opposite direction to that observed between income/wealth and satisfaction with national services. One possible reason for this difference is that the survey asks about different services at the national and local level. In particular, national services include providing jobs, constraining prices and improving standards of living. These are areas widely perceived as being performed very badly, and which wealthier respondents are more likely than the poor to give the national government low marks.

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3. Satisfaction with Government Institutions

Sections 1 and 2 examine the public’s satisfaction with a variety of the services provided by national and local governments. The Nepal Inclusive Governance Survey also asked respondents to consider the performance of the service provider institutions. This is a rather subtle distinction for most citizens to make, but at least in theory citizens should be able to distinguish broad categories of services from more specific service providers.

Figure 3-1 reports public satisfaction with eleven local and national intuitions. Overall the public expresses even greater satisfaction with institutions than with the services they provide. Consistent with the patterns observed above, the public expresses greatest satisfaction with VDC/Municipal institutions. Nearly a quarter say they are very satisfied with local government and another 65 percent say they are at least somewhat satisfied.

Health and educational institutions also are rated very positively – health posts and sub-health posts even more than district hospitals although the differences are tiny. Secondary schools are rated higher than primary schools, although both are rated highly.
Local development offices also are rated highly although a quarter of respondents said they either had no experience with or no opinion about these institutions. Similarly more than 40 percent of respondents had no experience with or no opinion about their District Forrest Office and nearly as many did not know or offer opinions about the Agricultural Office. More than half of all respondents (including 50 percent of women) said they had no experience with or opinion about the Women and Children offices. These large percentages of non-responses are powerful indicators that these questions are measuring what survey research experts call ‘non-attitudes.’ When asked about institutions with which they have little experience and no opinion, many people with admit they don’t know. Many others, however, will answer the question anyway so as not to appear uneducated to the interviewer. The responses, as a result, have limited meaning. Public confidence in health and educational institutions have low percentages of no opinions and are probably meaningful. The data on other institutions are more problematic and probably should be discounted except for the fact that public knowledge of the institutions is very low.

Figure 3-1: Public Satisfaction with Services Provided by Eleven Local and National Institutions

Figure 3-2 breaks down public satisfaction with all eleven institutions and, more specifically, with health and educational institutions by geographic area. Overall, public satisfaction is highest for schools. The national average of 3.02 is more than a half-point above the mid-point of the 1-4 scale. Institutional satisfaction is somewhat lower in the USAID-assisted zone. Satisfaction also is slightly lower in urban areas and the Far-Western region. It is highest in the Eastern region. Satisfaction with health care institutions is especially low in the Far-Western and Mountain regions. Those living in the Mountain region express relative high satisfaction with their schools as do residents of the Eastern and Central regions.
Satisfaction with national and local institutions does not vary much across different social groups (Figure 3-3). Men’s and women’s attitudes are very similar. Women and men express greatest satisfaction with schools followed by health care institutions, but they are more satisfied than not with all institutions.
Older citizens express slightly more satisfaction with schools and the youngest express the least satisfaction with health care institutions; the differences are small, however, and not statistically significant. Less educated respondents express slightly more satisfaction with the schools than those with more education. Otherwise there are few differences in institutional satisfaction by education.

Figure 3-4 demonstrates that there is general satisfaction with Nepal’s institutions across all of the major castes and religions. Satisfaction is highest among the Terai/Madhesi Dalit and the Terai/Madhesi other castes. It is lowest among the Newari. Satisfaction with health institutions is especially high among the Terai/Madhesi Dalit but lowest among the Hill Dalit. The Terai/Madhesi Brahmin/ Rajput are least satisfied with their schools.

Among religious groups Muslims are the most satisfied and Buddhists the least. Muslims are especially satisfied with their schools but are much less satisfied with health care institutions. Opinions among Christians are similar but the difference in satisfaction between schools and health care institutions is slightly smaller.

Wealth and poverty-related differences in Institutional satisfaction are hard to interpret. Overall reported income is largely unrelated to satisfaction with institutions. However, Satisfaction with schools declines with income while satisfaction with health care institutions increases.

Measuring wealth as the number of household goods a family possess confirms the negative relationship between wealth and school satisfaction but shows no consistent relationship between wealth and satisfaction with health institutions.
Conversely, the poorest respondents who most often have to go without life’s necessities are slightly less satisfied with their schools but significantly more satisfied with health care providers.

Although there are some intriguing patterns in the data on institutional satisfaction, the data should be interpreted with caution not only because the patterns observed are at best faint but also because the very large percentages of respondents who are unaware of many of these institutions raise concerns about the validity of the remaining responses. Satisfaction with service-providing institutions is probably better measured by public satisfaction with the services themselves.

### 4. Political/Institutional Trust

Institutional trust is usually interpreted as a deeper, more fundamental, and more enduring form of support for an institution than satisfaction with the services the institution delivers. Satisfaction with services may rise and fall, according to this view, but trust should be more stable and enduring. Indeed, trust is supposed to allow institutions to survive and function effectively even in times when the public is at least temporarily displeased with the institution’s performance.
The Nepal Inclusive Governance Survey asked citizens whether or not they trusted nine different formal and informal institutions and leaders “to protect their interests.” Unfortunately the survey only recorded yes/no responses and did not allow respondents to indicate different levels or intensities of trust as is much preferred. Still the data can provide some basic information on the extent of trust among different sub-groups, even if the binary measures probably should not be compared to similar measures over time.

As indicated in Figure 4-1, citizens have little trust in either the President or Parliament. They express only slightly more trust for local government despite their generally positive assessments of local services (see Section 2). The police are the most trusted institution in Nepal and by a big margin; nearly three-quarters of all citizens say they trust the police to protect their interests. Community elders are the second most trusted followed by the courts, the Prime Minister and the Army. Except for police and community elders, which are trusted by 55 percent of respondents, no other individual or institution is trusted by as much as half of the public.

Importantly, four of the five most trusted institutions are instruments of authority (police, courts, army and Prime Minister) and are responsible in one way or another for enforcing the law. Even more interesting is the fact that the least trusted institutions on the list of nine are NGOs which are trusted by barely 10 percent of respondents.

There are several possible explanations for the poor showing of NGOs. One is simply that many people do not know the term NGO and have no reason to trust something they don’t know. Development officials take it as an act of faith that everyone is familiar with NGOs because they play such prominent roles in the development world. In fact, even in NGO-saturated societies, most people have little knowledge of and little direct contact with NGOs. Another possibility is that those who have heard of
NGOs do not have a very good understanding of what NGOs do and have little reason to think that NGOs work to “protect their interests.” Of course, it also is possible that most people do know NGOs and the functions they perform but simply do not trust them for any number of possible reasons. In any case, the minimal level of trust in NGOs, whatever its source, is problematic from a service delivery point of view.

Figure 4-2: Mean Percentage of Trust in All Institutions, Executive Institutions (President and Prime Minister) Institutions of Authority (Army and Police) and Informal Institutions (Elders and NGOs) by Geographic Area
Further analysis of the trust data indicate that the 9 institutions cluster into three categories: Executive Institutions (President and Prime Minister), Authority Institutions (Police, Army, and Courts) and Informal Institutions (Elders and NGOs) with the other institutions standing apart. Figure 4-1 compares the mean levels of trust in all institutions, and separately in executive, authority and informal institutions across the standard geographic divisions.

Overall trust in the nine institutions is very low. The average level of trust is only 29 percent. Average trust in the executive institutions is slightly higher at 35 percent. Clearly the greatest trust is in the three authority institutions which are trusted by 56 percent on average. Trust in the two informal institutions averages 30 percent.

Trust overall is higher in the USAID and earthquake-affected areas of the country than in the rest of the country although the differences are small. Interestingly, trust in NGOs is significantly higher in areas where USAID works and is very slightly higher in the earthquake-affected zone as well.

Trust in most institutions is slightly higher in urban areas. The one exception is trust in executive institutions which is relatively higher in rural areas but still very low in absolute terms.

There are big regional differences in trust. The highest trust is in the mid-western region where trust averages 33 percent overall and trust in authority institutions exceeds 75 percent. Trust is lowest in the Eastern region where trust averages only 20 percent and barely 50 percent trust authority institutions on average. Trust is highest in the Mountains, lowest in the Terai.

Figure 4-3 shows the relationship of trust to sex, age and education. Trust differences between women and men are small. Women are slightly more likely to trust authority institutions; other differences, including trust in informal organizations/NGOs are not significant.

Trust appears to decrease gradually with age and life-experience. The differences are small but generally consistent across the different types of trust.

Educational differences in trust are larger. Consistent with research in other new democracies, trust tends to increase with education. This is especially noticeable for trust in informal institutions, including NGOs; trust is dramatically higher among those with post-graduate degrees, a small but interesting subgroup that provides the leadership for many NGOs. Interestingly trust in both executive and authority institutions appears to increase with education through about the end of secondary school and then begins to decline thereafter.

There are big differences in trust across different castes and religions (Figure 4-4). Overall trust is highest among the Hill Brahmin/Chettri and the Hill Dalit at an average of about 40 percent across the nine institutions. Trust is lowest among the Terai/Madhesi Brahmin/ Rajput and the Terai/Madhesi Dalit both of whom average about 30 percent trust across all institutions.

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3 A principal components analysis of the nine institutions produced three factors or dimensions with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. Institutions with factor loadings greater than .50 were considered to be part of a dimension.
There are clear differences between the Hill and Terai Castes with the latter less trusting of virtually all institutions. Trust in authority institutions is about 20 percentage points lower among the Terai castes, for example. Trust in informal institutions is highest among the Hill Brahmin/Chettri at 34 percent but is only 17 percent among the Terai/Madhesi Brahmin/ Rajput.

There are big differences in trust across religious groups as well. Christians, Hindu and Buddhists have average levels of trust overall, but Muslim trust in institutions is almost ten percentage points lower. Christians are significantly more likely to trust authority institutions and the executive. Muslims are least
likely to trust both and by substantial margins. Muslims and Christians are less likely to trust informal institutions including NGOs. Buddhists trust informal institutions most closely followed by Hindus.

Overall there is little relationship between institutional trust and income, but this overall pattern disguises big differences in different types of trust. Trust in the executive, for example, declines sharply as incomes rise. Among those reporting incomes below 30,000 Rs, 30 percent of respondents say they trust the executive. Among those at the top end of the spectrum reporting incomes of more than 50,000 Rs; only 8 percent trust the president and prime minister on average.
Interestingly, the relationship between income and trust in informal institutions is just the opposite; trust rises with income. Fewer than 30 percent of those earning under 20,000 Rs trust informal institutions including NGOs and community elders. This figure nearly doubles to 45 percent among those in the highest income category.

The relationship between income and trust in authority institutions is different still and resembles the pattern observed for education. Trust is lowest among the lowest and highest incomes and highest in the middle.

![Figure 4-5: Mean Trust in All Institutions, Executive Institutions, Institutions of Authority and Informal Institutions by Income, Wealth and Poverty](image)

The relationship between income and trust in authority institutions is different still and resembles the pattern observed for education. Trust is lowest among the lowest and highest incomes and highest in the middle.
The relationship between trust and wealth as measured by household possessions is less clear. None of the patterns observed for income can be seen in the data on household wealth. There are differences in trust but most are small and there are no obvious patterns.

Poverty as measured by the frequency with which individuals have to go without some of life’s necessities has a still different relationship to trust. All three forms of trust decline with poverty. Those living in the most extreme poverty are 10 percent less likely to trust authority institutions than those who never have to do without necessities. They are only about half as likely to trust informal institutions, although they are about equally likely to trust executive intuitions—trust in which is almost universally low.

5. Social Trust

Political trust addresses the question of the extent to which citizens have confidence that political institutions and leaders will work to defend their interests. It speaks to defending the interests of people collectively at a distance. Social trust is much more personal and immediate. It speaks to the confidence that people have that there are others in their community to whom they can turn for help in a moment of crisis.

The Nepal Inclusive Governance Survey asked citizens whether or not they would trust each of eleven different individuals and organizations, “if you were harmed or threatened.” Again, unfortunately, the survey only allowed yes/no answers and did not measure the extent or intensity of trust, which means that future comparisons to these data are problematic. Also virtually no one refused to answer any of the 11 questions or indicated that they were not sure whether or not they trusted any of the organizations, which raises additional concerns.4

Figure 5-1 reports the results and shows that citizens overwhelming express trust in the police. Nearly 90 percent say they would trust the police to help if they were harmed or threatened. Smaller but still substantial majorities also say they would trust a family member (60.5 percent) or a Community Elder (53.9 percent).

Trust in others falls off dramatically. Only about 12 percent trust local governments or soldiers. Fewer than 10 percent trust women’s shelters. Five percent trust health workers or NGOs, and only about 3 percent trust school teachers or religious leaders for help.

Interpreting the meaning of these data is tricky since there are several possible ways to interpret “trust.” People may trust the police because the police have the power and authority to help even if citizens are not convinced that the police would actually act on their behalf. Conversely, people may trust their families to provide support and comfort even if they are not convinced their family has the power/ability to actually help. It is interesting in this regard that virtually all of those trusted by more than 10 percent

4 Typically in surveys a few people answer don’t know or refuse to answer the most innocuous questions such as their sex, age, the year they were born, or if they ate breakfast that morning. The same is true if you ask them if they love their children. Usually when you ask about attitudes toward authority figures such as the police, “don’t know” responses and refusals substantially increase. Asking about trust in eleven institutions, including authority institutions such as police and soldiers, and having no one say ‘don’t know’ or refuse to answer is extremely unusual and raises questions about the quality of survey fieldwork.
of respondents possess some official power or authority, except for family. Those with less than 10 percent trust may possess moral authority but little actual power to help in an emergency.

![Figure 5-1: Trust in Various Individuals and Groups to Help if "You Were Harmed or Threatened"

Figure 5-2 shows the distribution of social trust across the country. Average trust in all individuals and organizations provides a rough estimate of the number of sources that different groups feel they can trust and thus can be considered a crude indicator of social capital.

There are only modest geographic variations in social trust. There is slightly but significantly higher trust in the USAID-assisted area than in the country as a whole. Trust in the earthquake zone also is higher than in the nation as a whole, but not significantly. Those living in the quake zone have slightly higher trust in the police to help. Differences in trust for other potential sources of help are trivial at best. Trust in religious leaders is especially low both in the USAID and quake zones in relative terms, but the absolute difference are small and non-significant.

There are small but predictable urban rural differences in social trust. Trust overall is slightly but not significantly higher in urban areas and urban residents are more likely to trust the police and women’s shelters by small amounts. Rural residents are significantly more likely to trust community elders. To the extent that anyone trusts religious leaders, they mostly live in rural areas.

Overall trust is highest in the Mid-Western region and lowest in the Eastern. There is little regional variance in trust in the Police which varies between 85 and 90 percent. Trust in community elders is highest in the Mid-Western region and lowest in the Far-Western, and the different is considerable. Trust in Women’s shelters is highest in the Western region at 13 percent; trust in religious leaders is highest in the Eastern region at about 6 percent and virtually zero in the Far-west. There are no differences worth mentioning between the Mountains, Hill, and Terai.
Figure 5-2: Average Percentage Trusting All Social Institutions, Police, Community Elders, Women's Shelters and Religious Leaders to help in a Crisis Disaggregated by Geography

- **Nepal**: 23.9% All, 53.8% Police Officer, 28.5% Community Elder, 25.6% Women's Shelter, 23.8% Religious Leader
- **USAID**: 28.5% All, 51.8% Police Officer, 25.0% Community Elder, 25.0% Women's Shelter, 20.5% Religious Leader
- **Quake Zone**: 25.6% All, 50.0% Police Officer, 25.6% Community Elder, 10.0% Women's Shelter, 1.0% Religious Leader
- **Rural**: 23.6% All, 57.0% Police Officer, 25.0% Community Elder, 3.0% Women's Shelter, 8.6% Religious Leader
- **Urban**: 25.0% All, 40.3% Police Officer, 12.6% Community Elder, 0.2% Women's Shelter, 12.6% Religious Leader
- **Eastern**: 20.5% All, 51.4% Police Officer, 20.5% Community Elder, 5.4% Women's Shelter, 8.4% Religious Leader
- **Central**: 23.8% All, 58.1% Police Officer, 23.8% Community Elder, 8.7% Women's Shelter, 2.4% Religious Leader
- **Western**: 21.8% All, 49.6% Police Officer, 21.8% Community Elder, 13.0% Women's Shelter, 0.9% Religious Leader
- **Midwestern**: 32.7% All, 61.3% Police Officer, 32.7% Community Elder, 8.5% Women's Shelter, 0.8% Religious Leader
- **Farwestern**: 26.1% All, 37.9% Police Officer, 26.1% Community Elder, 9.2% Women's Shelter, 0.2% Religious Leader
- **Mountain**: 27.2% All, 51.0% Police Officer, 27.2% Community Elder, 9.7% Women's Shelter, 1.2% Religious Leader
- **Hill**: 25.7% All, 51.0% Police Officer, 25.7% Community Elder, 8.4% Women's Shelter, 2.3% Religious Leader
- **Terai**: 22.8% All, 55.4% Police Officer, 22.8% Community Elder, 9.9% Women's Shelter, 2.6% Religious Leader
Figure 5-3 examines social trust by sex, age and education. With one exception, trust in social institutions does not vary significantly between women and men. The one exception is trust in women’s shelters which is effectively zero for men and 18 percent for women. Still, trust in Women’s shelters
ranks only fourth in trust among women, far behind police, community leaders, and family members (the latter is not shown).

Trust in social institutions as a whole appears to decline slowly with age but the differences are small. Trust in the police rises with age and is over 90 percent among those over 50 years of age. Trust in women’s shelters is predictably higher among the young while trust in religion is higher among the oldest cohort.

Figure 5-4: Average Percentage Trusting All Social Institutions, Police, Community Elders, Women’s Shelters and Religious Leaders to Help in a Crisis Disaggregated by Caste and Religion
Social trust generally increases with education. This is certainly true for trust in the police and for trust in women’s shelters as well. Conversely trust in religious leaders and community elders declines significantly as education increases.

Caste and religious differences in social trust also are substantial (Figure 5-5). Although overall trust varies moderately from 19 percent (Terai/Madheshi Dalit) to 28 percent (Newari), differences in trust for specific individuals and organizations are even larger. For example trust in the police ranges from 77 percent for the Terai/Madheshi Brahmin/ Rajput to 95 percent of the Newari. The Terai/Madheshi other castes have the greatest trust in community elders at 64 percent while the Terai/Madheshi Brahmin/ Rajput have the lowest at 28 percent. Trust in women’s shelters is highest in the Terai/Madheshi Brahmin/ Rajput at a remarkable 42 percent and is lowest at 2 percent among the Terai/Madheshi Dalit.

![Figure 5-5: Average Percentage Trusting All Social Institutions, Police, Community Elders, Women’s Shelters and Religious Leaders to help in a Crisis disaggregated by Income, Wealth and Poverty](image-url)
Among the major religious groups, Christians express the most social trust overall while Muslims have the least though’ again, different religions trust different social institutions. Christians in particular trust the police (93 percent) and Buddhists trust police the least (at 72 percent). Muslims are more than 20 percentage point more likely to trust community elders (75 percent) and are far more likely to trust religious leaders in a crisis by 21 percent versus 2 percent or less for other religions. Christians are slightly more likely to trust women’s shelters; fewer than 2 percent of Muslims trust shelters.

Figure 5-5 examines income, wealth and poverty against social trust. Again, the differences are seen not in the overall level of social trust but in the specific objects of trust. Higher income respondents are slightly more likely to trust the police and substantially less likely to trust community elders. Higher income respondents also are least likely to trust religious leaders for help in a crisis. The same pattern can be seen if not quite as distinctly in the data on wealth as measured by household possessions.

The most impoverished citizens who most frequently have to do without basic necessities perceive the fewest places to turn in a crisis (by 19 percent to about 23 percent). They are the most trusting, however, of religious leaders and are among the most trusting of police. They are less trusting of community elders and of women’s shelters.

6. Bribery and Corruption

The opposite side of institutional satisfaction and trust are perceptions of corruption, and the two are frequently related. Perceptions that the system is rigged and that institutional services are for sale to the highest bidder undermine trust both in specific institutions and in the political system as a whole. Corruption also is considered to be a major impediment to economic development.

A distinction usually is made between grand corruption and petty corruption. Grand corruption involves kickbacks to government officials from businesses for contracts, favorable legislation, regulatory relief and the like. The number of participants is small but the money involved is substantial. Petty corruption usually involves bribes paid by individual citizens to lower level bureaucrats either to avoid a larger penalty or to expedite or secure a public service to which the citizen is freely entitled under the law. The scale of petty corruption is much wider. Although the money per bribe is much smaller, the total paid in bribes is substantial.

The Nepal Inclusive Governance Survey asked citizens about their own experiences with corruption, specifically whether or not they had paid a bribe in the previous twelve months. It also asked whether they or someone they know had experienced corruption in the past twelve months, although this question did not define corruption5 and few respondents are likely to know if one of their family or friends experienced corruption however defined. Finally the survey includes a question asking respondents their perceptions of whether corruption is worse at the national or local level or about the same for both. Unfortunately the survey does not ask how extensive they think corruption is at either level. Transparency International has a much bigger and better battery of questions about corruption in Nepal which has been asked over time. The TI data would provide a much better indication of both perceptions and experiences of bribery.

5 There are many forms of corruption of which bribery is only one albeit perhaps the most common one. Corruption also include nepotism, clientelism, favoritism, embezzlement, extortion, and blackmail among others.
Figure 6-1 reports the percentage of citizens who say that they or people they know have experienced corruption as well as those who admit to having paid bribes to various officials in the past 12 months. The experience of corruption and reports of bribe paying yield very similar results. About 9 percent have experienced corruption or know someone who has. Seven percent say they paid a bribe to at least one of seven agencies over the previous year.

Three agencies account for the great majority of bribes: Land Services, Registry/Permits, and Police in that order. The absolute number paying bribes to these agencies however is very small – less than three percent of citizens each. Reported bribe-paying to other agencies is even lower, less than 1 percent of respondents in every case. These numbers are considerably lower than those reported by Transparency International, although TI examines a larger and somewhat different set of agencies.6

Assessing the scope of corruption is difficult. The bribery question refers only to the past twelve months. It is likely the some people who did not pay bribes in 2014 did so in 2013 or periodically at earlier times. Second, people only pay bribes when they have a need for a service. Not everyone has an encounter with the police or a court or a permit office every year. So the percentage of bribe-paying among those who had contact with these agencies in the past years is certainly higher.

When asked their perceptions of corruption as opposed to their experiences, 29 percent said they though the national government was more corrupt than local governments, but 55 percent said they were equally corrupt.

6 Transparency International reported in 2013 that 27 per cent of respondents paid a bribe to one of twelve public agencies when accessing public services and institutions in the last 12 months. This number was largely unchanged from previous years. See http://www.tinepal.org/?p=404.
Figure 6-2: reports bribe paying and perceptions of corruption by geographic area. It shows, for example, that the incidence of bribery is somewhat lower in the USAID zone and significantly lower in the quake zone. At the same time, those in the quake zone and to a lesser extent the USAID zone tend to see corruption as more of a national than a local problem. Indeed virtually no one in the quake zone thought that local corruption was worse.

The incidence of corruption is modestly but significantly higher in rural areas by 7.4 to 4.5 percent. Urban areas, however, are much more likely to see corruption as a national problem. Most bribery, of course, is paid locally even when it is paid to a representative of the national government. Perhaps that is why rural respondents who are more likely to pay bribes see bribery as being higher locally than urban residents.

Reports of bribery are highest in the Eastern and Central regions and the Terai. Bribery is lowest in the Mid-Western and the Hill regions. Consistent with the speculation that paying bribes increases perceptions of local corruption, those regions with the highest reported rates of bribery report the greatest concern with local corruption and the least with national corruption.

Figure 6-3 shows that men are the principal bribe payers in the family by a ratio of more than 2:1. Bribe paying goes up very slightly, though not significantly, with age and increases slightly with education before spiking among college graduates. Contrary to the pattern observed above, highly educated respondents with the highest bribery levels also are much more likely to perceive national corruption as more of a problem than local corruption. Those with no formal education and those over 50 are most likely to emphasize local over national corruption.

There are large caste and religious differences in the experience and perception of corruption (Figure 6-4). In very general terms the Hill and Mountain castes report lower levels of bribery whereas the Terai
castes report substantially higher rates. Indeed 23 percent of the Terai/Madhesi Brahmin/Rajput report paying bribes in the past year as do 14 percent of the Terai/Madhesi other castes and almost 9 percent of the Terai/Madhesi Dalit.

**Figure 6-3: The Experience and Perception of Corruption by Sex, Age, and Education**

**Figure 6-4: The Experience and Perception of Corruption by Caste and Religion**
Similarly, virtually all of the Mountain and Hill castes attribute corruption overwhelmingly to the national government and very little to local government, whereas the Terai castes see local corruption as worse.

In terms of religion, reported bribe paying is highest among Buddhists (8 percent) and lowest among Christians (2 percent) although the differences are modest. Most of the religious groups agree in blaming the national government for corruption more than local government. The clear exception are Muslims, 41 percent of whom say local corruption is worse compared to only 11 percent who think national corruption is the larger problem.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>&lt;20,000 Rs</th>
<th>&lt;30,000</th>
<th>&lt;40,000</th>
<th>&lt;50,000</th>
<th>&gt;50,000 Rs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Any Bribe</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National More Corrupt</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local More Corrupt</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household Goods</th>
<th>Few</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>Many</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Any Bribe</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National More Corrupt</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local More Corrupt</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deprivations</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>Three</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Any Bribe</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National More Corrupt</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local More Corrupt</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There is a debate among corruption scholars about the impact of wealth on corruption. Some say the wealthy are better able to afford bribes, others argue that the wealthy often have connections that can help them get services without having to pay bribes. In Nepal, at least, it appears that the wealthy are more likely to pay bribes.

Figure 6-5 shows a generally steady rise in bribe paying across the various income levels from a low of 6.3 percent for those earning less than 20,000 Rs to a high of 14.1 percent for those with incomes over 50,000 Rs. Contrary to the thesis that bribe payers are more likely to blame the local government, higher income respondents are more likely to say that national corruption is higher and less likely to blame local corruption.

In terms of wealth, those with more household possessions are more likely to report paying bribes and more likely to blame the national government as well. Conversely, poverty as measured by the frequency of going without basic necessities, reduces bribery. Indeed none of those in the most abject poverty reported paying a bribe. In all likelihood they did not have the ability to do so even if they were willing.

7. Resilience

Resilience is the ability of people to cope with adversity and to recover and rebuild their lives when they have suffered loss, whether psychological or material. It is an important trait in the developing world where natural and man-made disasters are common and where the lack of government resources often puts the onus of recovery on the individual and local community.

There is some controversy about resilience theory – whether resilience is genetic or learned, what factors might lead to increased resilience, if any, and most basically how to measure resilience.

The Nepal Inclusive Governance Survey asked respondents a series of questions designed to measure their capacity for resilience. Specifically it gave them 10 phrases and asked how well each of the phrases described themselves:

1. I have people in my life I respect;
2. I share/cooperate with people around me;
3. My family is supportive toward me;
4. If I am hungry I can usually get enough food;
5. Spiritual beliefs are a source of strength for me;
6. I am proud of my ethnic background;
7. I talk to my family/partner about how I feel;
8. I know where to go if I need help;
9. I feel that I belong in my community
10. I feel it is important to help out in my community.

Figure 7-1 reports the percentages of respondents who think these terms apply to themselves. On the surface the terms do not appear to be very revealing. Virtually everyone thinks all ten of the terms apply to them at least to some extent. Fewer than 10 percent in most cases say the terms do not describe them even a little. Perhaps this is understandable in a country that has confronted and overcome so many challenges over the years. Maybe only the resilient survive. Still, the lack of variance is problematic in terms of statistical analysis.
A commitment to helping the community is the most widely claimed attribute among those interviewed. Fully 99 percent claim the attribute; 29 percent say it describes themselves somewhat and 70 say it describes them a great deal. Having a supporting family, being someone who shares or cooperates with others, having people one respects, being able to get food when hungry and feeling a sense of belonging in the community also are attributes claimed by virtually everyone, most saying these are characteristics they possess a great deal. At the opposite end of the spectrum, “only” 85 percent of respondents say spiritual beliefs are at least somewhat a source of strength for them, and only 37 percent say this describes them to a great degree. Still, according to respondents’ self-assessments, they are brimming with the qualities that contribute to resilience.

Further analysis of these data indicate that the 10 attributes cluster into two broad categories which can be defined broadly as a helping/sharing cluster and an identity/belonging cluster.

Figure 7-1: Extent to Which Nepali Think the Following Indicators of Resilience Apply to Themselves

Further analysis of these data indicate that the 10 attributes cluster into two broad categories which can be defined broadly as a helping/sharing cluster and an identity/belonging cluster.7

Figure 7-2 compares the mean levels of resilience for all ten attributes, the 4 helping attributes and the 3 identity attributes across the standard geographic divisions. For the country as a whole the average resilience score across the ten items is a very robust 3.54 on the four-point attribute scale. The average helping/sharing score is even higher at 3.64, while the score nationally for identity/belonging is 3.29 – relatively low but very high in absolute terms on a four-point scale.

7 A principal components analysis of the 10 attributes produces two factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. The first, defined as a “help” cluster includes the attributes sharing/cooperating, helping the community, getting food when hungry, and knowing where to get help. The second, defined as an identity cluster includes spirituality, ethnic/family pride and talking to partner.
Resilience attributes overall are about average in the USAID zone but are highest in the earthquake zone at 3.68. Whether this is a response to dealing with the earthquake and its aftermath or an attribute that preceded the quake cannot be determined in these data. The quake zone is especially high in helping/sharing. It is relatively high in identity/belonging also but not by as large of a margin.
Resilience, especially helping/sharing attributes, are somewhat higher in urban areas. Resilience generally and helping/sharing are especially high in the Mid-Western region and lowest in the Far-Western region, although “lowest” is strictly a relative term; resilience attributes are high in absolute terms everywhere. Resilience and helping are highest in the Hill region. There are far fewer and smaller differences geographically in belonging/identity.

As indicated in Figure 7-3, resilience does not vary appreciably between men and women. The differences are tiny and non-significant. There appears to be is a slight decline in resilience among those over fifty. However, the decline is not significant and is smaller than might be expected of those later in life.

In contrast, there is a strong association between resilience and education. Higher educated respondents score significantly higher in overall resilience, especially helping/sharing. Again, there are no significant differences in identity/belonging.

Differences in resilience across caste and religion are generally modest. As shown in Figure 7-4, the Terai/Madhesi Brahmin/ Rajput and the Newari register highest in overall resilience and in helping/sharing. Except for the Terai/Madhesi Brahmin/ Rajput, however, other Terai castes score lower both in overall resilience and helping/sharing. The lowest resilience scores are those of the Terai/Madhesi Dalit, who are not only low in helping/sharing but also in identity/belonging.

Among religious groups, the Buddhists are highest in helping; Christians are significantly lowest in identity/belonging. The two roughly balance out meaning that religious differences in overall resilience are small.
As might be expected, resilience is strongly related to wealth and poverty. Figure 7-5 shows that overall resilience increases from 3.49 for those with incomes below 5,000 Rs to 3.78 for those with incomes over 50,000 Rs. The increase in helping/sharing is even larger from 3.58 to 3.92. Income differences for identity/belonging, again, are much smaller, although it is interesting that they are significantly higher for those with incomes over 50,000 Rs.

The same general pattern is observed with respect to wealth measured in terms of household possessions. Those with more possessions score higher on both overall resilience and on helping.
/sharing. There are few differences in terms of identity but those with the greatest number of possessions have a small advantage in identity/belonging.

A different and mostly opposite pattern can be seen in the data on poverty measured as the frequency with which respondents have to do without life’s necessities. Those struggling with the greatest poverty are modestly but significantly less likely to have resilience attributes. This is especially the case for helping/sharing attributes. In this case, this means not that the poor are less likely to believe in helping their community but rather that they are less likely to know how to get food if they are hungry or otherwise to get help. Poverty is not strongly related to identity attributes. In fact, those suffering the greatest poverty have modestly higher identity/belong attributes which helps to reduce their overall resilience deficit in other areas.

**Human Trafficking: Knowledge, Awareness and Perceived Victimization**

Human trafficking is a growing concern internationally. Paraphrasing the Palermo Protocol, human trafficking involves the recruitment, transportation, or receipt of persons, by coercion, abduction, fraud or the abuse of power for the purpose of exploitation. Although attention frequently focuses on sex trafficking which often involves the enslavement of young girls for prostitution or other sexual services, human trafficking also includes forced labor (including of women, men and children), forced marriage, and the removal of human organs among a variety of other acts. Human Trafficking has been of increasing concern in Nepal as well, especially with regard to the exploitation of citizens who are recruited for work outside of the country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heard of Human Trafficking</th>
<th>Awareness of Types of Human Trafficking</th>
<th>Perceived Extent of Trafficking Among Those who Work Abroad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>89.9%</td>
<td>39.6%</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72.9%</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39.3%</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 8-1: Reported Awareness of Various Types of Human Trafficking and the Extent to which it Affects those Workin Abroad**

To gain at least a preliminary understanding of human trafficking, the Nepal Inclusive Governance Survey asked respondents a series of questions regarding their knowledge and understanding of trafficking and their perceived victimization. Again, virtually no one refused to answer the question
which is unusual. Figure 8-1 shows that fully 90 percent of respondents when asked if they had ever heard of human trafficking answered, yes. When asked if they had heard about specific types of trafficking nearly three quarters reported having heard about sex trafficking, nearly double the 39 percent who had heard of labor trafficking. Even smaller percentages said they had heard of organ trafficking (32 percent) or forced marriage (29 percent) although 57 percent said they had heard of trafficking in children, which is not technically a type of trafficking but a subtype of the others.

Despite the emphasis on the risks of human trafficking for migrant workers, a majority of respondents say that fewer than ten percent of those who work abroad become trafficking victims. Another quarter of puts the figure at less than 25 percent and fewer than 20 percent think at half or more of citizens who work abroad become human trafficking victims.

Respondents were then read the Palermo definition of trafficking, expressed in layperson’s language, and were asked whether this had ever happened to them. Again there were no refusals and no one who indicated they did not know, both of which responses typically are rather large in human trafficking surveys given the sensitivity of the questions.

As reported in Figure 8-2, barely one percent of respondents (a total of 20 people) indicated they considered themselves to be human trafficking survivors – a very small number. Given the small numbers or acknowledged survivors, data on the types of trafficking they experienced have to be interpreted with extreme caution. Still, the survey shows that only eight percent of acknowledged survivors reported having been sex trafficking victims. The largest number (63 percent) said they had been labor victims. Victims of organ trafficking and forced marriage ranked second and third (at 17 and 12 percent respectively) well behind labor trafficking and slightly above sex trafficking, at least to the extent the small numbers can believed.
Figure 8-3 examines variations in the awareness of trafficking and the distribution of self-identified trafficking survivors by geographic area. Again the survivor data are based on a very small number of cases and must be interpreted with great caution. For what the data are worth, they show higher concentrations of survivors in the USAID and quake zones albeit not significantly so. Similarly, the data tentatively suggest survivors are concentrated in urban areas particularly in the Far-Western and Mountain regions.

The data on trafficking awareness are more reliable. The USAID and quake zone are about average in the levels of human trafficking awareness. Awareness is modestly higher in urban areas and is highest in the Western and Mountain regions. Awareness is lowest in the Far-Western region and Terai. Interestingly, the higher the awareness of human trafficking in a region the higher that respondents assess the risk of workers being trafficked abroad. On average, citizens believe that about one in five citizens who travel abroad for work ends up as a trafficking victim. This estimate is slightly higher in urban areas but is much higher in the Western and Mountain regions and is slightly higher in the quake-affected area as well.

There are no interpretable differences in human trafficking survivorship between men and women, by age, or by education. The differences are too small and the numbers unreliable. In terms of trafficking awareness, men claim to be significantly more aware than women. Younger respondents are more aware than their elders. Awareness increases with education, although the big difference is between those with no formal education and everyone else. Three-quarters of those without formal education say they have heard of human trafficking compared to 95 percent of everyone else. Consistent with the
pattern seen in Figure 8-3, those with greater awareness of human trafficking offer significantly higher estimates of the incidence of human trafficking experienced by those working abroad.
Caste and religious differences in HT survivorship are small with two exceptions. The Newari and Hill Dalit have higher levels of survivors than other castes, although the usual caveat about the small number of cases still appl.

Awareness of human trafficking is higher among Hill and Mountain as compared to Terai castes. Awareness is highest among the Hill/Brahmin/Chettri, although the differences among the Hill castes are small. Buddhists are most aware of trafficking, Muslims least and the difference is large and significant.

![Figure 8-6: Self-identified Trafficking Survivors, Awareness of Trafficking, and Perceptions of Migrant Worker Trafficking by Income, Wealth and Poverty](image)

- **Self-identified HT Survivors**
- **Heard of HT**
- **Perceived % Foreign Workers Trafficked**
Among castes, the tendency observed overall holds: those more aware of trafficking offer higher estimates of the incidence of trafficking among workers who go abroad. This is not as obvious in the case of religion, but does not clearly contradict the pattern either.

Figure 8-6 reports trafficking awareness and survivors by income, wealth and poverty. To the extent that the survivor numbers can be believed, trafficking appears to be higher among middle income respondents and those whose household possession place them in the middle of household wealth. Victimization declines with poverty as measured by the frequency of doing without necessities. This makes intuitive sense if true. Wealthy individuals do not have to take the risks that less affluent citizens may feel compelled to take to feed their family or increase their standards of living. On the other hand, traveling abroad for work requires knowledge of the opportunities and some measure of income to pay for documents and tickets. The abject poor, in a perverted sense, are protected by their misery.

There is some evidence to support this in the data on trafficking awareness which is lowest among the lowest income and household wealth categories and highest among the highest income/wealthiest. Looked at from the other end, those having to do without basic necessities are less aware of trafficking than those not is poverty.

Given the emphasis given to working abroad in the conventional wisdom about risks of human trafficking, Figure 8-8 compares the percentage of trafficking survivors as well as the extent of human trafficking awareness among those who have worked abroad and those who have family members currently working abroad. The figure also compares the trafficking experiences of those who say that they or their families suffered physical or material injury during the civil war. Emerging research of the dynamics of human trafficking suggests that victimization is part of a syndrome of suffering. Those trafficked in some other countries have been found to be victims of other crimes, to suffer discrimination, and to have been physically assaulted or otherwise experienced abuse.

Beginning again with the caveat about the small number of survivors in the data, the limited available evidence does not support the idea that working abroad is a primary cause of trafficking. To begin, only 15 percent of the respondents in the sample say that they have ever worked outside of the country. In contrast 23 percent say they currently have family working abroad, but this almost certainly includes a large number of expatriate Nepali who have emigrated and taken up permanent residence abroad.

Contrary to expectations, there is a slightly higher percentage of human trafficking survivors among the groups who have never worked abroad as compared to those who have. In fact the difference is tiny and far from significant, but it stands in contradiction to the assumption that work abroad in a major human trafficking risk. Respondents who have family members currently working abroad also have a slightly smaller incidence of victimization than those who do not have family working abroad. This is worth noting because evidence elsewhere suggests that victimization runs in families. If I have family abroad that is being victimized there should be an increased chance that I have been or will be victimized as well because I live in the same high risk environment. The data certainly do not disprove

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8 It would be very difficult to have only 15 percent of current Nepali residents with foreign working experience while having 22 percent currently working abroad unless there had been a sudden and large surge of work migration or unless a large number of those living and work abroad had moved permanently. The latter is the more likely assumption.
the role of working abroad in human trafficking but do raise questions about it and demands further research.

Having worked abroad is associated with significantly higher awareness of trafficking. Those with family working abroad are slightly but not significantly more aware. Again, there is evidence that those more aware of trafficking offer higher estimates of the rate of trafficking among foreign workers. Although those who have worked abroad experienced less trafficking that those who did not (by a tiny margin) they estimate the risk of foreign trafficking modestly higher than those who have not gone abroad for work.

Finally, those who indicate that they or a close family member suffered physical or material damage in the civil war are slightly more likely to report being a trafficking survivor as well. They are not, however, appreciably more aware of human trafficking than non-war victims nor do they estimate the trafficking risks of work abroad significantly differently.

9. Political and Civic Engagement:

Citizen engagement in government and politics is the heart of the democratic system. It is a principal mechanism for citizens to express their wants and needs to government officials and the principal way citizens have to hold elected officials accountable for their actions.

The 2015 Nepal Inclusive Governance Survey asked respondents a series of questions regarding their political participation and broader civic engagement. Figure 9-1 shows the percentage of respondents who say they voted in the most recent, 2013 election for the Nepali Constituent Assembly and who report having engaged in a variety of other political activities ‘within the past two years.’ Fully 73
percent of respondents who were eligible to vote said they participated in the 2013 election. This figure is quite close to the official turnout of 78.3 percent which, given the two year time lapse between the election and the survey, is impressive. Predictably, participation in other forms of political activity is much less common, as it is almost universally. Most common of the other activities, just over 10 percent of respondents say that they have worked together with other citizens in the past two years to solve a (probably local) problem. Ten percent also say they have attended a party meeting or rally, and about 9 percent say they have engaged in some way with local government. Only three percent say they have written to a public official or visited their office to offer an opinion or seek help with a problem.

The percentage saying they have engaged in any form of political protest in the past two years also is quite small. Seven percent acknowledge taking part in a protest march or rally, while just under two percent have signed a political petition. Altogether only about one in five respondents say that they have taken part in any type of political activity over the previous two years, other than voting in 2013.

Most civic participation occurs in the context of social groups and particularly Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). When asked about their membership in a variety of different CSOs, only 28 percent of respondents said they belonged to any CSO; three percent reported belonging to two or more (see Figure 9-2). Women’s and youth groups were the most popular CSOs accounting for about ten percent of respondents each. Community-based organizations were next largest at 5.5 percent, business groups and political parties (which usually are not considered CSOs) are next at barely three percent.

Most of those not eligible were too young to vote in 2013. A small percentage were not registered for other reasons.
Memberships in farmers’ groups, religious and cultural groups, parent-teacher, sports, trade union, and traditional intuitions are all tiny.

Importantly, the data in Figure 9-2 report only membership in a group and not the level of engagement. The survey asked respondents to identify the one group that was most important to them (in fact, most belong only to one) and then asked how frequently the respondent participated in the group during the previous year. A healthy 57 percent claimed they often participated in the group and another 34 percent said they sometimes participated. When asked if the group had communicated with them in the past year, 90 percent said, yes. When asked how well they thought the group represents their interests, 31 percent said very well and another 66 percent said somewhat well. Overall, CSO membership appears relatively limited, although those who are engaged in civil society appear to be substantially engaged.

![Figure 9-2: Membership in Civil Society Organizations](image)

Closer inspection of the data on political participation indicates there are three dimensions to participation: voting, conventional participation (attending meetings, writing officials, working with others to solve problems, working with local government) and protest participation (signing petitions, and marching in demonstrations).  

Figure 9-3 describes the distribution of political and civic engagement across different regions and areas of the country. It shows that voter turnout is relatively evenly distributed across the county; no areas stand out as dramatically high or low; all vary in a narrow range between 71 and 79 percent with most in the mid 70’s. Turnout was somewhat lower in the USAID and especially the quake-affected area.

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10A principal components analysis of the seven political participation items produced three dimensions with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. The content of the three dimensions is described in the text.
although, of course, the election was held well before the earthquake. Turnout was modestly lower in urban areas. It was highest in the Western and Far-Western regions, lowest in the Mid-Western Region.

Figure 9-3: Political and Civic Participation by Geographic Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Voted 2013</th>
<th>Conventional Participation</th>
<th>Protest</th>
<th>CSO Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NEPAL</td>
<td>76.2%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>73.9%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quake Area</td>
<td>70.6%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>77.6%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>70.0%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>74.9%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>76.5%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>78.6%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwestern</td>
<td>72.4%</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>45.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farwestern</td>
<td>78.2%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain</td>
<td>78.4%</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill</td>
<td>73.7%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terai</td>
<td>77.3%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conventional participation varies a bit more across the country, but only a bit. Conventional participation is relatively higher in the USAID zone at 22 Percent. It is highest in the Mid-Western, Far-Western and Mountain regions and lowest by a considerable amount in the Central region.

Protest participation is low everywhere with few remarkable differences. CSO memberships are significantly higher in the USAID targeted areas and modestly higher in rural areas. CSO membership is highest in the Western, Mid-Western and Mountain regions, the same as conventional participation. It is lowest in the Central region and Terai.

![Figure 9-4: Political Participation by Sex, Age, and Education](image-url)

Figure 9-4: Political Participation by Sex, Age, and Education

- **Men**
  - Conventional Participation: 23.0%
  - Protest: 26.5%
  - CSO Membership: 20.0%
- **Women**
  - Conventional Participation: 10.7%
  - Protest: 28.7%
  - CSO Membership: 24.4%
- **Age Under 30**
  - Conventional Participation: 16.0%
  - Protest: 20.9%
- **Age 31-50**
  - Conventional Participation: 16.5%
  - Protest: 32.6%
- **Age Over 50**
  - Conventional Participation: 20.0%
  - Protest: 24.4%
- **No Formal Ed**
  - Conventional Participation: 19.9%
- **Primary Education**
  - Conventional Participation: 24.9%
- **Incomplete Secondary**
  - Conventional Participation: 30.8%
- **Complete Secondary**
  - Conventional Participation: 29.7%
- **Complete University**
  - Conventional Participation: 36.6%
- **Graduate**
  - Conventional Participation: 44.4%
- **Post-Graduate**
  - Conventional Participation: 49.0%
There are bigger differences in participation across different social and demographic groups as illustrated in Figure 9-4. As in most democratizing countries, women participate less than men in most political activities. The gender gap in voting is surprisingly small – only about 3.5 percent and not statistically significant. The gap is much bigger in conventional participation (more than 2:1) and even more so in protest participation (3:1) although the protest numbers are small for everyone.

Voting increases substantially with age. Only slightly more than half or those 18-29 who were eligible at the time voted in the 2013 elections compared to 82 percent of middle-aged respondents and 93 percent of those over 50. Conventional participation increases with age as well, although less dramatically. Civic participation as measured by CSO membership is highest among the middle-aged and lowest among the young, while protest participation does not appear to vary by age. Voter turnout declines with education for the most part. More than 80 percent of those without formal education voted in 2013 compared to only about 70 percent with college degrees (post-graduates are a very small sub-set and subject to large fluctuations). In contrast conventional politics, protest participation and civic activism all increase substantially with education.
Figure 9-5 examines caste and religious differences in participation. Voter turnout varies modestly among the castes with two exceptions. Turnout among the Newari and the Terai/Madhesi Brahmin/Rajput was below 70 percent in 2013. In comparison turnout among the Terai/Madhesi other castes exceeded 80 percent. The Newari are very low in conventional participation as well at only 5.4 percent. The Terai/Madhesi Dalit and the Hill Dalit also are very low at 9.5 and 11.7 percent respectively. The Terai/Madhesi Brahmin/Rajput stand out for their frequency of protest participation. A quarter of the members say they have engaged in demonstrations or signed petitions in the previous two years.

The Hill/Brahmin/Chettri and the Hill Dalit report being most engaged in CSOs. The Terai/Madhesi Dalit are least involved in CSOs. Fewer than 10 percent report being members of any association.

Religious differences are pronounced as well. Buddhists and Christians are substantially less like to report having voted in 2013. Hindu and Buddhists are most likely to engage in conventional activities. Only 8 percent of Muslims and 2 percent of Christians participated in any of the several conventional political activities in the previous two years. Buddhists are much more likely to engage in protest and are much more likely also to belong to CSOs. Muslim and Christian participation in both is limited. Overall, Hindus are active in all forms of political and civic participation. Buddhists are the most active in all areas except elections. Muslims and Christians are the least engaged overall, by considerable margins.
Figure 9-6 compares levels of political and civic participation by income, wealth (measured in terms of household possessions) and poverty (measured as the frequency of having to do without basic necessities). Income is only slightly related to participation in the data. There are no consistent income differences in voting. Conventional participation is highest among the middle income groups and lowest at the extremes. Protest may be very slightly higher among higher income groups, although the pattern is not strong. And CSO membership is unrelated to income except for the low participation of those earning less than 5000Rs.
The patterns are slightly stronger for wealth. Those with more household possessions were modestly more likely to vote in 2013. They were clearly more likely to engage in conventional political activities and more likely to engage in protest activities as well. The wealthy also were relatively more engaged in CSOs. Indeed, the wealthy were more engaged in virtually all activities.

Poverty, conversely, depresses most activities from voting to CSO membership, and the differences are large. Barely half of those in the most abject poverty voted in 2013. Conventional participation by the very poor is less than half that of those who are better off. Almost none of the poor engage in political protest. Barely 6 percent are CSO members which is less than one-quarter of the participation rate of others.

10. Multivariate Analyses

The central purpose of this report is to highlight, elaborate and extend some of the evidence provided in the topline report on the Nepal Inclusive Governance Survey. The topics addressed and the variables used to disaggregate the data were chosen in consultation with USAID/Nepal. The analyses thus far have been bivariate and descriptive. However, a few simple multivariate analyses can help to place the bivariate results in a broader context and to identify stronger and weaker relationships.

The multivariate analyses focus on the extent to which public satisfaction with government services is linked to public trust in government. In turn the analyses consider whether satisfaction with and trust in government are linked to citizen participation in politics. A composite measure of trust in Institutions was constructed as the number of different institutions that individuals trust. The measure ranges from zero to ten. Four different measures of political participation were used as discussed in Section 9 of the report. These include measures of voting, engagement in ‘normal politics’ (i.e., campaign activity, contacting public officials, and working with others to solve local problems), political protest participation and membership in civil society organizations. Because trust is a continuous measure while the four participation variables are binary measures (participated/didn’t participate) Ordinary Least Squares regression is used to analyze trust and Logistic Regression is used to analyze the four participation variables.

All five of the models include a variety of other possible influences on trust and participation including age, education, income, religion, geographic location, the experience of bribery, attitudes toward the peace process and of women’s place in society, the experience of being a war victim and the extent of resilience.

Figure 10-1 reports the regression results for citizen trust in government institutions. The coefficients in the figure are standardized regression coefficients and show the relative influence on trust of different variables. The R² (coefficient of determination) for the regression is .14 which suggests that this combination of variables accounts for a small although statistically significant amount of the individual-level variation in trust.

Among the variables in the analysis, more highly educated individuals are substantially more likely to trust government institutions than citizens with less education even controlling for other variables in the analysis. Women are slightly but significantly less trusting of government than men. Urban residents also are comparatively low in trust although those living in the USAID zone have much higher levels of trust than residents elsewhere in the country.
Muslims have modestly but significantly lowers levels of trust than Hindu respondents (the excluded comparison group). Interesting respondents who have paid a bribe in the past two years are not any less trusting than those who have not paid bribes. Similarly CSO membership appears to have little impact on political trust; the minority of citizens who are members of CSOs are no more trusting than the majority of non-CSO members. Citizens with more liberal views of the role of women in society are substantially more trusting of government, as are citizens with more resilient attitudes.

Figure 10-1: OLS Regression (Standardized Coefficients) of Cumulative Trust in Ten Government Institutions (Significant .05 Coefficients in Large Italics)

Satisfaction with government policy, however, has relatively small effects on political trust. Overall, the extent to which citizens approve of the national governments handling of a variety of policy issues has small positive although statistically significant effects on trust. By contrast, approval of local government services has no apparent effect. On a specific policy, the government’s handling of the peace process, those who think the government has moved too slow are slightly but significantly less trusting of government.

Figure 10-2 reports a multivariate Logit analysis that examines some of the predictors of voting in the 2013 elections. It includes the same set of variables used to predict political trust but also includes trust as a predictor of voting. The Nagelkerke R² for the analysis is .24 which indicates that the analysis provides a reasonable description of the data. The coefficients in the table are Log Odds Ratios which can be interpreted as the odds or probability that a one unit change in the independent variable will
produce a unit increase (or decrease) in the binary dependent variable\textsuperscript{11} controlling for other influences in the analysis.

Clearly voting in Nepal is very strongly associated with membership in CSOs. Participation in CSOs more than doubles the odds of voting. Membership contributes to a citizen’s sense of collective responsibility and also strengthens social and political skills important for political participation. (The reciprocal relationship likely also exists; voting probably also contributes to the likelihood of joining CSOs creating a virtuous cycle).

Consistent with a variety of research on voting, older and wealthier citizens are more likely to vote. Unusually, there is no apparent relationship between education and voting and women appear to vote more than men, although the latter relationship falls just short of statistical significance. Hindus

\textsuperscript{11} For example a coefficient of 1.33 means than a one unit change in x has a 33 percent chance of producing a one unit increase in y. Conversely a coefficient of 0.5 means that a one unit change in x has a 50 percent chance of producing a one unit decrease in y. Numbers greater than 1 indicate a positive relationship. Those between 0 and 1 indicate a negative relationship. A coefficient of 1.0 means there is no relationship.
appear to vote at slightly higher levels than others, although none of the religious relationships are significant. Regarding the relationships between government satisfaction, trust and voting, the results show a strong relationship between voting and satisfaction with the national government’s handling of a variety of policy areas. Indeed, since satisfaction with national government policies is a ten-point variable and the coefficient measures the impact of a one-point change in government satisfaction, the potential impact of national satisfaction is very large. Similarly, the widespread perception that the government is not moving fast enough on the peace process has significant negative effects, reducing the propensity to vote by about half. Approval of local services, however, while positively related to voting is not significant. Neither is political trust whose positive relationship with voting also falls just short of significance.

Voting is the most common form of participation but, for that reason, also the most atypical. Most other forms of participation such as working for parties or candidates, attending meetings and rallies, writing to elected officials, etc. require more time and initiative as well as greater social and political skills. Figure 10-3 reports the Logit analysis of the predictors of participation in any of a variety of normal, non-voting activities.

Unlike voting but consistent with a large body of literature on political participation more broadly, women in Nepal are only about half as likely as men to participate in most non-voting political activities after taking into account out influences on participation. Among those other influences, older and more educated citizens are more likely to participate, a pattern found in most democratic countries rich and poor.

As was seen with voting, the best predictor of participation in political activities is CSO membership. Those who belong to one or more CSOs are almost five times more likely to participate in non-voting political activities compared to those who do not belong to any CSOs. Similarly, those who report that they or close family members were victimized during the civil war also are much more active politically than other citizens. It is not clear from the data why war victims are so active. It is possible that their experiences during the war has activated them. It also is possible that they were active before/during the war and were targeted at least partly for their political activism. Whatever the explanation, war victims, who in Figure 10-2 are no more likely to vote, are about twice as active as non-victims in most other normal political activities.

Support for gender equality is linked to lower non-voting participation and exacerbates the lower participation of women. Those with more resilient attitudes, in contrast participate more frequently in most normal political activities even though they were less likely to vote in 2013.

Interesting, approval of government’s handling of public policy and of local governments’ provision of services are not significantly linked to normal political activities. Trust in government, however, has a very large and positive impact. Moreover, because government approval has significant

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12 Specifically, members of other religions shown in the table vote at lower rates than Hindus who are omitted from the table and provide the baseline or comparison group.
effects on trust (see Figure 10-1), government approval likely has an indirect effects on participation through the intervening effect of trust.

![Figure 10-3: Logistic Regression of Reported Participation in Non-Voting Political Activities (Odds Ratios: significant .05 Coefficients in Large Italics)](image)

Participation in political protest activities is another form of political engagement often assumed to be exceptional because of its confrontational style and, often, anti-system orientation. Extra caution must be taken in analyzing the protest data, however, given the very small number of respondents (about 4 percent) who report having participated in protests. Still, the Logit analysis in Figure 10-4 suggests that protest participants are not fundamentally different from other political participants with a few notable exceptions. Similar to other participants, protestors are significantly better educated. They also are slightly, although not significantly, older, wealthier and more likely to be men.

As with other participants, protestors are significantly more likely to be CSO members and civil war victims. Indeed, CSO members are more than three times more likely to engage in protests than non-members and Civil War victims are nearly as likely to engage in protests.

What is different about protest participation, however, is that Buddhists are more than four times more likely to engage in protests as majority Hindus, and three time more likely to participate in protests as Muslims, the other major religious minority. Also of interest is the observation that people who report having paying bribes in the past year are more than three times more likely to protest as
those who do not report paying bribes. The latter is a bit hard to interpret. One possibility is that those willing to pay bribes to get what they feel they need or deserve are similar in personality to those willing to take to the streets in protest when they feel they have not been fairly treated or adequately heard.

The evidence regarding the relationship of government approval to protest, however, is weak and contradictory. On one hand, those who think that the government is moving too slowly on peace are more likely to engage in protest as are those who least approve of the national government’s handling of a variety of policy issue, albeit neither relationship is statistically significant. On the other hand, those who are most trusting of the government also are more likely to engage in protests along with those who most approve of local governments’ services, although these relationships are not significant either. The meaning of protest participation in Nepal is unclear.

Although participation in Civil Society Organizations is not a form of political participation per se, the survey data make clear that CSO membership provides a gateway to a variety of other types of

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13 Although several of these relationships have relatively large odds ratio coefficients, the standard errors for the relationships (not shown) are large and therefore the relationships are not statistically significant (i.e. cannot be determined with sufficient certainty to be greater than zero in the population from which the sample is drawn). This is due in part to the very small number of respondents who report having participated in protests.
participation including both voting and non-voting activities and political protest. As such it warrants the closer scrutiny provided in Figure 10-5, which reports a Logit analysis of the predictors or organizational membership.

Unlike most other forms of participation where men are more active, CSO membership is dominated by women; women are almost twice as likely to be members as men controlling for other influences. Similar to other forms of participation, however, CSO membership is higher among older, better educated individuals. Buddhists are more than twice as likely to participate in CSO compared to Hindus but Muslim participation lags far behind both. Urban residents are significantly less likely to participate in CSOs as are residents in the Quake affected zone, although those in USAID targeted areas participate most of all. War victims, those who believe in gender equity and, especially, those with more resilient attitudes are all significantly more likely to be CSO members.

![Figure 10-5: Logistic Regression of Reported Organizational Membership (Odds Ratios: Significant .05 Coefficients in Large Italics)](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>2.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID Zone</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quake Zone</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Victim</td>
<td>1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Bribe</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Equality</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resilience</td>
<td>5.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approve National Policy</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approve Local Services</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Process Too Slow</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Government</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interestingly, CSO membership is largely unrelated to attitudes toward government. To the extent that there is a relationship, CSO members are more likely to be a skeptical about government – less likely to approve national government handling of policies, less satisfied with local services, less trusting of government overall. These relationships are all weak and none is significant, but the lack of a significant relationship stands in marked contrast to other forms of participation which are liked to positive government approval.
11. Summary, Caveats, Next Steps

This report provides a more detailed description of some of the data in the 2015 Nepal Inclusive Governance Survey. The topics addressed and the variables used to disaggregate the data were chosen in consultation with USAID/Nepal. The purpose of the report is descriptive. Analyses are bivariate at best which was the contracting mandate.

Drawing conclusions from such limited data is risky, and this report has mostly refrained from doing so. A number of the variables analyzed in the report are highly correlated with one another (e.g. income, education, and caste among others). Disentangling their independent relationships with the topics of interest is impossible without more sophisticated, multivariate analyses.

In effect, the report provides a snapshot of political attitudes and behaviors among Nepali citizens at the time the survey was conducted. The snapshot is imperfect. It has blank spots and is blurry in places, but still provides considerable resolution in at least some limited respects. Like all snapshots, it permits a variety of interpretations, some better than others, but none clearly definitive. Those with a longer, deeper understanding of Nepali government, politics and society can interpret the results for themselves. This report refrains from doing so. In any case, modesty in interpreting these data is warranted by whomever attempts the task.

The survey itself is about as good as a survey of this sort can be – one written by committee, by individuals with lots of interesting ideas, a lot of passion for the subject, but limited understanding of survey methods and their limits. Among other concerns, the widespread use of binary, yes-no, questions to measure attitudes is problematic. On a four point political trust scale a move overtime from 1-3 is a considerable move; a move from 2-3 is as likely to be measurement error as meaningful change. Yet using a binary measure of trust, they both are recorded the same. Similarly binary scales cannot measure moves from 1-2 or 3-4 over time which are as meaningful as moves from 2-3. If the purpose of a survey is to establish a baseline against which to measure future change, binary variables have limited utility. To be fair, development indicators often require assessments of “the percentage trusting government to represent their interests, or “the percentage satisfied with community health centers.” For one-shot surveys these far fine. For measuring change over time, they are of limited value.

That said, there are methodological ways to redeem binary variables, especially where the variables are part of block as is the case for political trust. What is required, however, are rather sophisticated scaling techniques which aggregate all of the items in the series into a single number. These methods and numbers however are likely to be opaque to users and few contractors are likely to be experienced in using them.

The survey also is limited by the presence of a fair number of questions that measure ‘non-attitudes.’ If you ask respondents if they trust the Mishlenti – an imaginary group that does not exist – a substantial majority will answer, indicating that they either do or do not trust the group for fear of appearing ignorant. And their responses will not necessarily be random. Ordinary people are not political elites. They do not read or follow politics closely. There are lots of things that development specialists take for granted which have never crossed the minds of most ordinary people. NGOs, social audits, scorecards, etc., are alien concepts to most respondents and have to be carefully explained to obtain valid responses. Even then, if I have just heard you explain social audits to me for the first time, my response
is likely to be based on your description not my personal experience. Non-attitudes need to be caught and corrected during the survey pretest if not before.

The pretest also should catch and correct questions on which respondents opinions do not vary. If everyone answers ‘Yes’ to a question, that question is mostly worthless because there is no variation to analyze. The resilience questions are a classic case of limited variance. Everyone effectively answers yes -- either enthusiastically yes, or moderately yes, but they all answer, yes. The utility of this battery is limited as a result. Among other concerns, the battery does not allow for future surveys to gauge whether resilience has increased. You cannot meaningfully increase beyond 3.8 on a 4 point scale.

None of this is meant to denigrate the survey. There is no such thing as a perfect survey. There are none that the survey developer would not change in important ways after the fact if that were possible. This survey in many ways is better than most that USAID conducts. Still caution should be exercised in interpreting the current data as well as in using the survey as a template for additional surveys in the future. Although it usually is preferable to ask the same questions the same way in a subsequent survey so as to maximize comparability, there may be questions that should not be asked again or in the same way simply because the data will not be comparable with the first survey by virtue of the way the questions are constructed. Serious survey expertise needs to be involved -- and heeded -- in designing any subsequent survey.

Leaving aside the question of a second survey, there is still much more information to extract from the current survey. A variety of topics still have not been examined in any depth including attitudes towards the peace process, transitional justice, local conflict, government oversight, the rights of vulnerable populations, peaceful political change, and post-earthquake attitudes among others. Even those examined here can be probed in considerably more depth. The current report considers fewer than a dozen of the numerous variables that might help to explain differences in attitudes and behavior including party loyalties, levels of political engagement (used not as a focus of inquiry but as an explanatory variable), civil war experience, family living abroad, experience of living abroad, and numerous others. How for example does satisfaction with government affect trust? How does it affect attitudes toward peace? The list of possible questions is virtually endless.

In addition to broadening the analysis it also is possible to deepen it – to go beyond description and bivariate analysis and begin to test more systematically competing ideas about the causes of attitudes or behavior. Although causation can never be established definitively using survey data, it is possible to make reasonable causal inferences. Such inferences can be useful for evaluating existing programs as well as designing new ones.
Appendix A: Number of Weighted Cases for Main Analytical (Independent) Variables

Figure A-1: Number of Weighted Interviews in Different Geographic Areas

- NEPAL: 1978
- USAID Quake Area: 1278
- Rural: 1603
- Urban: 1200
- Eastern: 792
- Central: 456
- Western: 334
- Midwestern: 233
- Farwestern: 164
- Mountain: 47
- Hill: 654
- Terai: 1278

Figure A-2: Number of Weighted Interviews Conducted with Various Demographic Groups

- Men: 998
- Women: 980
- Age Under 30: 620
- Age 31-50: 1033
- Age Over 50: 325
- No Formal Ed: 602
- Primary Education: 411
- Incomplete Secondary: 351
- Complete Secondary: 327
- Complete University: 131
- Graduate: 123
- Post-Graduate: 33
Figure A-3: Number of Weighted Interviews with Members of Different Castes and Religions

- Hill Brahmin/Chettri: 680
- Hill/Mountain Janajati: 312
- Newari: 63
- Hill Dalit: 113
- Terai/Madhesi Brahmin/Rajput: 13
- Terai/Madhesi Adivasi Janajati: 300
- Terai/Madhesi Other Castes: 265
- Terai/Madhesi Dalit: 148
- Hindu: 1771
- Buddhist: 98
- Muslim: 81
- Christian: 28

Figure A-4: Number of Weighted Interviews for Different Levels of Income and Wealth

- Income:
  - <5,000 Rs: 750
  - <25,000: 760
  - <30,000: 323
  - <50,000: 96
  - >50,000 Rs: 44

- Household Goods:
  - Few: 205
  - 2: 438
  - 3: 531
  - 4: 338
  - Many: 466

- Deprivation:
  - None: 1562
  - 1: 283
  - 2: 95
  - Three: 39