Civil Resistance and Corporate Behavior

Mapping Trends and Assessing Impact

Research and Innovation Grants Working Papers Series

August 12, 2016

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MESSAGE FROM THE DIRECTOR

The Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance is pleased to share "*Civil Resistance and Corporate Behavior: Mapping Trends and Assessing Impact*." This publication was produced by USAID in partnership with the Institute of International Education and the University of Denver as part of the Research and Innovation Grants Working Papers Series.

The *Strategy on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance*[1] reaffirmed USAID's commitment to "generate, analyze, and disseminate rigorous, systematic, and publicly accessible evidence in all aspects of DRG policy, strategy and program development, implementation, and evaluation." This paper, along with the others contained in the series, makes a valuable contribution to advancing this commitment to learning and evidence-based programming.

This series is part of USAID's Learning Agenda for the DRG Sector, a dynamic collection of research questions that serve to guide the DRG Center's and USAID field missions' analytical efforts. USAID seeks to inform strategic planning and project design efforts with the very best theory, evidence, and practical guidance. Through these efforts, the Learning Agenda is contributing to USAID's objective to support the establishment and consolidation of inclusive and accountable democracies to advance freedom, dignity, and development.

For this paper, the research team constructed a pilot dataset to study how citizens organize against corporate human rights abuses and how corporations operating in Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, and South Africa respond to civil resistance. The findings suggest that multiple coordinated citizen-led events were more effective at gaining concessions from targeted corporations; that corporations undergoing leadership changes were more open to making concessions; and, that corporations operating in effective rule of law settings were more willing to make concessions than those operating in countries with less legal accountability.

I hope you find this research enlightening and helpful. As the DRG Center's Learning Agenda progresses, we will continue our effort to bring forward the latest in relevant social science research to important constituencies for our work, particularly our DRG cadre and implementing partners, but also others. I invite you to stay involved as this enriching, timely, and important work proceeds.

Neil Levine, Director
Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance
US Agency for International Development

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[1] https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/USAID%20DRG_%20final%20final%206-24%203%20(1).pdf

ACRONYM LIST

CEO	Chief Executive Officer
DCHA	USAID's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance
DFG	Democracy Fellows and Grants Program
DRG	Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance
DRG Center	USAID's Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance
DU	University of Denver
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IIE	Institute of International Education
MAC	Most Admired Corporation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
SEC	US Securities and Exchange Commission
SIC	Standard Industrial Classification
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Corporations can be implicated in human rights violations involving their employees and the communities in which they operate. Although corporations function within a framework of national and international human rights norms, such as the *UN's Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights*—and several industries have self-regulated, promoting sector-specific standards—corporations may be most responsive not to top-down standards or enforcement, but to citizen-led resistance. What sorts of civil resistance are most effective in gaining concessions and from which corporations? What corporate characteristics—such as sector, market share, reputational value, or leadership changes—and contextual factors, like rule of law, influence the likelihood that corporations will make concessions?

Through a Research and Innovation Grant funded by USAID's Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance under the Democracy Fellows and Grants Program, Professors Erica Chenoweth and Tricia Olsen from the University of Denver constructed a new dataset to answer these questions, gathering observational data in Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, and South Africa. The project was a pilot, assembling the first such dataset to study how citizens organize against corporate human rights abuses and how corporations operating outside the United States respond to this civil resistance.

Citizen-dependent findings include:
- Multiple coordinated events over time are more effective than a single, one-off event: 21% of civil resistance efforts that included only one event were successful in achieving partial or full accommodation of their requests, but 49% of efforts that included at least two events were successful; the more events, the more likely it was that the corporation made concessions.

Corporation-dependent findings include:
- Corporations whose public reputations are a recognized asset, *e.g.,* those that are on *Fortune Magazine's* Most Admired Corporations list, were no more likely to make concessions than companies with fewer reputational assets.
- Corporations undergoing leadership change were more likely to make concessions—suggesting that whether or not the civil resistance contributed to leadership change, such change presents an opening for progress on human rights.
- Corporations in competitive markets, where several corporations are filling the same market demand, are less likely to make concessions overall. Further, if one corporation does make concessions, its peer corporations in the same market may be less likely to do so.

Context-dependent findings include:
- Corporations in sectors that are among the top two producers of a country's annual industrial output seem slightly less likely to make concessions.
- Corporations in countries reliant on labor-intensive extraction (coal or minerals) are more likely to make concessions than those in countries reliant on capital-intensive extraction (oil).
- Corporations in countries with more robust rule of law are more likely to make concessions than those operating in countries with less adherence to rule of law, suggesting both that 1) working to improve rule of law may ultimately make corporate concessions more systemically likely and 2) activists and civil society groups should evaluate the political and economic contexts in which they, and their target corporations, operate to better assess the probability that civil resistance will yield change.

INTRODUCTION

Businesses are often implicated in human rights violations. For example, the US Department of Labor reports that mining companies in Nigeria routinely rely on child and forced labor (2012).[2] Sources allege that the Coca-Cola Company employed paramilitary members to threaten, kidnap, and murder union leaders at bottling plants in Colombia (PBS 2012). In 2013, Chevron Pacific's environmental manager, a United States citizen, was sentenced by an Indonesian court to two years in prison for his connection with a failed environmental cleanup effort (Cochrane 2013).

In response, governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and philanthropists have attempted to reduce human rights abuses by corporations through various top-down, formal, global initiatives.[3] The UN created the Global Compact in 2000, a voluntary initiative to encourage improved corporate citizenship. In 2011, the UN Human Rights Council unanimously endorsed the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and established a UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights to promote those principles.

Industry-led initiatives have also become common as a response to concerns of corporate irresponsibility. To avoid costly litigation and deleterious reputational effects, specific business sectors (*e.g.,* the apparel industry, the extractive industry, the chemicals industry) have created their own codes of conduct in response to potential regulation or notable crises. In addition, NGOs such as the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre have sought to bring victims and alleged corporate violators in dialogue to remedy harm and deter future violations.

Despite the growth of formal institutions concerned with business and human rights, many of the most prominent examples of shifts in corporate behavior begin with pressure emerging from ordinary civilians who organize effective resistance against abusive behavior.[4] Multi-national solidarity movements and civilian groups in industrialized countries have led many of the better-known campaigns to this effect. For instance, in the 1990s, consumers boycotted Nike after seeing photographs of child laborers, which motivated Nike to fundamentally change their outsourcing strategy. A Greenpeace campaign over environmental concerns in Germany reduced The Royal Dutch/Shell group's revenues by 40% and led them to adopt more responsible disposal practices. More recently, public outcry over Apple's manufacturing in China (*e.g.,* Foxconn) led the company to partner with the Fair Labor Association to document and improve working conditions.

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[2] We define a "corporation" as a group of people organized as a legally recognized entity engaged in commercial activity, per standard definitions. We use this term interchangeably throughout this paper with the terms "firm," "company," "business," and "enterprise."

[3] We would characterize these state and government institutions as "formal institutions," since they rely on the pre-set institutional and legal structures of the sovereign state. Elites generally dominate such institutions, which engage in "top-down" approaches to resolve conflict in societies. This contrasts with civil society, which engages in "bottom-up" approaches to remedy.

[4] Following Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), we define civil resistance as technique of conflict in which unarmed civilians confront an opponent using a variety of tactics that do not physically harm or threaten to physically harm the opponent.

Despite this growing interest, systematic research regarding how civil society[5] can influence and shape corporate human rights behavior in developing countries is quite limited. Activists often wonder how, if at all, they can affect the behavior of private corporations, whose decision-making processes are often obscured to the public. Although a small literature has evaluated the impact of protests on corporate share value (King and Soule 2007), the effect of boycotts on corporate finances (Koku, Akhigbe, and Springer 1997; Pruitt and Friedman 1986), and the effect of boycotts on corporate reputation (McDonnell and King 2013), each of these existing studies evaluates the effect of a single, narrow tactic (*e.g.,* protests or boycotts) against corporations in the United States, despite the fact that many campaigns against corporations feature multiple tactics (*e.g.,* protests, strikes, boycotts, *etc.*) and occur outside of the US context. Moreover, with few exceptions (*e.g.,* Banerjee and Burroway 2015; Soule 2009), existing studies tend to focus on metrics related to corporate standing (*e.g.,* stock price, financial position, or reputation) rather than whether the movement tactic actually led to policy or behavior change aligned with movement demands.

As such, this paper addresses three main questions:
1) What types of interventions do we observe civil society actors using to influence private corporations in the developing world?
2) To what extent are civil resistance campaigns successful in winning concessions from the corporations they target?
3) What, if any, contextual factors facilitate successful campaigns?

Our multi-level framework avers that bottom-up, civilian-led mobilization can affect corporate behavior in ways not always appreciated in the existing literature. We assume that although corporations are largely driven by profit motives, no corporation is monolithic. Employees, shareholders, and corporate management have differing opinions about whether the corporation's current behavior benefits its interests (*e.g.,* Raeburn 2004). We hypothesize that coordinated campaigns of non-violent action can often create internal divisions within corporations—or sharpen pre-existing ones—as compared to one-off protests or demonstrations. To minimize internal damage to the corporation, we theorize that, *ceteris paribus*, corporations faced with coordinated non-violent action generally make concessions to the local population. However, this tendency may be contingent on a variety of contextual factors identified in extant literature, such as reputational concerns, competition, leadership structures, and state dependency on particular economic sectors.

To test this set of hypotheses, we create the first multi-country dataset on civil resistance toward corporations in developing countries. These pilot data allow us to map some patterns and trends of civil resistance across time, countries, and industries. Second, the data provide information about corporate responses to civil resistance. By gathering data on specific campaign outcomes, we gain a better understanding of why corporations make concessions as opposed to ignoring or suppressing challenges from below. Third, we are able to identify the contextual factors that may affect the willingness of corporations to concede to civil society.

Our research strategy began with data collection regarding civil society challenges to corporations in four cases in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. A cross-regional comparative method allowed us to test a series of hypotheses about civil resistance and corporate behavior in various contexts. We

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[5] We define civil society as the aggregate of NGOs, institutions, and grassroots groups that manifest the will of citizens; we exclude governmental actors and corporations from this definition.

selected four emblematic cases (Nigeria, South Africa, Mexico, and Indonesia), as explained below. As a pilot study, this research design does not allow us to make airtight causal claims, but it does provide the opportunity to establish descriptive patterns and correlations that could be further validated and tested in future studies.

Empirically, this project makes an important contribution to our understanding of corporate human rights compliance. Theoretically, this project engages with and builds on recent trends in social science research that focus on ways that local communities can use non-violent techniques to reclaim, protect, and promote rights that others have violated.

SCOPE OF THE PROJECT

The main goals of this project were to collect data on civil resistance against corporations in developing countries; to explore patterns of civil resistance against corporations in these contexts; to devise and test a theoretical framework for understanding these data; and to develop a portable instrument that can be used to develop similar observational data in other contexts. As a pilot project, we were successful in building a rich and novel dataset that researchers can use in future studies on the characteristics of successful (and unsuccessful) civil resistance campaigns targeting corporations in the four countries of interest—the first such dataset outside of the US context. We produced a replicable data collection method for application in other cases. We were also successful in conducting exploratory tests into the validity of different hypotheses articulated in the current literature based on data in the US context. Our findings are suggestive of several important trends that further research can explore in more detail.

That said, our project has some important limitations. First, the analysis below does not allow us to fully establish or test causal claims, nor does it allow us to comprehensively develop or test the many potential theories governing these relationships. We were not able to conduct fieldwork in these settings, nor were we able to produce qualitative case studies fleshing out correlations in search of causal mechanisms. While such attempts are worth pursuing, they are beyond both the resources and the scope of this project. Moreover, because of the small number of observations in these data, we were not able to employ more sophisticated statistical techniques, such as two-stage models to test for endogeneity, multi-level models to nest campaign-level factors within firm- and state-level factors, or matching techniques to identify causal impacts. Further investigation and data collection must take place in order to conduct more sophisticated tests that establish clear causal mechanisms.

Second, while our own data collection yielded a great deal of data on civil resistance against corporations and corporate responses, we were greatly disappointed with the paucity of publicly available data on the corporations themselves. Despite months of searching for comprehensive and complete sources of material on firm-level factors in public and proprietary sources, finding contemporary, let alone historic, data on firms in developing countries proved to be a deeply frustrating endeavor. As such, much of the quantitative analysis described below relies on a necessarily truncated sample of post-2005 cases on which data remain incomplete. This is a function of data unavailability—a major constraint that we did not anticipate based on the public descriptions of the proprietary data we accessed for this project. In spite of these limitations, we believe that the findings contained in this pilot study provide ample justification for future research on these topics. We intend to seek resources to pursue them.

LITERATURE REVIEW: CIVIL RESISTANCE AND CORPORATE BEHAVIOR

In this section, we briefly evaluate existing research on civil resistance and corporate behavior, discuss the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches, and draw out testable hypotheses. To do this, we draw upon two previously distinct, albeit related, literatures.

Civil resistance is a method of conflict in which unarmed civilians use a variety of coordinated tactics like strikes, boycotts, protests, demonstrations, and many others to confront oppressive behavior. Recent research shows that mass civil resistance has been an effective way for civilians to remove incumbent leaders from power (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), achieve self-determination (*Ibid*.), and usher in democratic institutions (Celestino and Gleditsch 2013).

Recent research on the effectiveness of civil resistance highlights specific scope conditions under which these activities are especially effective. Broadly speaking, civil resistance campaigns succeed when they solicit large numbers of diverse participants (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011); develop broad-based linkages across civil society (Kingston, *et al.* 2013); shift between concentrated methods like protests and dispersed methods like stay-at-home demonstrations (Schock 2005, Chenoweth and Stephan 2011); and provoke defections among security forces, economic elites, or civilian bureaucrats (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, Wood 2000).

Importantly, however, most empirical research on civil resistance has been preoccupied with civilians' struggles against governments—either resistance against domestic governments, in which opposition groups wish to depose the incumbent leadership or secede from the center, or against foreign governments, in which national groups wish to expel foreign military occupations. Even empirical research about civil resistance against economic exploitation has focused on when and how protest affects the privatization policies of states (*e.g.,* Kingstone, *et al.* 2013) rather than on civil resistance against corporate behavior itself.

A notable exception is Sarah Soule's book on protest against corporate practices. She notes that in recent decades, the world has seen an increase in anti-corporate protest (Soule 2009, pp7-9), with activists increasingly targeting corporations because of frustration about lack of corporate accountability as well as an inability to effect government policy regarding corporate accountability. Civil society, in other words, sometimes perceives corporations as more effective targets for change. She argues that protests targeting corporations are also less likely to face state repression, thereby reducing the opportunity costs of mobilization. As King (2008b, 2011) notes, opportunities for collective action should be particularly important for movements attempting to affect corporate behavior. This is because "non-traditional stakeholders" can seldom affect corporate behavior without direct access to corporate resources that give them leverage over policy (Davis and Thompson 1994).

Another notable exception is the recent work of Banerjee and Burroway (2015), who find that corporate embeddedness, especially in moderate to right-wing networks, made Fortune 500 companies less likely to concede to (and more likely to retaliate against) protestors in the United States. However, corporations more embedded in left-leaning or corporate social responsibility networks were more likely to concede to protests, indicating that—as theorized by King (2008a, 2008b, 2011) and others (*e.g.,* Zald, *et al*. 2005)—political opportunities, framing processes, and mobilizing structures are particularly important in influencing corporate behavior.

As such, several of the principles that apply to civil resistance against governments may also apply to civil resistance against corporations. Most notably, the basic assumptions behind theories of non-violent action are that no opponent is completely monolithic, no power is permanent, and all powerholders are dependent upon the cooperation, obedience, and help of people that reside in the so-called "pillars of support." Pillars of support are simply the different groups and institutions on whose cooperation the powerholder is dependent. The theory of civil resistance advanced by Gene Sharp (1973) suggests that when these pillars of support withdraw their cooperation from the powerholder due to pressure from below, unarmed civilians can effectively remove the existing authority and replace it with another. For states, the relevant pillars of support are security forces, state media, religious authorities, educational elites, economic elites, business elites, the elderly, civilian bureaucrats, and others. For corporations, the relevant pillars—or stakeholders, as they are called in the business ethics and management literature—are managers, employees, shareholders, distributors, NGOs, consumers, community members, public sector agencies, and others.

For example, during the California Farm Workers' strike, famously led by Cesar Chavez, grape farm laborers pressured grocery stores to stop selling grapes from farms with exploitative labor practices. These efforts were not successful. Neither were labor strikes, since grape farmers simply hired short-term replacement workers. But Chavez and his movement finally found an influential pillar—truck drivers and the Longshoremen's union—who were willing to withdraw their cooperation from exploitative farms. These drivers agreed to "drag their feet" in delivering grapes to the Port of Oakland for export and took days to complete deliveries that could have been completed in hours. By the time they reached the port, the grapes had spoiled. Without transportation workers to deliver grapes to distributors on schedule, grape farm corporations were forced to negotiate with the farm workers, who were able to leverage fair working conditions and pay. This case demonstrates how sequencing civil resistance tactics can help to pull different pillars of support away from an opponent and create accountability to movement demands. The participating farm workers used a sequence of tactics that continually put pressure on the opponent, and they provoked defections among stakeholders whose cooperation was essential to change the status quo. This example illustrates the importance of bottom-up efforts to create corporate accountability.

A. Strengths and Weaknesses of Extant Research

Extant research on corporate behavior and civil resistance suffers from three basic flaws: theoretical, empirical, and methodological. From a theoretical perspective, existing research on how corporate practices change revolves almost entirely around firm-level, state-level, or market-based outcomes. Missing from existing theory is a deeper understanding of the mechanisms through which pressure from below might influence both firm-level factors and subsequent corporate behavior with regard to specific movement demands. For example, in Soule's important book (2009), she argues that leadership changes and internal divisions within corporations might provide opportunities for activists to put effective pressure on corporations. However, she does not identify where those leadership changes or internal divisions came from, or entertain the possibility that such leadership changes may have been *caused* by the activism itself. In fact, corporations often enter into periods of introspection and self-critique when they face a major challenge from civic groups calling on them to be more accountable for their behaviors. Such pressures may create divisions between hardliners and progressives within the corporation, effectively creating the opening that Soule suggests activists can exploit. In other words, political opportunities do not always emerge on their own. Sometimes civil resistance creates opportunities where they did not exist before.

The second major flaw is empirical. In brief, within the civil resistance literature, a preoccupation with states has led to a paucity of data on civil resistance toward non-state actors. Indeed, the lack of existing data on such cases leaves us with no systematic catalogue of the range of options available to civil society (including legal recourse, political organizing, mass mobilization, and civil disobedience) to influence private enterprise, specifically. Likewise, no one has systematically catalogued the various ways that corporations might ignore, reject, or concede to different claims.

The third major flaw is a methodological one. Much of the existing research is based on single case studies (most notably within the United States). Thus, related findings are not generalizable to other situations and may have limited applicability outside of the context of industrialized countries. For instance, Soule's research identifies anti-corporate activism in the United States alone, and her main goal is to expand upon social movement theory to evaluate its applicability to corporate targets (2009). Moreover, extant work does not differentiate between the impacts of one-off or spontaneous protests and coordinated civil resistance campaigns—a distinction that proves vital in our analysis below.

HYPOTHESES ON CIVIL RESISTANCE AND TARGET RESPONSE: A MULTI-LEVEL FRAMEWORK

Our approach draws upon insights from the civil resistance literature about how civilians can mobilize effectively against their targets; however, we recognize that some corporations are more vulnerable than others to influence by non-traditional stakeholders (King and Soule 2007; King 2011, 2013; Soule 2009), and that this level of vulnerability may also depend on the country in which the corporations operate. Hence, we also articulate several basic hypotheses related to firm- and state-level factors that might make the people power theory more contingent.

People Power. From auto manufacturing workers protesting wage cuts in Mexico, to indigenous villagers opposing unfair working conditions in textile factories in Indonesia, to miners' unions opposing unsafe working conditions in South Africa, to the Ogoni tribe opposing the environmental damage caused by oil drilling in Nigeria—groups of civilians often mobilize against corporate practices they see as violating their interests and/or rights. Whether these groups are comprised of local civilians organizing from the ground up to redress a specific claim or an organized union with routine experience struggling for workers' rights, our project hypothesizes that civilian actors often have the ability to affect the behavior of private industry. They can do this using non-violent actions that call perceived injustices to the attention of consumers, shareholders, or corporate leadership, thereby imposing costs on the corporation. Our framework starts with the basic assumption that no corporation is monolithic, and that different employees within the corporation (its "agents") have varying degrees of agreement as to whether the corporation's status quo behavior suits its long-term interests (Sharp 1973). We also assume that a corporation's behavior is entirely dependent on the cooperation of its agents in seeking profit. Because of this heterogeneity within different pillars of the corporation, every corporation is fundamentally vulnerable to internal division.[6] We theorize that these divisions become exacerbated when the corporation faces a challenge from the population in which it is located. Specifically, our theory suggests that campaigns of non-violent action are likely to create internal divisions within corporations or sharpen pre-existing ones, as compared with one-off protests. To minimize the internal

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[6] Although we are unable to specifically test this mechanism due to data limitations, further research should focus explicitly on data collection related to internal divisions within corporations.

damage to the corporation in the face of such campaigns, we theorize that, *ceteris paribus*, corporations generally attempt to make concessions to the local population.

> *People Power*
> H1: Corporations that face challenges from civil resistance campaigns are more likely to make concessions regarding human rights practices than corporations that do not face civil resistance campaigns.

Firm-level factors. Previous research on corporate behavior shows that businesses have not fully embraced the global norm of respect for human rights (Wright 2008), nor have they always responded uniformly to challenges from below (*e.g.,* Soule 2009; Banerjee and Burroway 2015). The business ethics literature suggests a number of potential firm-level causal explanations could be at play in explaining this variation. We consider firms' reputation, leadership, and the competitive environment in which they operate.

Reputation. Numerous academic studies and industry surveys have documented the link between corporate reputation and their bottom line (King and McDonnell 2015; King and Pearce 2010; King and Soule 2007; Koku, Akhigbe, and Springer 1997; McDonnell and King 2013). For example, research conducted in the United States suggests that many consumers prefer to purchase products labeled as having "fair labor" standards—and that such consumers are often willing to pay 20% more in return for fair labor standards (Hiscox and Smyth 2011). Deitelhoff *et al*. (2010, p208) state that "the more the market success of a company depends on its image and reputation, the more the company will engage" in responsible behavior. Reputation-dependent companies are the most vulnerable to domestic and global civil society campaigns in part because of the negative attention they can bring to the company. Corporations are even more concerned about their reputation today as images and information can spread at unprecedented speed through social media. This approach assumes that companies will be most likely to respond to strategies of civil resistance to avoid negative reputational concerns.

A firm's reputational vulnerability, however, can vary substantially. Those most prone to reputational concerns, for example, may produce end-consumer products with brands that are widely known. For example, "[o]perating in a market segment where customers possess awareness or being ranked as the market leader function as enabling conditions for corporate engagement" in corporate social responsibility leadership initiatives (Deitlhoff *et al*. 2010, p208). These firms are likely to be found in the food and beverage sector, such as Nestle and Coca-Cola, or highly recognized apparel brand names like Gap and Nike, or globally recognizable oil companies such as Shell, Texaco/Chevron, and BP. This literature suggests that vulnerable companies may also be more conciliatory due to their visibility and reputational concerns.

> *Reputation*
> H2: Civil resistance targeted at those companies with greater reputational assets will be more likely to lead to corporate concessions.

Leadership & Ownership. As mentioned above, Soule's (2009) research on civil resistance to corporations highlights the importance of internal power shifts within corporations in producing windows of opportunity for civil resistance movements. Applying a political opportunity approach to the corporate setting, Soule argues that protest opportunities may arise during changes in corporate leadership, mergers and acquisitions, and/or corporate restructuring (*Ibid*., p46). Internal leadership or ownership changes, for example, create windows of opportunity in which corporations are most likely to

change. Civil resistance would likely be most influential, then, as substantial changes are occurring within the business.

Leadership & Ownership
H3: Civil resistance is more likely to lead to concessions when firms are experiencing leadership or ownership changes.

Competition. Another body of literature recognizes that firms operate in a competitive environment. Some scholars suggest that corporations operating in markets with many providers are less visible and therefore incentives for responsible behavior are lower (see Briscoe and Safford 2008; Wolf *et al*. 2007, p309; Deitelhoff *et al*. 2010, p217). High levels of competitiveness, in other words, may actually decrease incentives to behave responsibly since firm differentiation is difficult.[7]

Alternatively, others note that some firms adhere to a logic of "doing well by doing good." This body of scholarship sidesteps the normative debate about the responsibility of business and suggests, instead, that corporate responsibility and profitability need not be discrete goals. Instead, both social and profit motives improve the economic competitiveness of the firm (Porter and Kramer 2006, 2011; Briscoe and Safford 2008). In contradiction to Friedman (1984), scholarship from the business ethics literature suggests that private enterprise has a purpose and obligation beyond its economic and legal responsibilities (Abrams 1951; Carroll 1981). Businesses become "good" corporate citizens by contributing resources to the community and improving individuals' life quality (Buchholz 1998; Hutton and Olsen 2015). Deitelhoff *et al*. (2010) claim that there is some market-level threshold at which an individual firm is more likely to comply with human rights norms once its competitors also do so. "To reduce competitive losses, compliance with human rights is more likely the more competitors comply as well. This amounts to strong incentives for the more vulnerable companies to engage in norm-entrepreneurship" (*Ibid*., p234; see also Zald *et al* 2005). This contagion effect, in other words, would suggest that once a competitor provides concessions to civil society, others would shortly follow suit, thereby shaping the industry norm. Our study is the first to assess whether there is a diffusion of corporate practices (*i.e.,* replication of concessions across business within the same industry).

Competition
H4a: Civil resistance will be less likely to lead to concessions in a more competitive market, as firms perceive their vulnerability and reputational concerns to be lower.

H4b: Firms learn from their competition; if a firm's competitor concedes to civil society groups, other firms individually will be more likely to provide concessions.

State-Level Factors. Abuses by firms and movements occur within states, and several important state-level factors may also influence the degree to which civil resistance affects corporate behavior. For example, state tolerance of human rights abuses is likely to affect firm behavior and response toward civil resistance in that the state can create a permissive atmosphere in which the cost to businesses in committing human rights abuse is low. Where states are permissive, for example, corporations may be less likely to concede to civil resistance. However, such permissive environments may result from a range of different factors. For example, where rule of law systems prevail and states are able to enforce

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[7] The logic of competition is slightly different than the logic of reputation, since market competitiveness is dependent on the number and density of competitors rather than the visibility of the brand or specific sector norms that privilege reputation.

human rights standards, they are likely to increase the costs of businesses to commit violations. The willingness of states to adjudicate these cases depends in part on their dependence on, or relative autonomy from, businesses. We thus consider rule of law and the political economy concerns in states and societies to understand when and where corporations might be most influenced by civil resistance.

Rule of Law. With regard to civil resistance and corporate behavior, the rule of law[8] may strengthen and contribute to stronger democratic (particularly legal) institutions and protections for human rights (Dancy and Michel 2015). In contexts where rule of law is robust, firms that may otherwise count on compliant judges and judicial institutions recognize that abuses may not go unpunished, and they change their behavior accordingly. By upholding international human rights standards and enforcing them domestically, moreover, strong rule of law guarantees certain legal rights and remedies unavailable to citizens in weak rule-of-law systems (Hutchinson and Monahan 1987; Waldron 1999). For example, scholars have claimed that human rights trials can lead to the "discovery of law" (Smulovitz 2002) and to "rights-enhancing judicialization" (Epp 1998), which can shape and influence leaders' expectations and behavior regarding human rights. Moreover, countries in which rule of law is high may have more robust press freedom. Thus, popular action and corporate human rights abuses are likelier to receive attention, thereby increasing the reputational consequences of corporate malpractice and the coverage of the movement's demands.[9]

> *Rule of Law*
> H5: Civil resistance is likely to lead to concessions in countries with stronger rule of law.

State Dependency. Finally, the development context in which businesses operate may also affect their tendency to respond to civil resistance. If a particular business or industry is integral to the overall economic health and growth of a country, we would expect that state reliance on those businesses could create a more permissive attitude toward their violations. Likewise, particularly strategic business sectors might find a more permissive attitude toward their violations than less strategic ones. A state that relies heavily upon business in general, or a given investment sector, may look the other way (Shakleman 2006).

This process may be exacerbated when states within the same region find themselves competing for foreign investment in a given industry (Dougherty 2011). Host nations, in other words, may not challenge businesses' operations for fear of establishing a reputation as unwelcoming to business and outside investment (O'Donnell 1988). In such instances, industry leaders may take their operations elsewhere. Thus, countries dependent on business for their development objectives—especially when regional neighbors have a similarly structured economy—would likely lower incentives to respond to civil resistance. Alternatively, firms in a more diverse economy may be more likely to engage with civic actors, even if doing so increases the cost to businesses.

> *State Dependency*
> H6: When state actors rely heavily upon a given industry, firms within that industry will be less likely to provide concessions to civil resistance.

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[8] We define "rule of law" as the principle that all people and institutions are accountable to a law that is fairly applied and enforced.
[9] We thank a USAID reviewer for this insight.

Table 1 summarizes the different factors specified in the hypotheses, their derivations in the existing literature, and their expected effects on corporate concessions.

Table 1: Summary of Hypotheses

Factor (Hypothesis)	Derivation	Expected Effect on Corporate Concessions
People Power		
Civil Resistance Campaign (H1)	Soule 2009; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011	+
Firm-Level Attributes		
Company Has Reputational Concerns (H2)	King and McDonnel 2015; King and Pearce 2010; King and Soule 2007; Koku, Akhigbe, and Springer 1997; McDonnel and King 2013; Deitelhoff *et al*. 2010	+
Leadership & Ownership Changes (H3)	Soule 2009	+
Market Comparison (H4a)	Briscoe and Safford 2008; Wolf *et al*. 2007; Deitelhoff *et al*. 2010	-
Diffusion of Concessions (H4b)	Deitelhoff *et al*. 2010; Zald *et al*. 2005	+
State-Level Attributes		
Rule of Law (H5)	Teorrell 2012; Dancy and Michel 2015	+
State Dependency on Industrial Sector (H6)	Shakleman 2006; O'Donnell 1988	-

Existing literature therefore leaves us with three key tasks. First, we outline our methodology for measurement, data collection, and analysis. Second, we create a catalogue of civil resistance tactics and corporate responses that identifies the wide range of techniques and strategies available to these actors. Third, we model which civil society, firm, and state factors are correlated with corporate concessions in four developing countries.

RESEARCH STRATEGY

We selected four countries spanning Africa (Nigeria and South Africa), Latin America (Mexico), and Southeast Asia (Indonesia). We selected these countries at the specific request of USAID, limiting our list of candidate countries to those that have historically been open to international economic investment, have a long history of business-society engagement, and possess prominent industries based on resource extraction. These countries represent important variation, in terms of economic structure. In South Africa and Mexico, services comprise the largest segment of the GDP while industry does so in Indonesia and Nigeria. With regards to natural resource extraction, Nigeria, Mexico, and Indonesia all rely primarily on oil. Among these, Nigeria is most reliant on oil—at its peak, 60% of the GDP was from oil rents, compared to a height of around 8% for both Mexico and Indonesia. South Africa, alternatively, relies primarily on minerals, but to a lesser extent, as the rents as a percentage of GDP peaked around 4%.[10] Two of our cases are middle-income countries (South Africa GDP/capita = $6,484; Mexico

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[10] The percentage of rents is calculated as the difference between the value of production at world prices and the total cost of production; these figures, and the economies of our sample countries, are thus somewhat reliant on global commodity prices.

GDP/capita = $10,230) while individuals in the other two cases are poorer (Indonesia GDP/capita = $3,493; Nigeria GDP/capita = $3,203).[11]

We followed previous research on civil resistance to create a database of civil society mobilization toward corporations (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Drawing on multiple different open sources—including news reports, wire services, activist self-reports, human rights NGO reports, and corporate records—we collected information about incidents targeting corporations between 1990 and 2013. The dataset includes 840 incidents across South Africa, Nigeria, Mexico, and Indonesia during this time period. See Appendices A and B for detailed discussions of the coding procedures and resultant data, respectively.

Unit of Analysis. In the quantitative analysis below, the unit of analysis is the **campaign**. We define a campaign as a series of episodes linked in coordinated fashion by the same set of actors toward the same goal. We linked related incidents together into campaigns so that we can separate these from one-off events. A campaign begins when we observe the first related incident; it ends when we observe the last related incident. Functionally, campaigns end when they are effectively suppressed, when participants obtain their preferred outcome (*e.g.,* concessions), or when they fizzle out.

We identified specific campaigns by determining whether specific incidents are linked to form some kind of coordinated activity. For example, even though they were separate "incidents," the California Farm Workers' boycotts of businesses were part of the same overall campaign as Cesar Chavez's hunger strike. We determine whether incidents are related by whether they are organized by the same actors, with the same general goal, under the same general leadership or movement name, and within the same general timeframe (*e.g.,* they are days or weeks apart). If incidents are more than one year apart with no activity in between, we code them as separate incidents (not part of the same campaign). To identify linked incidents, we produce a unique campaign ID that associates related incidents to one another. For example, if a community group conducts a strike one day, a protest the next, and a sit-in the next, we would code all these as separate incidents belonging to the same campaign. A general demonstration, with no linkages to other activities, would not count as a campaign *per se*.

Below we provide descriptive statistics for each target country to illustrate the frequency with which we were able to identify organized civic action against perceived abuses by corporations. The database has 199 discrete campaigns, with coverage spanning from January 8, 1990 through August 29, 2014. Of these, we include 185 campaigns for analysis, as 14 campaigns primarily targeted the government rather than the corporation regarding their claims of corporate human rights abuses.

Dependent Variable. The dependent variable is corporate concessions, which we define as material concessions or full accommodation relative to movement demands (see Appendix B). More often than not, corporations ignore or deny their involvement in any given activity (Olsen and Payne 2013). Material concessions and full accommodation occurred in 18% of the incidents. Our primary dependent variable is coded as a 1 if the corporation makes concessions and 0 if otherwise—the strictest measure of corporate concessions. Non-material concessions (such as praise, promises, or verbal offers) were excluded from this strict measure to stave off criticism that we were conflating a corporation's verbal concessions with real, tangible concessions to civil society actors. However, non-material concessions like praise and promises are not equivalent to ignoring the campaign or repressing the campaign either. Therefore, we also created a weak measure of corporate concessions, which is coded as a 1 if the

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[11] These are the most recent figures available from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.

corporation acts with full accommodation, material concessions, and non-material concessions and 0 if otherwise. We estimate all models using both dependent variables for robustness.

Independent Variables and Covariates. To test each hypothesis, we rely on our original data as well as several other data sources on the firms and the states in which the campaigns take place. Each model contains a standard set of control variables, including company size (measured by logged assets),[12] time dummies, and industry dummies (not reported in tables below).[13] The results discussed here include those movements in which a company was the primary target, as opposed to the government (n=185).

To test Hypothesis 1 (people power), we constructed a count variable for the number of incidents involved in the campaign. If a corporation faced only a single protest, it should be less likely to concede than if it faced a more durable campaign involving numerous incidents.

To test Hypothesis 2 (reputation), we created a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the company was listed on *Fortune Magazine*'s Most Admired Corporations (MAC) and 0 if otherwise. The MAC data were developed through a survey administered to senior executives, directors, and financial analysts annually since the early 1980s. It includes an assessment across eight different components of reputation for more than 300 companies.

To test Hypothesis 3 (leadership), we aggregated data on leadership and ownership changes from various firm-level resources.[14] The variable is coded as 1 if the targeted firm experienced such a change within five years of the movement and coded 0 if otherwise.

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[12] For the measure of logged assets, we use post-2005 averages of assets as controls for size in pre-2005 years. These are the only available data for this proxy. While less than ideal, we justify this choice by the fact that we are really concerned about the relative differences in average rates of growth—not the absolute values—represented by firm size.

[13] We include year dummies and follow McDonnell and King (2013) to include specific industry controls for those industries that constitute over 5% of our sample. The firms in our dataset are predominately from five industries: manufacturing, oil, mining, transportation and public utilities, and retail. To designate industries, Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes were created by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. We used the definitions provided on www.siccode.com: Manufacturing (SIC codes 20-39) includes activity that involves the engagement in mechanical or chemical transformation of materials or substances into new products; Oil (SIC code 13) includes the extraction of oil, gas, crude petroleum, and natural gas and any field services associated with this process; Mining (SIC codes 10 or 14) includes metal mining and mining and quarrying of non-metallic minerals; Transportation and Public Utilities (SIC codes 40-49) include transportation by air, communications, and electric, gas and sanitary services; and Retail Trade (SIC codes 50-59) include both wholesale trade (business primarily engaged in selling merchandise to retailers) and retail trade (businesses selling merchandise for personal or household consumption).

[14] For changes in leadership, our graduate assistant used publicly available data (company websites, press releases, newspaper articles, SEC filings) to identify when CEO leadership and/or top management changed.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Covariates

Variable	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Number of Incidents	185	3.908108 13.	13.2233	1	132
Competition	118	10.99459 26.	26.33757	-90.606	50.624
Diffusion	185	0.2216216 .41	0.4164649	0	1
Reputation	179	0.1564246 .36	0.3642763	0	1
CEO Leadership Changes	185	0.1081081 .31	0.3113596	0	1
Rule of Law	178	5.629769 1.3	1.373326	1	8
Oil Rents	185	5.24938 8.7	8.755553	0	38.23832
Mineral Rents	185	0.9466435 1.2	1.263227	0.0000937	4.082563
Coal Rents	185	0.6458307 1.2	1.275989	0	6.660432
Assets (logged)	143	14.80565 4.3	4.334922	4.239677	19.91871
State Dependency on Sector	185	0.7135135 .45	0.4533464	0	1
Minerals	185	0.1243243 .33	0.3308466	0	1
Mining	185	0.0864865 .28	0.2818439	0	1
Retail	185	0.0864865 .28	0.2818439	0	1
Transport	185	0.0810811 .27	0.2737003	0	1
Natural Gas	185	0.0864865 .28	0.2818439	0	1

Oil	185	0.0540541 .22	0.226738	0	1
2005	185	0.0864865 .28	0.2818439	0	1
2006	185	0.0702703 .25	0.2562956	0	1
2007	185	0.0216216 .14	0.1458393	0	1
2008	185	0.0216216 .14	0.1458393	0	1
2009	185	0.027027 .16	0.1626022	0	1
2010	185	0.0432432 .20	0.2039562	0	1
2011	185	0.0162162 .12	0.1266489	0	1
2012	185	0.0216216 .14	0.1458393	0	1
2013	185	0.0432432 .20	0.2039562	0	1

To test Hypotheses 4a and 4b, we first created a variable identifying each corporation's industry in accordance with the SIC grouping. To proxy for market competition (H4a), we calculated a company's average profit margins throughout the duration of the campaign. Given that we control for industry-level effects, a firm's profit margin should represent, in general, a relative sense of competition amongst industry competitors. We obtained these data from BvD/Orbis, a proprietary database that contains the most comprehensive information on private and public firms around the globe. To assess the contagion effect (H4b), we created an indicator identifying whether same-industry corporations have engaged in non-material concessions, material concessions, or full accommodation toward activists within the same country in the previous two years.[15]

To test Hypothesis 5 (rule of law), we used Jan Teorell's measure from the Rule of Law Index, which measure whether there are checks and balances to ensure respect for civil rights on a scale of 0 (weak) to 8 (strong).

Finally, to test Hypothesis 6 (state dependency), we created a dummy variable for each incident identifying whether the corporate target belongs to a vital national industry, as defined by whether that industry is among the top two sectors for that country-year in terms of the country's annual industrial

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[15] Here we gauge concessions using both the strong and weak measures, since verbal concessions may have sufficient reputational impact to encourage emulation by competitor firms.

output (see Appendix C for specific coding decisions). We also evaluated whether there were significant differences in corporate concessions across extractive sectors—often thought to be the most invulnerable sector to challenge from below (Middleton-Detzner 2011). We constructed three variables based on the percentage of the national GDP reliant on oil rents, mineral rents, and coal rents. We expect that those economies dependent on oil rents (which is more dependent on capital and is therefore somewhat shielded from work stoppages and labor actions), will be less likely to concede than those economics dependent on mineral and coal rents (which are more dependent on labor and are therefore more vulnerable to labor actions).

EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

We conducted logistic regressions to evaluate the statistical association between the different covariates and the likelihood of corporate concessions. Due to missing data and a relatively small sample size, we were unable to use more sophisticated procedures (such as multi-level modeling or matching strategies) in our estimations. With a larger sample, such methods may be useful in further assessing conditional hypotheses.

We estimated several models for each hypothesis: one containing a truncated sample[16] of post-2005 observations and the other with the full sample. We used two samples because the earliest firm-level data we could obtain are from 2005; in addition, one model used the strict measure of concessions and another used the weak measure. The firm-level data were primarily used as a control for firm size. While we recognize the post-2005 data do not represent the absolute size of firms prior to 2005, it is intuitive to think the relative sizes of firms might be captured by these data. We provide both specifications, however, to illustrate any differences in the post-2005 and full sample specifications.

In addition to estimating the aggregate effects, we also included firm size, sector dummies, and year dummies in each model to ensure our results are not driven by cross-sectoral or temporal variation alone. We clustered robust standard errors around the country. We report the results in tabular and graphical form, reporting marginal effects of the primary covariate on predicted probabilities of concessions. Replication files and the STATA scripts are available at www.ericachenoweth.com/research.

Our first hypothesis (people power) suggests that corporations that face civil resistance campaigns will be more likely to concede than those that face only a single protest. Of the 185 movements of which a company is the primary target, 97 were a single event while 88 consisted of two or more related events. Of the single events, only one in five (21%) garnered full accommodation or material concessions. Alternatively, nearly one in two (49%) of the durable campaigns (involving more than one event) obtained full accommodation or material concessions from the target company. We find that this difference is also statistically significant in a two-tailed t-test (t = 4.21, p < 0.0001): corporations are much more likely to concede when faced with a campaign of two or more related incidents.

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[16] The truncated models involve no more than 46 observations, meaning that the results are highly unstable. Logistic regressions require more than 100 observations to yield stable results (Long and Freese 2005). Therefore, the results from the truncated sample must be interpreted as suggestive only.

Table 3: Effect of Number of Civil Resistance Incidents on Corporate Concessions

Variable	Truncated Sample (post 2005 only)		Full Sample (1990 – 2013)	
	Model 1 (Concessions – Strict Measure)	Model 2 (Concessions – Broad Measure)	Model 3 (Concessions – Strict Measure)	Model 4 (Concessions – Broad Measure)
Number of Incidents	0.113***	0.113***	0.113***	0.219***
	(13.89)	(13.89)	(13.89)	(4.66)
Assets (logged)	0.00494	0.187	0.0838	0.171***
	(0.07)	(1.52)	(1.23)	(6.59)
Constant	-1.932	-2.223	-2.802**	-4.332***
	(-1.20)	(-1.02)	(-2.64)	(-9.25)
Observations	46	46	129	136
Pseudo R^2	0.251	0.325	0.289	0.307

t-statistics in parentheses
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 1: Effect of Number of Incidents on Predicted Probability of Concessions (based on Table 3, Models 4 and 3, respectively)

In a logistic regression, we found additional support for Hypothesis 1 (Table 3). Firms are more likely to provide concessions when faced with a civil resistance campaign; the higher the number of events, the more likely are concessions. This finding is the most robust in our entire analysis, holding across both the truncated (post-2005) sample and the full sample, as well as across both the strict and weak operationalizations of the dependent variable. We visualize the substantive impact in Figure 1.

Our second hypothesis (reputation) suggests that reputable firms (as designated by *Fortune Magazine*'s MAC list) would be more likely to concede than companies that are not as well known. Descriptively,

there is support for this hypothesis, as well. MAC companies provided full accommodation or material concessions in response to exactly half of the movements they faced (14 of 28 movements). Non-MAC companies, alternatively, only provided concessions one in three times (49 of 157 movements). A two-tailed t-test, however, illustrates that this difference is not statistically significant (t = -1.94, p < 0.0537). This finding is corroborated in our logistic regression, which finds no support for Hypothesis 2. When faced with a civil resistance campaign, firms with reputational concerns are no more or likely to provide concessions than firms excluded from the list. We visualize the substantive impact in Figure 2.

Table 4: Effect of Reputational Concerns on Corporate Concessions

Variable	Truncated Sample (post 2005 only)		Full Sample (1990 - 2013)	
	Model 1 (Concessions – Strict Measure)	Model 2 (Concessions – Broad Measure)	Model 3 (Concessions – Strict Measure)	Model 4 (Concessions – Broad Measure)
Reputation	-0.136	0.992	-0.157	0.0404
	(-0.08)	(0.56)	(-0.21)	(0.04)
Assets (logged)	-0.0131	0.156	0.0872	0.168***
	(-0.11)	(1.08)	(1.14)	(5.51)
Constant	-0.298	-2.447	-2.609**	-3.862***
	(-0.15)	(-0.86)	(-2.20)	(-8.50)
Observations	46	46	129	136
Pseudo R^2	0.119	0.293	0.251	0.270

t-statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Figure 2: Effect of *Fortune Magazine's* "Most Admired Companies" Designation on Predicted Probability of Concessions (based on Table 4, Models 4 and 3, respectively)

The next hypothesis suggests that those firms undergoing a leadership change may be more likely to concede when faced with civil resistance. Our descriptive data also support this hypothesis. While leadership changes occurred only 11% of the time (20 of the 185 movements), concessions were granted in over half (11 of 20) of the movements. Corporations are more likely to provide concessions when undergoing leadership changes as the movement is underway. A two-tailed t-test illustrates that this finding is statistically significant ($t = -2.11$, $p < 0.0365$). A logistic regression provides further support for Hypothesis 3. In fact, this finding is consistent across the strong measures of concessions as well as the weak measure in the full model. We visualize these effects in Figure 3. Further research is required to understand whether the civil resistance campaign caused these leadership changes (as expected by the people power theory) or whether the changes occurred independent of the civil resistance.

Table 5: Effect of CEO Changes on Corporate Concessions

Variable	Truncated Sample (post 2005 only)		Full Sample (1990 – 2013)	
	Model 1 (Concessions – Strict Measure)	Model 2 (Concessions – Broad Measure)	Model 3 (Concessions – Strict Measure)	Model 4 (Concessions – Broad Measure)
CEO Leadership Changes	1.167* (2.36)	1.339 (1.43)	1.942*** (3.33)	1.837 (2.69)
Assets (logged)	-0.0153 (-0.18)	0.153+ (1.83)	0.0800 (0.96)	0.160*** 6.49
Constant	-0.859 (-0.62)	-1.142 (-0.79)	-2.554* (-1.98)	-3.786*** (-10.77)
Observations	46	46	129	136
Pseudo R²	0.144	0.282	0.290	0.304

t-statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Figure 3: Effect of CEO Changes on Predicted Probability of Concessions (based on Table 5, Models 4 and 3, respectively)

Our next set of hypotheses (4a and 4b) suggests that industry trends may help explain why some companies respond favorably to campaigns while others do not. With regard to market competition, our logistic regression reveals support for Hypothesis 4a. Firms operating in more competitive markets are less likely to concede to civil resistance campaigns, perhaps because such firms perceive their vulnerability and reputational concerns to be low. We visualize this effect in Figure 4.

Table 6: Effect of Market Competition on Corporate Concessions

Variable	Truncated Sample (post 2005 only)		Full Sample (1990 – 2013)	
	Model 1 (Concessions – Strict Measure)	Model 2 (Concessions – Broad Measure)	Model 3 (Concessions – Strict Measure)	Model 4 (Concessions – Broad Measure)
CEO Leadership Changes	-0.0785+	-0.0345	-0.0183	-0.0209***
	(-1.67)	(-0.35)	(-1.49)	(-2.63)
Assets (logged)	0.0464	0.647+	0.245*	0.366***
	(.62)	(1.66)	(2.43)	(3.99)
Constant	-1.229	28.24	-3.535	-5.000***
	(-1.32)	(15.02)	(-.46)	(-3.79)
Observations	22	26	101	89
Pseudo R²	0.292	0.601	0.342	0.280

t-statistics in parentheses
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 4: Effect of Market Competition (Average Profit Margin) on Predicted Probability of Concessions (based on Table 6, Models 4 and 3, respectively)

However, interestingly, we find no real support for Hypothesis 4b, which focuses on whether firms tend to follow suit when within-industry competitors make concessions. The truncated model's strict measure of concessions suggests a negative effect, meaning that such behaviors actually *reduced* the probability of firm concessions. This may imply a *negative* adaptation effect among firms, rather than a more conciliatory emulation effect, in that firms may actually attempt to fortify themselves against civil society challenges as a result of their competitors' earlier concessions. However, this finding requires further exploration, since it was not supported by any of the other models.

Our fifth hypothesis tested the extent to which levels of democracy influence whether companies provide concessions in response to campaigns. The changes in Teorell's Rule of Law Index, over time, are displayed in Figure 5. We found modest support for Hypothesis 5, in that civil resistance is likelier to lead to concessions in countries with stronger rule of law. This finding holds in both the truncated and full samples when the measure of concessions is strict, but drops out with the weak concessions measure. We visualize this effect in Figure 6.

Table 7: Effect of Diffusion on Corporate Concessions

Variable	Truncated Sample (post - 2005 only)		Full Sample (1990 - 2013)	
	Model 1 (Concessions – Strict Measure)	Model 2 (Concessions – Broad Measure)	Model 3 (Concessions – Strict Measure)	Model 4 (Concessions – Broad Measure)
Diffusion	-2.633*	-1.682	0.640	1.749
	(-2.13)	(-1.10)	(0.61)	(1.62)
Assets (logged)	-0.101	0.104	0.088	0.187***
	(-1.09)	(1.09)	1.36	(5.27)
Constant	1.189	0.308	-3.035***	-1.811***
	(0.85)	(0.15)	(-4.87)	(-3.21)
Observations	46	46	129	136
Pseudo R^2	0.160	0.273	0.255	0.297

t-statistics in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 5: Rule of Law Comparisons Over Time

Table 8: Effect of Rule of Law Index on Corporate Concessions

Variable	Truncated Sample (post - 2005 only)		Full Sample (1990 - 2013)	
	Model 1 (Concessions – Strict Measure)	Model 2 (Concessions – Broad Measure)	Model 3 (Concessions – Strict Measure)	Model 4 (Concessions – Broad Measure)
Rule of Law	0.931**	0.631	0.830*	0.359
	(2.72)	(1.53)	(2.49)	(0.92)
Assets (logged)	0.0241	0.195*	0.0806	0.189***
	(0.23)	(2.36)	(1.24)	(4.76)
Constant	-6.220***	-4.608+	-8.318***	-6.697**
	(-3.54)	(-1.76)	(-4.72)	(-3.11)
Observations	46	46	127	134
Pseudo R²	0.157	0.274	0.268	0.274

t-statistics in parentheses
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 6. Effect of Rule of Law on Predicted Probability of Concessions (based on Table 8, Models 4 and 3, respectively)

To test our last hypothesis (state dependency), we assessed whether the structure of a state's economy influences companies' response to civil resistance. We hypothesized that firms belonging to those sectors that are among the top two producers of annual industrial output are less likely to concede than their counterparts. We find very modest support for this hypothesis, with the weak measure of concessions in the full model demonstrating a negative impact of state dependency on the likelihood of

firm concessions (while the strong measure shows no effect). We visualize this effect in the bottom right-hand corner of Figure 7. Neither measure of concessions demonstrates an impact in the truncated sample.

Table 9: Effect of State Dependency on Sector on Corporate Concessions

Variable	Truncated Sample (post - 2005 only)		Full Sample (1990 - 2013)	
	Model 1 (Concessions – Strict Measure)	Model 2 (Concessions – Broad Measure)	Model 3 (Concessions – Strict Measure)	Model 4 (Concessions – Broad Measure)
State Dependency on Sector	-0.734 (-0.46)	-2.368 (-1.32)	-0.477 (-1.18)	-0.538** (-2.67)
Assets (logged)	-0.003 (-0.06)	0.069* (2.03)	0.069 (1.52)	0.106*** (3.91)
Constant	0.458 (0.25)	2.735 (1.30)	-1.226+ (-1.71)	-1.285* (-2.42)
Observations	52	52	136	136
Pseudo R²	0.066	0.243	0.041	0.065

t-statistics in parentheses
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

We also evaluated whether reliance on different extractive industries yielded different impacts on corporate concessions. We found support for the proposition that heavy national dependence on oil rents is negatively correlated with the likelihood of corporate concessions, whereas dependence on mineral or coal rents is correlated with an increased likelihood of corporate concessions. These findings are fairly consistent across both the truncated and full samples (Tables 10 and 11, respectively). We visualize this effect in Figure 7.

Table 10: Effect of Extractive Industries on Corporate Concessions (Truncated Sample)

Variable	Model 1 (Concessions – Strict Measure)	Model 2 (Concessions – Broad Measure)	Model 3 (Concessions – Strict Measure)	Model 4 (Concessions – Broad Measure)	Model 5 (Concessions – Strict Measure)	Model 6 (Concessions – Broad Measure
Oil Rents	-0.056*** (-3.34)	0.035 (1.12)				
Mineral Rents			3.497*** (8.61)	1.558* (2.28)		
Coal Rents					2.590*** (3/35)	1.904* (2.24)
Assets (logged)	0.003 (0.04)	0.132 (1.35)	-0.0827 (-0.76)	0.255** (3.02)	0.034 (0.34)	0.291*** (3.30)
Constant	-0.109 (-0.07)	-0.482 (-0.26)	-5.243** (-2.93)	-3.948* (-2.11)	-4.604* (-2.17)	-4.407** (-2.58)
Observations	46	46	46	46	127	134
Pseudo R²	0.142	0.267	0.407	0.366	0.333	0.365

t-statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 11: Effect of Extractive Industries on Corporate Concessions (Full Sample)

Variable	Model 1 (Concessions – Strict Measure)	Model 2 (Concessions – Broad Measure)	Model 3 (Concessions – Strict Measure)	Model 4 (Concessions – Broad Measure)	Model 5 (Concessions – Strict Measure)	Model 6 (Concessions – Broad Measure)
Oil Rents	-0.075+	-0.006				
	(-1.94)	(-0.30)				
Mineral Rents			1.155***	1.392***		
			(4.80)	(6.74)		
Coal Rents					1.523***	1.761*
					(6.38)	(6.67)
Assets (logged)	0.094	0.170***	0.0950	0.199***	0.0845	0.186
	(1.40)	(5.31)	(1.12)	(3.99)	(0.92)	(3.53)
Constant	-2.716**	-3.892***	-7.068***	-9.582***	-6.310***	-8.456***
	(-2.58)	(-7.72)	(-9.61)	(-36.35)	(-5.29)	(-13.99)
Observations	129	136	129	136	129	136
Pseudo R^2	0.269	0.270	0.301	0.334	0.311	0.337

t-statistics in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 7: Effect of State Dependency on Predicted Probability of Concessions (based on Table 10, Models 2, 4, and 6; and Table 9, Model 4, respectively)

Finally, we estimated the complete model incorporating those covariates found to be statistically significant in prior estimates.[17] The finding on the impact of the number of campaign-related incidents is quite robust, as is the finding on the effects of CEO removal on concession patterns. We

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[17] Here we included covariates if they were significant in any of the prior models (*e.g.,* truncated or full samples, weak or strict measures of the dependent variables).

also found consistent (albeit weakened) results regarding the negative effect of market competition on concessions. In an initially surprising reversal, we found that rule of law has a negative impact on corporate concessions, across nearly all models. However, this finding is an artifact of multi-collinearity with the oil rents variable; when we dropped oil rents, rule of law resumed its positive impact on the likelihood of concessions in line with the bivariate findings in Table 8.[18] The findings on sector differences are also consistent: higher state dependency on oil rents diminishes the probability of concessions; higher state dependency on mineral rents increases it. Here, the impact of coal rent dependency is negligible. In this model, the impact of state dependency is more pronounced, with a strong negative effect appearing in almost every model. Firm size also, as measured by total assets, has a consistent positive impact on the likelihood of corporate concessions.

Our findings suggest that civil society activity—when concentrated in enduring campaigns— can alter corporate behavior when the target firms are large and are undergoing internal instability (such as a shift in management). However, several contextual factors may mitigate these tendencies, including whether the firm is less sensitive to reputational costs due to market competition; whether the country possess a robust rule of law; whether the country's economy is highly dependent on the firm's sector; and whether the country's economy is highly dependent on oil rents, in particular. More generally, we find that campaign-, firm-, and state-level factors all influence corporate concessions to civil society.

Table 12: Effect of Number of Civil Resistance Incidents on Corporate Concessions

Variable	Truncated Sample (post 2005 only)		Full Sample (1990 - 2013)	
	Model 1 (Concessions – Strict Measure)	Model 2 (Concessions – Broad Measure)	Model 3 (Concessions – Strict Measure)	Model 4 (Concessions – Broad Measure)
Number of Incidents	0.331**	0.126*	0.106***	0.091+
	(2.88)	(2.46)	(5.38)	(1.77)
CEO Leadership Changes	-5.711	-0.774	1.510+	1.217+
	(-1.11)	(-0.24)	(1.65)	(1.66)
Competition	-0.823	-0.023	0.001	0.003
	(-1.34)	(-0.65)	(0.10)	(0.62)
Rule of Law	-0.720+	-0.546*	-0.237***	-0.073
	(-1.67)	(-1.98)	(-5.61)	(-1.41)
Oil Rents	-3.188***	0.040	-0.318*	-0.064
	(-3.42)	0.31)	(-2.22)	(-1.58)
Mineral Rents	3.649*	1.644**	0.224	0.277
	(2.38)	(4.19)	(0.42)	(0.41)
Coal Rents	-3.188***	-0.647	-0.363	-0.291
	(-3.42)	(-1.05)	(-1.14)	(-0.49)
State Dependency	-6.055+	-2.817	-1.195*	-1.221**
	(-1.82)	(-1.52)	(-2.30)	(-2.68)
Assets (logged)	0.245*	0.160+	0.224*	0.209***
	(2.18)	(1.65)	(2.42)	(5.49)
Constant	4.483*	-0.308	-1.277***	-2.487
	(2.05)	(-0.20)	(-3.30)	(-4.08)
Observations	42	42	116	116
Pseudo R^2	0.595	0.421	0.274	0.204

t-statistics in parentheses
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

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[18] Additional models available upon request.

Table 13: Summary of Findings (Derived from Complete Model in Table 12)

Factor (Hypothesis)	Derivation	Expected Effect on Corporate Concessions	Observed Effect on Corporate Concessions
People Power			
Civil Resistance Campaign (H1)	Soule 2009; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011	+	+
Firm-Level Attributes			
Company Has Reputational Concerns (H2)	King and McDonnel 2015; King and Pearce 2010; King and Soule 2007; Koku, Akhigbe, and Springer 1997; McDonnel and King 2013; Deitelhoff *et al.* 2010	+	∅
Leadership & Ownership Changes (H3)	Soule 2009	+	+
Market Comparison (H4a)	Briscoe and Safford 2008; Wolf *et al.* 2007; Deitelhoff *et al.* 2010	-	-
Diffusion of Concessions (H4b)	Deitelhoff *et al.* 2010; Zald *et al.* 2005	+	∅
State-Level Attributes			
Rule of Law (H5)	Teorrell 2012; Dancy and Michel 2015	+	+
State Dependency on Industrial Sector (H6)	Shakleman 2006; O'Donnell 1988	-	-

CONCLUSION

This study lays the groundwork for developing a more systematic and empirically grounded understanding about how civilians can affect corporate behavior in constructive ways. The data presented in Appendix B illustrate that civil society groups use a wide variety of tactics to influence firm behavior. We find that companies are more likely to concede when civil resistance campaigns are durable and the company is undergoing a leadership change. We also find firm-level effects: companies operating in highly competitive markets are less likely to concede than others. Moreover, firms in highly productive sectors are less likely to concede than those on whom the state is less dependent. We also find that firms operating in countries with more robust rule of law are more likely to concede than those operating in countries with less adherence to rule of law. And we find that corporations in countries reliant on labor-intensive extractive sectors, like coal and minerals, are more likely to yield to civil society demands than corporations in countries reliant on capital-intensive extractive sectors (specifically, oil).

If our findings are causally motivated—as further research may prove them to be—then they support several practical implications for civil society actors seeking remedy against alleged corporate human rights abuses. First, durable campaigns are more effective than one-off protests. They are also more effective against larger corporations that are undergoing leadership change, suggesting that civil society groups should select corporate targets possessing these attributes. Second, civil society groups seeking concessions from corporations are likely to face higher barriers to success against firms active in highly competitive markets on which the state is highly dependent. Labor-intensive sectors are more vulnerable than capital-intensive sectors. Working to improve adherence to the rule of law may ultimately make corporate concessions more likely in the long run. This suggests that activists and civil

society groups would do well to evaluate the political and economic contexts in which they (and their target firms) operate to better assess the probability that such challenges will ultimately yield change.

Empirically, this project makes an important contribution to our understanding of altering corporate compliance with the demands of civil society groups. It is the first study of its kind to collect cross-country data on civil resistance toward corporations and subsequent changes in corporate behavior in developing countries. Theoretically, this paper brings together two previously distinct, but related, literatures on civil resistance and corporate behavior. With very few exceptions, researchers have scarcely studied bottom-up pressures on corporations in a systematic way, and no researchers have done so outside of the context of the United States. Therefore, our research builds on work that emphasizes the creative potential of "people power from below" as a way to foster an engaged citizenry and enable local communities to restore their rights where others have violated them.

Our research has even broader implications for the societies in which these campaigns take place. In many developing countries, where violent civil conflict is often a possibility, small-scale victories of grassroots mobilization may have important demonstration effects throughout the society. In fact, research on other types of people power movements has shown that civil resistance is preferable to many other forms of mobilization because countries emerging from mass civil resistance campaigns are 15% less likely to relapse into civil war than campaigns emerging from armed conflict (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Moreover, countries in which civilians have waged non-violent struggle are much more likely to usher in democratic institutions through a "democracy-from-below" mechanism. In other words, civil resistance—and experience with civil resistance—creates stronger and more stable societies and therefore improves people's lives in a variety of ways, including in development (Stoddard 2013).

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APPENDIX A: CODING PROTOCOL

This project collected data on non-violent actions by non-state actors related to claims of corporate human rights abuses. Each "incident" is a discrete action conducted in which civilian groups, NGOs, or community organizations attempt to seek redress for grievances against corporate human rights abuses. Actions include protests, strikes, sit-ins, legal action, and other non-violent events. Each record includes information about the type and date of incident, the actor and target of the incident, the opponent's posture, the involvement of third parties (including the government), and the outcome of the incident. Although many corporate and government actions are captured in the auxiliary variables, the unit of analysis is a community group's/activist's action. Incidents of repression or oppression that occur outside the scope of the event are excluded.

Search Protocol

STEP 1. Conduct a search on known databases.
- Look up the country at both http://www.ejatlas.org and http://business-humanrights.org.
- Begin a list of relevant companies and conflicts from which to code.
- When possible, code events based on source materials located at these sites.

STEP 2. Conduct a search on electronic wire service databases.
- From the Lexis Nexis (LN) Advanced Search Form, input [country name] AND [company name] AND "compan*" AND "protest*" OR "strike*" OR "riot*" OR "violen*" OR "attack*" OR "demonstrat*" OR "clash*".
- Select the appropriate date ranges based on the conflicts identified above, with the full calendar year (*i.e.,* input 1/1/1990 as the start date of the search and 12/31/2013 as the end date of the search).
- In sources, enter the following sources: "Associated Press, The," "BBC Monitoring: International Reports," "Associated Press International," "Agence France Press – English," "Associated Press Online."
- Use the sorting button to display stories with oldest first and proceed chronologically (do not sort by relevance). Each story should be ignored/discarded if not relevant to information fitting the unit of analysis.
- There will be many articles coving a single news story or event, even if LN's duplication elimination function is in use. Avoid double counting a single event by determining if the main actor(s), target(s), and issue(s) are distinctive.
- Use the most recently cited and/or most common estimates for disputed information, such as the number of deaths.
- Repeat using the search string: "[country name]" AND "[company name]" AND "human right*".
- Add any more relevant conflicts discovered through the wire services.

STEP 3. Conduct a focused search on Google with relevant sectors.
- Google search: "[sector/industry] human rights abuse [country name]".
- Keep a list of company names that you find during this search.
- Wikipedia is an allowable source as long as a) the specific item of data is documented/referenced; and b) you can confirm the reference.

STEP 4. Consult additional sources identified in the Appendix (as necessary).

Variables

The list of variables is drawn from the SCAD database as well as the NAVCO 3.0 database, with some modifications. This procedure replicates the strengths of these two databases while allowing for compatibility of these data with those sources.

Unique ID
The "unique id" column lists the country code and event number, which is a unique number generated for each event. The country codes are: MEX (Mexico), SAF (South Africa), INS (Indonesia), and NIG (Nigeria).

Movement ID
The "movement id" column lists the country code and movement number, which is a unique number generated for each movement.

Target name
The "target id" column lists the company name. List the most immediate target (*e.g.,* the local subsidiary rather than the name of a parent corporation) at this stage.

CoAbuse (categorical)
Note target's level of involvement in the alleged abuse/grievance:
- 1 = committed the abuse
- 2 = assisted in committing the abuse
- 3 = no involvement in the abuse

Start Date
Lists the day, month, and year in DD/MM/YYY format for when the event begins. If the exact day cannot be identified, this is the best approximation of the start date. The start year (*styr*), start month (*stmo*), start day (*stday*) are listed in separate columns.

End Date
Lists the day, month, and year in DD/MM/YYYY format for when the event ends. If the exact day cannot be identified, this is the best approximation of the end date. The end year (*eyr*), end month (*emo*), end day (*eday*) are listed in separate columns.

Duration
The number of days the event lasted.

Etype(categorical)
Indicates how the event began according to the following coding scheme (this allows for the event to escalate or change into a different event type):
- 0 = **Held Meeting.** Members of an organization convene with one another (and/or members of the community) to plan, prepare for, organize, or coordinate actions.
- 1 = **Parallel Institution.** Civilians create a new organization, institution, commission, or service. Can include political, economic, social, health, inquiry and justice, or community

protection institutions. Formal organizations and protest movements do not qualify; however, formal organizations or protest movements explicitly created as alternative or parallel institutions to those already available to the community do qualify.

- 2 = **Formal Communication.** Opposition groups directly communicate their grievances and/or demands to the opponent (through the release of a written communication or through a press conference, for example).
- 3 = **Judicial Action.** Litigation or threat of litigation.
- 4 = **Organized Demonstration.** Distinct, continuous, and largely peaceful action directed toward members of a distinct "other" group or government authorities. In this event, clear leadership or organization(s) can be identified.
- 5 = **Spontaneous Demonstration.** Distinct, continuous, and largely peaceful action directed toward members of a distinct "other" group or government authorities. In this event, clear leadership or organization cannot be identified.
- 6 = **Organized Violent Riot.** Distinct, continuous and violent action directed toward members of a distinct "other" group or government authorities. The participants intend to cause physical injury and/or property damage. In this event, clear leadership or organization(s) can be identified.
- 7 = **Spontaneous Violent Riot.** Distinct, continuous and violent action directed toward members of a distinct "other" group or government authorities. The participants intend to cause physical injury and/or property damage. In this event, clear leadership or organization(s) cannot be identified.
- 8 = **General Strike.** Members of an organization or union engage in a total abandonment of workplaces and public facilities.
- 9 = **Limited Strike.** Members of an organization or union engage in the abandonment of workplaces in limited sectors or industries.
- 10 **= Anti-Government Violence**: Distinct violent event waged primarily by a non-state group against government authorities or symbols of government authorities (*e.g.,* transportation or other infrastructures). As distinguished from riots, the anti-government actor must have a semi-permanent or permanent militant wing or organization.

EtypeSpecific (text)
A text description of the event.

NV_cat (categorical)
If the event is non-violent, the overall category of non-violent action:
LOGIC: This only shows up if the coder did NOT choose 6, 7, or 10 in the previous question.
- 0 = **Persuasion:** expression of objection of disapproval by words only.
- 1 = **Protest**: expression of objection or disapproval by actions.
- 2 = **Non-cooperation**: deliberate restriction, discontinuance, withholding, or a combination of these of social, economic, or political cooperation with opponent individuals, activities, institutions, or a government during a conflict.
- 3 = **Intervention:** direct interference in a situation by non-violent means. Most often physical, such as a sit-in, occupation, or obstruction; the most militant non-violent action. Also includes the establishment of parallel institutions.
- 4 = **Political engagement:** dialogue or negotiations.
- 5 = **Judicial action:** formal and official judicial redress.
- 6 = **Organization:** planning, preparing, training, or organizing actions.

NV_nc (categorical)
If the event is non-violent non-cooperation (NV_cat = 2), the type of non-violent non-cooperation:
LOGIC: This only shows up if the coder chooses 2 in the previous question.
- 1 = **Social non-cooperation**: refusal to carry on normal social relations with persons or groups regarded as having perpetrated some wrong or injustice, or to comply with certain behavior patterns or social practices.
- 2 = **Economic non-cooperation (boycott):** the withdrawal of economic cooperation in the form of buying, selling, producing, or handling of goods and services.
- 3 = **Economic non-cooperation (strike):** a collective, deliberate, and normally temporary restriction or suspension of labor during a conflict, designed to exert pressure on employers
- or others in controlling positions, such as a government.
- 4 = **Political non-cooperation:** a withdrawal of the usual political cooperation, or obedience, or other participation in the political system (*e.g.,* election boycotts, mass resignation from parties, *etc.*).

NV_commission (categorical)
If the event is non-violent, whether or not it is an act of commission in which the "participants perform acts which they usually do not perform, are not expected by custom to perform, or are forbidden by law or regulation from performing." Acts of commission are also positive actions to create something new (*i.e.,* party, institution, organization). This contrasts to acts of omission, in which "participants refuse to perform acts which they usually perform, are expected by custom to perform, or are required by law or regulation to perform." Such acts focus on people "not" doing something that they are otherwise supposed to, essentially disobedience and withdrawal from existing institutions.
- 0 = act of **omission**
- 1 = act of **commission**
- 2 = **ambiguous**

NV_concentration (categorical)
If the event is non-violent, whether it is physically concentrated activity in a specific geographical location or whether it is physically dispersed.
- 0 = act of **physical dispersion**
- 1 = act of **physical concentration**
- 2 = **mixed**

Actor_Escalation (categorical)
Did the actor escalate the event during its duration?
- 0 = **No Escalation.**
- 1 = **Parallel Institution.** Civilians create a new organization, institution, commission, or service. Can include political, economic, social, health, inquiry and justice, or community protection institutions. Formal organizations and protest movements do not qualify; however, formal organizations or protest movements explicitly created as alternative or parallel institutions to those already available to the community do qualify.
- 2 = **Formal Communication.** Opposition groups directly communicate their grievances and/or demands to the opponent (through the release of a written communication or through a press conference, for example).

- 3 = **Organized Demonstration.** Distinct, continuous, and largely peaceful action directed toward members of a distinct "other" group or government authorities. In this event, clear leadership or organization(s) can be identified.
- 4 = **Spontaneous Demonstration.** Distinct, continuous, and largely peaceful action directed toward members of a distinct "other" group or government authorities. In this event, clear leadership or organization cannot be identified.
- 5 = **Organized Violent Riot.** Distinct, continuous, and violent action directed toward members of a distinct "other" group or government authorities. The participants intend to cause physical injury and/or property damage. In this event, clear leadership or organization(s) can be identified.
- 6 = **Spontaneous Violent Riot.** Distinct, continuous and violent action directed toward members of a distinct "other" group or government authorities. The participants intend to cause physical injury and/or property damage. In this event, clear leadership or organization(s) cannot be identified.
- 7 = **General Strike.** Members of an organization or union engage in a total abandonment of workplaces and public facilities.
- 8 = **Limited Strike.** Members of an organization or union engage in the abandonment of workplaces in limited sectors or industries.
- 9 = **Anti-Government Violence**: Distinct violent event waged primarily by a non-state group against government authorities or symbols of government authorities (*e.g.,* transportation or other infrastructures). As distinguished from riots, the anti-government actor must have a semi-permanent or permanent militant wing or organization.

Target_Escalation (categorical)
Did the target escalate the event during its duration?
- 0 = **No escalation.**
- 1 = **Pro-Government Violence (Repression):** Distinct violent event waged primarily by government authorities, or by groups acting in explicit support of government authority, targeting individual, or "collective individual," members of an alleged opposition group or movement. Note that this event is initiated by the government or pro-government actors. See code for repression, below.
- 2 = **Extra-Government Violence:** Distinct violent event waged primarily by a non-state group targeting individual, or "collective individual," members of an alleged oppositional group or movement. As distinguished from riots, at least one actor must have a semi-permanent or permanent militant wing or organization. Government authorities are not listed as actors or targets.
- 3 = **Intra-Government Violence:** Distinct violent event between two armed factions associated with different elements within the government. These include violence between two legally constituted armed units (*e.g.,* clashes between police and military) or between unofficial militias associated with particular governmental leaders. This code includes events such as military coups.

Actors (categorical, single answer, text)
Please choose one of the following social, political, or identity groups (*i.e.,* actors) directly prosecuting the event. In the text box below, list the name of each actor.
- 1 = NGO
- 2 = INGO
- 3 = Government

- 4 = UN
- 5 = Media
- 6 = Community
- 7 = Company
- 8 = Religious Organization
- 9 = Academic Organization or Research Center
- 10 = Organized Labor
- 11 = Other (specify)

Trans_actors (categorical, text)
Please choose any of the following social, political, or identity groups *i.e.,* actors) affiliated with and/or explicitly acting on behalf of those prosecuting the event. In the text box below, list the name of each actor.
- 1 = NGO
- 2 = INGO
- 3 = Government
- 4 = UN
- 5 = Media
- 6 = Community
- 7 = Company
- 8 = Religious Organization
- 9 = Academic Organization or Research Center
- 10 = Organized Labor
- 11 = Other (specify)

Cgovtarget(dichotomous)
Was the central government the direct target of the event? In the text box below, list the name of the target (*e.g.,* the specific ministry, *etc.*).
- Yes = 1
- No = 0

Rgovtarget(dichotomous)
Was a regional, provincial, or local government the direct target of the event? In the text box below, list the name of the target (*e.g.,* the specific ministry, *etc.*).
- Yes = 1
- No = 0

Corptarget (dichotomous)
Was a local business, corporation, or subsidiary the target of the event? In the text box below, list the name of the target.
- Yes = 1
- No = 0

MNCtarget (dichotomous)
Was a transnational / multinational corporation the target of the event? In the text box below, list the name of the target.
- Yes = 1
- No = 0

Target (categorical, text)
Please choose the primary social, political, or identity group that is the direct target of the event. In the text box below, list the name of the target.
- 1 = NGO
- 2 = INGO
- 3 = Government
- 4 = UN
- 5 = Media
- 6 = Community
- 7 = Company
- 8 = Religious Organization
- 9 = Academic Organization or Research Center
- 10 = Organized Labor
- 11 = Other (specify)

Target1_posture (categorical, text)
The primary target's reaction to the event. In the text box below, describe the posture.
- 1 = full accommodation
- 2 = material concessions
- 3 = non-material concessions
- 4 = neutral / ignore
- 5 = non-material and non-physical repression
- 6 = material and/or physical repression short of killing
- 7 = material and/or physical repression intended to result in death

Add_trans
Are there additional targets?
- 1 = Yes
- 2 = No

Trans_target (categorical, text)
Please choose any of the following social, political, or identity groups affiliated with and/or explicitly acting on behalf of the target. In the text box below, list the name of each one.
- 1 = NGO
- 2 = INGO
- 3 = Government
- 4 = UN
- 5 = Media
- 6 = Community
- 7 = Company
- 8 = Religious Organization
- 9 = Academic Organization or Research Center
- 10 = Organized Labor
- 11 = Other (specify)

Target2_posture (categorical, text)
If there are multiple targets, the secondary target's (*Trans_target's*) reaction to the event. In the text box below, describe the posture.
- 1 = full accommodation
- 2 = material concessions
- 3 = non-material concessions
- 4 = neutral / ignore
- 5 = non-material and non-physical repression
- 6 = material and/or physical repression short of killing
- 7 = material and/or physical repression intended to result in death

Target3_posture (categorical, text)
If there are multiple targets, the tertiary target's reaction to the event. In the text box below, describe the posture.
- 1 = full accommodation
- 2 = material concessions
- 3 = non-material concessions
- 4 = neutral / ignore
- 5 = non-material and non-physical repression
- 6 = material and/or physical repression short of killing
- 7 = material and/or physical repression intended to result in death

Npart (categorical)
Total number of participants in the event.
- 1 = less than 10
- 2 = 10 to 100
- 3 = 101 to 1,000
- 4 = 1,001 to 10,000
- 5 = 10,001 to 100,000
- 6 = 100,001 to 1,000,000
- 7 = over 1,000,000
- -99 = unknown

Ndeath (cardinal numbers)
Records the best estimate of the number of persons killed in the event. If multiple estimates are given, use the mean number of reported deaths or the most recent figures. If the exact number is not given, use the following codes:
- -99 = unknown
- -88 = unknown but probably small (less than 10)
- -77 = unknown but probably large (10 or more)

Repress (categorical)
Did the government use repression or violence against participants in the event?
- 0 = no repression used
- 1 = non-lethal repression used (*e.g.,* tear gas, arrests, *etc.*)
- 2 = lethal repression used (there must be deaths reported)

RepressOther (categorical)
Did a non-governmental group use repression or violence against participants in the event?
- 0 = no repression used
- 1 = non-lethal repression used (*e.g.,* tear gas, arrests, *etc.*)
- 2 = lethal repression used (there must be deaths reported)

Locnum (categorical)
Event locality.
- 1 = Capital city
- 2 = Other major urban area (population greater than 100,000)
- 3 = Rural (including small towns, villages with population less than 100,000)
- 4 = Multiple urban areas
- 5 = Multiple rural areas
- 6 = Province/region listed, exact location unknown
- 7 = Nationwide. Effects several cities and rural areas
- -99 = location unknown

Issue 1 (categorical)
Given your informed impression of the event, what was the primary issue at stake in the conflict?
- 1 = elections
- 2 = economy, jobs
- 3 = food, water, subsistence
- 4 = environmental degradation
- 5 = ethnic discrimination, ethnic issues
- 6 = religious discrimination, religious issues
- 7 = education
- 8 = foreign affairs/relations
- 9 = domestic war, violence, terrorism
- 10 = human rights, democracy
- 11 = pro-government
- 12 = economic resources/assets
- 13 = other
- 14 = unknown, not-specified

Issue 2 (categorical)
Given your informed impression of the event, what was the secondary issue at stake (if any) in the conflict?
- 1 = elections
- 2 = economy, jobs
- 3 = food, water, subsistence
- 4 = environmental degradation
- 5 = ethnic discrimination, ethnic issues
- 6 = religious discrimination, religious issues
- 7 = education
- 8 = foreign affairs/relations
- 9 = domestic war, violence, terrorism
- 10 = human rights, democracy
- 11 = pro-government

- 12 = economic resources/assets
- 13 = other
- 14 = unknown, not-specified

Issue 3 (categorical)
Given your informed impression of the event, what was the tertiary issue at stake (if any) in the conflict?
- 1 = elections
- 2 = economy, jobs
- 3 = food, water, subsistence
- 4 = environmental degradation
- 5 = ethnic discrimination, ethnic issues
- 6 = religious discrimination, religious issues
- 7 = education
- 8 = foreign affairs/relations
- 9 = domestic war, violence, terrorism
- 10 = human rights, democracy
- 11 = pro-government
- 12 = economic resources/assets
- 13 = other
- 14 = unknown, not-specified

Issuenote (text)
A very brief description of the issue at stake.

Damage (categorical)
The amount of specific and direct damage done by the event (by actors/activists).
- 0 = no property damage
- 1 = minor property and economic damage
- 2 = significant property damage and/or economic impact
- 3 = substantial losses estimated upwards of multiple millions of dollars.

Econ_impact (categorical)
Broad economic impact of the event on the country.
- 0 = no economic impact
- 1 = minor economic impact
- 2 = significant economic impact on local or regional interests
- 3 = significant economic impact on the national economy

*Impact (*text)
Open text field to write in specific estimates or analyses of economic or political impacts.

Nsource(categorical)
Did more than one news article give information on the event?
- 1 = yes
- 0 = no

Notes (text)

This provides additional information about the event. It lists any irregularities in the case, difficulties in coding, discrepancies between sources, *etc.*

Sources (text)
Please list the sources you used to code this event here.

Additional Sources

Business and Human Rights Resource Centre (see country-specific news stories)
http://business-humanrights.org/

Minorities at Risk Data (global)
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp

Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (Middle East and North Africa only)
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp#quantitativemarob

Social Conflict in Africa Database
http://www.scaddata.org/

Swarthmore Global Non-Violent Action Database
http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/

Urban Social Disturbances in Africa and Asia http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Economic-and-Socio-Demographic/Urban-Social- Disturbance-in-Africa-and-Asia/

Violent Intranational Conflict Data Project (Colombia, Nigeria, Peru, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe)
http://mailer.fsu.edu/~whmoore/garnet-whmoore/vicdp/vicdp.html

Conflict Barometer
http://www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/index.html

Civil Resistance Bibliography and Case Studies
http://www.civilresistance.info/

Beyond Intractability)searchable website with a number of different types of resources)
http://www.beyondintractability.org/

General Encyclopedic Yearbooks/Almanacs (Reference Section at Penrose Library)

Revolutionary Movements in World History
D295 .R49 2006, v. 1-3

History Behind the Headlines: The Origins of Conflicts Worldwide
D410 .044 2001, v. 1-3

Encyclopedia of Human Rights
JC 571 .E673 2009, v. 1-5

Encyclopedia of Political Revolutions
JC 491 .E63 1998

Political Handbook of the World
JF37 .P6 (1930-1965; 1970; 1986; 1990)

Colonialism
HV .C59 2003

Region-or Case-Based Reference Sources (Reference Section at Penrose Library)

Encyclopedia of Modern Asia
DS4 .L48 2002, v. 1-6

Southeast Asia: Historical Encyclopedia from Angkor Wat to East Timor
DS 524 .S68 2004, v. 1-3

New Encyclopedia of Africa
DT2 .N48 2008, v. 1-5

World Encyclopedia of Political Parties and Systems, 2 vols.
Encyclopedia of Conflicts since WWII, 4 vols.

APPENDIX B: THE DATA DESCRIBED

To demonstrate how campaign-level data are devised, we provide a comparative description of the **incidents** and **episodes** identified during the data collection process. We define an **incident** as a discrete action in which civil society **actors** (including civilian groups, activists, NGOs, or community organizations) attempt to seek redress for grievances against corporate human rights abuses. They do this through actions such as protests, strikes, sit-ins, legal action, and other non-violent events directed at **targets** (corporations). Incidents may include a wide variety of activity, including a general anti-corporate protest, demonstrations, boycotts, human blockades, or a legal proceeding involving a specific corporation. For each incident, we coded the incident actor or group, date, location, the name of the incident target (business), the stated grievances, the type of tactic, the number of alleged participants, the duration of the incident (see Appendix A for the project's coding protocol). However, we also collected data on government behavior to account for the ways that the behavior of local or national government agencies affect relations between communities and corporations.

Terms Referring to Civil Society Actors	Terms Referring to Targets
Community groups	Corporations
Civic organizations	Firms
Labor unions	Subsidiaries
NGOs	Multinationals
Activists	Businesses

An **episode** is a set of immediate interactions that results from each incident, such as the way the target immediately responds, whether the incident escalates, or whether or not authorities repress the actors.[19] Each record includes both incident- and episode-level information about the type and date of incident, the actor and target of the incident, the opponent's posture, the involvement of third parties (including the government), and the outcome of the incident. We define a **campaign** as a series of episodes linked in coordinated fashion by the same set of actors toward the same goal.[20] A campaign begins when we observe the first related incident, and it ends when we observe the last related incident. Functionally, campaigns end when they are effectively suppressed, when participants obtain their preferred outcome (*e.g.,* concessions), or when they fizzle out. We identified specific campaigns by

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[19] Incidents and episodes are closely related. Incidents are simply the actions taken by the actor (*e.g.,* limited strike). Episodes are any subsequent happenings that flow immediately from that incident, including both escalation by the target (*e.g.,* repression) or the actor (*e.g.,* anti-government violence). If some activists staged a limited strike, the government cracks down, and some activists respond to the crackdown with immediate anti-government violence—and if all of this occurred in the same place on the same day—we would consider the limited strike the "incident," but would consider the limited strike, the repression, and the escalation to anti-government violence the "episode." We would mark the next incident as the next discrete incident (*i.e.,* a demonstration that starts on a new day). A campaign is a series of incidents and/or episodes linked together.
[20] We planned to identify campaign start and end dates by participation rates (*i.e.,* observed participation above 1,000 active participants), but this proved sub-optimal for several reasons. First, having such a high participation threshold in such localized conflicts would have excluded the vast majority of data. Second, the high threshold was unnecessary since we could observe start and ends dates of campaigns simply by evaluating their level of coordinated activity. The resultant dataset yields a much richer and more nuanced dataset than we could have produced if we had excluded cases with under 1,000 participants.

determining whether specific incidents are coordinated and linked to form some kind of coordinated activity.

For example, even though they were separate "incidents," the California Farm Workers' boycotts of businesses were part of the same overall campaign as Cesar Chavez's hunger strike. We linked related incidents together into campaigns so that we can separate these from one-off events. We determined whether episodes are related by whether they are organized by the same actors, with the same general goal, under the same general leadership or movement name, and whether they occur in the same general timeframe (*e.g.,* they are days or weeks apart). If incidents are more than one year apart with no activity in between, we coded them as separate incidents (not part of the same campaign). To identify linked incidents, we produced a unique campaign ID that associates related incidents to one another. For example, if a community group conducts a strike one day, a protest the next, and a sit-in the next, we would code each of these as separate incidents belonging to the same campaign. A general demonstration, with no linkages to other activities, would not count as a campaign *per se*. Below we provide descriptive statistics for each target country to illustrate the frequency with which we were able to identify organized civic action against corporations.

The dataset includes 840 incidents across South Africa, Nigeria, Mexico, and Indonesia. The database has 199 discrete campaigns, with coverage spanning from January 8, 1990 through August 29, 2014.[21]

As Figure 8 shows, the most commonly reported incidents are spontaneous demonstrations, followed by anti-government violence, limited strikes, and formal communications. **Spontaneous demonstrations** are distinct, continuous, and largely peaceful actions directed toward members of a distinct "other" group or government authorities. In this event, clear leadership or organization cannot be identified. **Anti-government violence** is identified as a violent event[22] waged primarily by a non-state group against government authorities or symbols of government authorities (*e.g.,* transportation or other infrastructures). The anti-government actor must have a semi-permanent or permanent militant wing or organization. **Limited strikes** occur when members of an organization or union engage in the abandonment of workplaces in limited sectors or industries. **Formal communication** can be identified through a group's direct communication of their grievances and/or demands to the opponent (*e.g.,* through the release of a written communication, through a press conference, or through direct communication via social media).

Organized non-violent actions include the following activities. A **meeting** is described as members of an organization convening with one another (and/or members of the community) to plan, prepare for, organize, or coordinate actions. **Parallel institutions** are identified when civilians create a new organization, institution, commission, or service. **Judicial action** is defined as litigation or the threat of litigation. Formal organizations and protest movements do not qualify; however, formal organizations or protest movements explicitly created as alternative or parallel institutions to those already available to the community do qualify. A **general strike** is when members of an organization or union engage in a total abandonment of workplaces and public facilities. An **organized demonstration** is a distinct, continuous, and largely peaceful action directed toward members of a distinct "other" group

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[21] Of these, we have firm-level data for 185 campaigns.

[22] Violence includes harming or threatening to physically harm another person. For our purposes, this includes damage to property.

or government authorities, where clear leadership or organization(s) can be identified. **Limited strikes** and **formal communication** are defined above.

Spontaneous demonstrations comprise only 2.74% of all recorded actions, whereas organized non-violent actions (meetings, issuing communications, bringing judicial action, limited strikes, general strikes, building parallel institutions, and organized demonstrations) together make up over 87% of the events. Violent incidents (spontaneous or otherwise) comprise 10.12% of the actions.

As Figure 9 illustrates, the most common targets of the incidents in our dataset are companies, followed by governments. The general community, NGOs, organized labor, and the UN are each targeted less than 1% of the time.

Figure 10 contains some interesting trends regarding the typical target posture for each incident. The model category is for targets to ignore the action—a stance they take over 57% of the time. However, the next most frequent response is to grant non-material concessions to the campaign, followed closely by material concessions. **Non-material concessions** are verbal or written communications, which may include public apologies or acknowledgement of wrongdoing. **Material concessions** are always tangible, physical assets. Together, targets accommodate the campaign materially or non-materially 25.5% of the time.

Occasionally, they adopt a repressive stance toward the movements. Targets employ **non-material repression** (criticism, threats, expressions of recalcitrance, *etc.*) under 5% of the time. **Non-lethal repression**, which includes any violation of one's physical integrity rights short of killing (arrests, crowd control techniques, beatings, *etc.*), occurs 2.38% of the time. It is quite uncommon that companies use direct **lethal repression**, which occurs only 1.31% of the time.

Overall, these descriptive trends suggest a rich evidentiary basis for testing the effects of non-violent action on corporate human rights behavior. First, we have assembled a large enough number of observations to make meaningful statistical inferences within and across cases. Second, these data are rich in detail and provide sufficient variation on both the independent and dependent variables (*i.e.,* movement strategy and target posture, respectively) to allow for hypothesis-testing. Third, the descriptive patterns provide several intriguing empirical puzzles, such as why targets yield to some movements and not others.

Below is a description of the number of incidents, episodes, and campaigns for each country in the data series, along with the dates of coverage.

Nigeria Descriptive Statistics (Figures 4 and 5)
189 incidents/episodes
17 campaigns
Coverage completed: September 15, 1993 – June 21, 2009

Mexico Descriptive Statistics (Figures 6 and 7)
217 incidents/episodes
93 campaigns
Coverage completed: January 8, 1990 – December 11, 2013

Indonesia Descriptive Statistics (Figures 8 and 9)
163 incidents/episodes
12 campaigns
Coverage completed: April 5, 1995 – December 1, 2013

South Africa Descriptive Statistics (Figures 10 and 11)
271 incidents/episodes
77 campaigns
Coverage completed: July 23, 1991 – August 29, 2014

**Figure 8: Count of Incident Types**

Figure 9: Distribution of Incident Targets (n=840)


**Figure 10: Frequency of Target Response Types**

Figure 11: Distrbution of Incident Types in Nigeria (n=189)

Figure 12: Distribution of Target Response Types in Nigeria (n=189)

Figure 13: Distrbution of Incident Types in Mexico (n=217)

Figure 14: Distribution of Target Response Types in Mexico (n=217)

Figure 15: Distrbution of Incident Types in Indonesia (n=163)

Figure 16: Distribution of Target Response Types in Indonesia (n=163)

Figure 17: Distrbution of Incident Types in South Africa (n=271)

Figure 18: Distribution of Target Response Types in South Africa (n=271)

APPENDIX C: MEASUREMENTS ON STATE DEPENDENCY & VITAL NATIONAL INDUSTRIES

The figures below highlight general trends in economic output across the four countries under investigation. Broad economic indicators are generic and do not offer industry-specific data for firms. Instead, we highlight general trends in the following sectors: services, agriculture, manufacturing, and industry. Included in the **service** industry are firms in transportation, communication, gas and electricity, finance, sanitation and works, public administration, and other general services. Included in the **agriculture** category are all agricultural products, livestock, and forestry. Included in the **industrial** category are mining, construction, wholesale trade, and retail trade. Included in the **manufacturing** category are textiles and apparel, timber, printing, chemicals, refineries, electronics, and other miscellaneous manufacturing. Categories are drawn from the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) scores (available for reference at: https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html).

These figures form the basis of our coding decisions for the "state dependency" variable of each firm in our dataset. We coded state dependency as a 1 if the firm was part of the top two industrial categories as a percentage of the country's aggregate GDP for that year. For instance, in Nigeria, agriculture and industry were the top two categories until 2010, when agriculture and services became the top two SIC categories. Starting in 2011, services and industry were the top two categories in Nigeria.

Figure 19: Economic Composition, Nigeria

Given the predominance of resource extraction in the four countries, we also include a second graph for each country that highlights the rents (as a percentage of GDP) garnered from oil, mineral and natural gas production.

Figure 20: Rents from Extractives, Nigeria

The coding of the state dependency variable is straightforward in Mexico, Indonesia, and South Africa, where services and industry are the top two categories for all years.

Figure 21: Economic Composition, Mexico

Figure 22: Rents from Extractives, Mexico

**Figure 23: Economic Composition, Indonesia**

Figure 24: Rents from Extractives, Indonesia

**Figure 25: Economic Composition, South Africa**

Figure 26: Rents from Extractives, South Africa